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The Brakes that Failed: Constitutional
Restriction of International
Agreements in France
Gerald L. Neumant
Can constitutions successfully constrain the exercise of the treaty power?
This article examines the French Constitution of 1958 as a case study. The
founders of the Fifth Republic drafted provisions intended to protect national
sovereignty, as the Gaullists understood that concept, against inroads resulting
from international agreements. Looking back fifty years later, it is clear that
those protective efforts did not succeed. The sequence of events by which the
constraints were loosened or evaded may represent one nation's particular his-
tory, but they illustrate the limited capacity of constitutional restrictions to
control international commitments in the long term.
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In 2008, the French Fifth Republic celebrated the fiftieth anniversary
of its origin in the Constitution of 1958. That same year, the Republic also
adopted a far-ranging set of constitutional amendments that included a
significant alteration in its methods of constitutional review. In particular,
the distinctive French system in which statutes are subject to review for
constitutionality at the moment of their enactment, but cannot later be
challenged as unconstitutional once the brief window for review has
closed, has been replaced by procedures permitting both a priori and post-
enactment constitutional review. The short-term and long-term
consequences of the 2008 amendments are uncertain, but a new era in
French constitutional law has definitely begun. This watershed provides
an appropriate occasion for looking back over the past half-century of legal
development.
This Article focuses on a particular aspect of that recent history: the
relationship between the Constitution and transnational cooperation,
especially the making of international agreements. Regarding this
relationship, Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote, "When we are
dealing with words that also are a constituent act . . . we must realize that
they have called into life a being the development of which could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters."I The
experience of the Fifth Republic may provide a potent illustration of the
inability of parchment barriers to restrain a political will to engage in
transnational institution-building.
1. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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I. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic
The Fifth Republic was born out of crisis, but its Constitution created
a stable political system that has undergone peaceful evolution for more
than half a century. That record contrasts strongly with the Fourth Repub-
lic, established by the Constitution of 1946 after the liberation of France.
In that parliament-dominated regime with a fractured Assembly, cabinets
fell roughly twice a year.2 General Charles de Gaulle found the system
incapable of providing France with the strong leadership he believed it
needed, and he withdrew from political life.3
His opportunity to return on favorable terms arose when the Republic
was threatened by its own army, rebelling against the prospect of
decolonization in Algeria.4 De Gaulle accepted the post of prime minister
and took on the dual assignment of governing and proposing a new consti-
tution.5 He chose as his Minister of Justice Michel Debre, a close associate
who had been working with the General on constitutional reform propos-
als since the 1940s. Debre led the drafting project and became "the princi-
pal author of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic."6 The draft had to be
negotiated with de Gaulle's coalition partners in the cabinet, taking into
account the views of a consultative committee appointed largely by the par-
liament and the advice of the Conseil d'Etat, before the final draft was sub-
mitted to referendum.7 The entire process, from authorization to popular
approval, was accomplished within four months.8
The leading innovations of the 1958 Constitution concerned the struc-
ture of the executive and legislative branches and the relations between
those branches. The Fifth Republic enshrined a "semi-presidential" system,
with a powerful head of state independent of the legislature and a prime
minister as head of the Government, responsible to the majority in the
National Assembly.9 At first, the President was indirectly elected, but de
Gaulle obtained a constitutional amendment in 1962 substituting direct
election, in the hope of giving his successors a mandate analogous to his
own personal authority.10 The Constitution also restrictively defines the
powers and procedures of both chambers of the legislature (the National
Assembly and the Senate). In Debr's model of "rationalized" parliamen-
2. See ROBERT ELGIE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 12 (2003).
3. See id. at 10-11.
4. See id. at 12-13.
5. See id. at 12-13.
6. ANNE STEVENS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE 48 (3d ed. 2003). For an
English account of the drafting process by a scholar who received privileged access at
the outset of his distinguished career, see Nicholas Wahl, The French Constitution of
1958: 11. The Initial Draft and Its Origins, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 358 (1959).
7. See Frangois Luchaire, Introduction, in LA CONSTTUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN-
CAISE 1, 3-4 (Franois Luchaire et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
8. See ELGIE, supra note 2, at 13.
9. See ELGIE, supra note 2, at 95. Where appropriate, I will use the capital letter to
distinguish the "Government," as that portion of the executive led by the Prime Minister,
from the government more generally.
10. See STEVENS, supra note 6, at 52-53; cf. infra note 69 (discussing the means by
which President de Gaulle obtained this amendment).
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tary procedure, the Government exercises substantial control over the legis-
lative agenda, and can employ techniques for streamlining the passage of
legislation." The Constitution provides that some international agree-
ments do not require legislative approval at all, while others must be
authorized by statute.' 2
A secondary innovation, which later transformed the character of
French constitutionalism, involved the creation of a Conseil constitutionnel
("Conseil"'13 ) as an independent body authorized to decide upon the consti-
tutionality of legislation. The original main purpose of the Conseil was to
enforce the reduction of legislative power by preventing the legislature from
invading the sphere assigned to the executive and by keeping legislative
procedures within the framework dictated by the Constitution.' 4
The Conseil is not technically a court, but rather an independent tribu-
nal. It has nine members, appointed for staggered nine-year terms.' 5 The
President of France, the President of the Senate, and the President of the
National Assembly each appoint three of the members. They need not be
lawyers, and are often senior politicians; other members have been profes-
sors, or have come from the civil or administrative courts.16 The main
functions of the Conseil today are constitutional review of legislation and
supervision of national elections.
Independent constitutional review departed from a long republican
tradition in France. Previously, legislation had been seen as embodying
the Rousseauian "general will," and the legislature had served as the expos-
itor and implementer of the Constitution. The laissez-faire period of U.S.
constitutionalism had only strengthened the criticism in France of a "gov-
ernment of judges." The legislature's judgments of constitutionality,
11. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17-19 (1992).
12. See 1958 CONST. art. 53 ("Peace treaties, trade agreements, treaties or agreements
relating to international organization, those committing the finances of the State, those
modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law, those relating to the status of
persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory . . .");
Pierre Michel Eisenmann & Raphaele Rivier, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in
NATIONAL TREATY LAw AND PRACTICE 253, 259-60 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005). In
some cases, a referendum may substitute for legislative approval. Id. at 261-62; see infra
note 65.
13. For brevity, I will often refer to the Conseil constitutionnel as the "Conseil." For
clarity, I will never refer to any other body as simply "the Conseil" (e.g., the Conseil
d'Etat). Also for clarity, I will use the French term "Conseil," rather than "Council," in
order to distinguish it from various European "Councils" to be mentioned later. See
infra note 114.
14. BELL, supra note 11, at 27-29.
15. 1958 CONST. art. 56. In addition, former presidents of the Republic are eligible
to sit on the Conseil as ex officio members if they are not otherwise serving in govern-
ment. Id. This practice fell into disuse after 1962, but was revived by former President
Valkry Giscard d'Estaing in 2004. Subsequently both he and former President Jacques
Chirac have participated from time to time. The inclusion of former presidents has long
been criticized as in tension with the increasing judicialization of the Conseil, but a pro-
posal to abolish presidential participation failed in 2008. See Michel Verpeaux, La revi-
sion constitutionnelle a I'arrache, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE-EDITION GENERALE, No. 31-35,
July 30, 2008, 18.
16. BELL, supra note 11, at 34-36,
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implicit in the enactment of a statute, were authoritative, and the statute
operated as a "screen" (the loi-ecran) that judges were not authorized to
look behind.17
The Fifth Republic's less reverent attitude toward Parliament allowed
for the creation and gradual expansion of constitutional review. Unlike
both the U.S. style of judicial review in the ordinary courts and the Aus-
trian style of a specialized constitutional court, the Conseil's procedure of
constitutional review was limited to a priori examination of statutes during
the brief period between their enactment by the legislature and their offi-
cial promulgation.' Initially, Article 61 of the Constitution empowered
only four principal political officers (the President, the Prime Minister, the
President of the Senate, and the President of the National Assembly) to
refer statutes to the Conseil constitutionnel for review.' 9 A very important
constitutional amendment in 1974 extended this power of referral to
groups of sixty senators or sixty members of the National Assembly, thus
opening the path to the Conseil constitutionnel to the parliamentary opposi-
tion and greatly increasing its caseload. But neither individuals nor judges
could refer cases before the 2008 amendments, and laws once promulgated
were immune from direct challenge. 20
In 1971, the Conseil constitutionnel held that it could evaluate statutes
for their conformity to principles referenced in the Preamble to the 1958
Constitution, and not just to the numbered articles of the Constitution
itself.2 This recasting of the Conseil's role inaugurated a jurisprudence of
constitutionally protected rights, derived from such sources as the 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the Preamble to the 1946
Constitution, and even the legislation of the earlier Republics, all indicated
directly or indirectly by the 1958 Preamble.
These changes in the function of the Conseil illustrate the evolution of
de Gaulle's Constitution after de Gaulle himself passed from the scene.
Some features of the regime as initially designed have proved resilient,
while others have been modified, with or without express amendment.
A similar observation could be made about the term "Gaullist," which
once denoted loyalty to the General and some subset of his political ideas,
but in later years has been harder to define. As a party label, it covers a
sequence of reorganized and redesignated political parties-UNR, UDR,
17. See Martin A. Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of International
Tribunals in the United States and France: Reflections on Recent Practice, 58 ME. L. REv.
406, 466 (2006).
18. BELL, supra note 11, at 32-33.
19. BELL, supra note 11, at 29. A restricted set of "organic statutes" (lois organiques),
are subject to mandatory referral, as are rules of procedure (reglements) of the National
Assembly and the Senate. Id. at 31.
20. As will be discussed later, the Conseil constitutionnel later adopted a doctrine that
partly circumvents this immunity, allowing provisions of previously enacted laws to be
challenged indirectly when laws amending those provisions are before the Conseil for a
priori review.
21. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 71-44 DC,
July 16, 1971; see ELGIE, supra note 2, at 187.
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RPR, UMP 22-none of which included the General's name in their official
title. As a current of political thought, characteristic themes of "Gaullism"
have included the independence and greatness of the French nation, the
strength and stability of the state, and a degree of social solidarity.23 How-
ever, positions on these issues have varied within the party and across
decades, and, occasionally, it may be useful to distinguish "traditional
Gaullists" from the "neo-Gaullists" who eventually outnumbered them.2 4
Debre shared de Gaulle's emphasis on the status of France as an inde-
pendent power that should not be subservient to other great powers or
shackled by overly constraining treaties and alliances. In the European
regional context, de Gaulle and Debr's preferred vision was a loose inter-
governmental cooperation among sovereign states, and not a federal or
supranational Europe.25
The early 1950s proposal of a European Defence Community (EDC)
cast a long shadow over future debates. The EDC originated in a French
initiative for a common European defense force that would protect West
Germany, instead of permitting the Germans to rearm and join NATO.
Under U.S. influence, the initiative evolved into a proposed merger of six
nations' armed forces, including German forces, into a single European
army controlled by an explicitly "supranational" commissariat. 26 The
EDC Treaty would not have totally abolished separate national armed
forces, but would have limited their size and functions; its effect would
have gone far beyond the loaning of contingents to a supplemental Euro-
pean army. The Treaty received legislative approval in West Germany and
the Benelux states, but provoked heated debate in France. The Gaullists,
among others, condemned the treaty as inimical to French national sover-
eignty and unconstitutional. The National Assembly rejected the EDC by a
substantial majority in August 1954.27
Although de Gaulle opposed the structural arrangements of the treaty
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), he welcomed
some of the economic policies it embodied, and he did not attempt to repu-
diate it once the Fifth Republic began. Instead, he exerted pressure within
the institutions to make the EEC operate more by consensus than by the
majoritarian process that the treaty established on certain issues.28 This
22. These initials stand for, in chronological succession, Union pour la nouvelle
Republique, Union des Democrates pour la Republique, Rassemblement pour la Republique,
and both Union pour une Majorite Presidentielle and Union pour un Mouvement Populaire.
These continual changes make the initials unsuitable for narrative purposes in this
article.
23. See ANDREW KNAPP, GAULLISM SINCE DE GAULLE 454-55 (1994).
24. Id. at 395.
25. See ALAIN GUYOMARCH ET AL., FRANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 21 (1998).
26. See Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community art. 20, May 26,
1952, reprinted in S. EXECS. Q & R, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 173 (1952) (unofficial trans-
lation); see generally Gerhard Bebr, European Defence Community and the North Atlantic
Alliance, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 637 (1954).
27. Gerhard Bebr, The European Defence Community and the Western European Union:
An Agonizing Dilemma, 7 STAN. L. REV. 169, 173 (1955).
28. GUYOMARCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 24-25.
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strategy resulted in the "empty chair crisis" of 1965, when France boy-
cotted meetings of the EEC Council of Ministers, and the Luxembourg
Compromise of 1966, an informal side agreement enabling states to block
action on measures that adversely affected what they considered vital
national interests.2 9
Debre had condemned the EEC Treaty as a member of the upper
chamber in 1957,30 and resistance to supranationality became a hallmark
of his career. Understandably, he fought to include provisions that would
inhibit the sacrifice of national sovereignty in the 1958 Constitution. The
frustration of his purpose over time will be the major theme of this Article.
II. Constitutional Restrictions-In Theory
Michel Debre described in his memoirs his struggle with his "suprana-
tional adversaries" in the drafting of the provisions on international rela-
tions in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. 3 1 Three points of
comparison between the 1958 and 1946 Constitutions call for attention
here: first, the revised treatment of the place of treaties in the hierarchy of
norms; second, the continuing effects of provisions on international law
and organizations in the 1946 Preamble; and third, the creation of a new
mechanism for resolving doubts about the constitutionality of an interna-
tional agreement.
A. Article 55 and Treaty Enforcement
Debre sought to weaken the effect of treaties in the domestic legal sys-
tem, but he achieved only a partial retreat from the provisions of the 1946
Constitution. Prior to 1946, France had followed a "dualist" approach to
treaties, distinguishing their international legal force from their domestic
legal force and requiring a separate decree of presidential promulgation to
give a ratified treaty domestic effect.3 2 The drafters in 1946 pursued a
more "monist" approach: Article 26 of the 1946 Constitution gave ratified
treaties domestic legal force from the moment of their publication.3 3 Fur-
thermore, Article 28 directed that duly ratified and published treaties had
29. Desmond Dinan, Fifty Years of European Integration: A Remarkable Achievement,
31 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1118, 1129 (2008).
30. The upper chamber of the Fourth Republic was called the Conseil de la Rpub-
lique. It regained the traditional name of Senat in the Fifth Republic.
31. MICHEL DEBRE, TROIS REPUBLIQUES POUR UNE FRANCE: MEMOIRES 1946-1958, at
383 (Tome 2, 1988) ("Mes adversaires supranationaux, c'est-5-dire les juristes col-
laborateurs ou disciples de Jean Monnet . . . .").
32. NGUYEN Quoc DINH, PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUB-
LIc 231 (7th ed. 2002).
33. Id. at 231-32. The requirement of publication has usually been met by publica-
tion in theJournal Officiel. For secondary norms issued by certain international organi-
zations, French practice also treats publication in the official journal of the organization
as sufficient. See CONSEIL D'ETAT, LA NORME INTERNATIONALE EN DROIT FRANCAIs 53
(2000). Admittedly, the difference between executive publication and the prior practice
of presidential promulgation is subtle. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 239.
Allowing publication by the international organization to give an international obliga-
tion domestic force is more clearly "monist."
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authority superior to statutes.3 4 It did not, however, specify the mecha-
nism for enforcing that superiority.
Debre omitted both these provisions from his initial draft of articles
on international relations for the 1958 Constitution, and he strongly criti-
cized the proposal by others to reinstitute the superiority of treaties over
statutes. 3 5 The drafting history reveals a continuing struggle among those
who opposed the superiority of treaties, those who adhered to the monist
legacy of the Fourth Republic, and those who regarded some priority for
treaties as necessary for constructing the European communities. 3 6 Debra
accepted a compromise that conditioned the superiority of treaties on
actual compliance by treaty partners, and he resisted attempts to make this
test of reciprocity easier to satisfy. The resulting text of Article 55 provides:
Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication,
prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, in regard to each agreement or
treaty, to its application by the other party.37
The Government overrode warnings that this reciprocity condition would
create uncertainties and obstruct compliance, particularly with regard to
multilateral treaties.3 8 One example prominently mentioned to illustrate
the value of the reciprocity requirement involved noncompliance by the
United States with NATO obligations regarding exemption from
conscription.3 9
34. 1946 CONsT. art. 28.
35. See Louis Favoreu, Le droit international, in L'ECRITURE DE LA CONSTITUTION DE
1958, at 577, 585 (1992) [hereinafter ECRITURE]; L'Avant-projet de Constitution prepare L
la mi-juin 1958, in 1 COMITE NATIONAL CHARGE DE LA PUBLICATION DES TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA V' REPUBLIQUE: DOCUMENTS POUR SERVIR A L HISTOIRE
DE L ELABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION Du 4 OCTOBRE 1958, at 251, 256 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter DPS 1]; Compte rendu de la reunion du groupe de travail du 8 juillet 1958, in DPS I, at
381-82. In citing documents from the drafting history, I should mention that most of
the documents were originally confidential, and were not revealed to the public until
years later.
36. See Favoreu, supra note 35, at 591-92; Debat, in ECRITURE, supra note 35, at
597-99 (remarks of Raymond Janot and Francois Luchaire).
37. 1958 CONST. art. 55; see Favoreu, supra note 35, at 586-88, 591.
38. See, e.g., 2 COMITE NATIONAL CHARGE DE LA PUBLICATION DES TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA V' REPUBLIQUE: DOCUMENTS POUR SERVIR A L HISTOIRE
DE L'ELABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, at 133 (1987) [hereinafter
DPS II] (remarks of Pierre-Henri Teitgen); 3 COMITE NATIONAL CHARGE DE LA PUBLICATION
DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA V" REPUBLIQUE: DOCUMENTS POUR
SERVIR A L'HISTOIRE DE L'ELABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, at 370-371
(1987) [hereinafter DPS Ill] (remarks of Frangois Luchaire).
39. See DPS II, supra note 38, at 529-30; 4 COMITE NATIONAL CHARGE DE LA PUBLICA-
TION DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA V' REPUBLIQUE: DOCUMENTS POUR
SERVIR A L'HISTOIRE DE L'LLABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, at 187
(1987) [hereinafter DPS IV]. The discussions referred to a dispute between France and
the United States in the early 1950s over conscription of French nationals residing in the
United States who had already performed military service in France, which was charac-
terized as U.S. failure to implement a treaty obligation. Whether that description accu-
rately summarized the earlier dispute may be less important than the fact that the
drafters of the 1958 Constitution thought it did.
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The 1958 Constitution also did not specify how the superior authority
of treaties would be enforced. The Cour de Cassation (the supreme French
court in civil and criminal matters) had long applied subsequent treaties as
prevailing over earlier statutes, on a theory of implicit legislative authoriza-
tion.40 But neither the Cour de Cassation nor the Conseil d'Etat (the
supreme administrative court) had regarded themselves as permitted to
enforce the priority of earlier treaties over subsequent statutes under the
1946 Constitution. The high respect for laws enacted by the representa-
tives of the people had led the administrative courts to treat later statutes as
a "screen," blocking resort to earlier treaties, just as respect for statutes
precluded the courts from judging their conformity to the Constitution
(the doctrine of the loi-ecran). This jurisprudence carried over, at least ini-
tially, into the first decades of the Fifth Republic.4 1 Some commentators
hypothesized that the new Conseil constitutionnel would enforce the superi-
ority of treaties by preventing inconsistent statutes from coming into effect
because they would be unconstitutional under Article 55.42 This mecha-
nism would operate, however, only if the statute were referred to the Con-
seil constitutionnel by an authorized official immediately after its passage.
(As it turned out, the Conseil constitutionnel disclaimed jurisdiction to
enforce Article 55 in this manner.) Thus, at the outset of the Fifth Repub-
lic, it appeared that respect for earlier treaties would depend primarily on
the self-restraint of the legislature. In reality, changes in interpretation over
time resulted in routine enforcement of treaties by the courts and the hol-
lowing out of the reciprocity proviso.
B. The Uncertain Legacy of the 1946 Preamble
Another legacy of the 1946 Constitution passed into the 1958 Consti-
tution in a more indirect and precarious manner. The Preamble to the
1946 Constitution had begun by proclaiming that human beings had ina-
lienable rights, solemnly reaffirming the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen as well as "the fundamental principles recognized by
the laws of the Republic."4 3 It then proclaimed a set of "political, eco-
nomic, and social principles particularly necessary for our times," which
supplemented the 1789 Declaration with economic and social rights.4 4
That set also included two provisions signaling the good citizenship of
France in the post-war international order:
[' 14] Faithful to its traditions, the French Republic shall comply with pub-
lic international law. It shall never undertake any war of conquest, and
never deploy its forces against the freedom of any people.
40. See Philippe Manin, The Nicolo case of the Conseil d'Etat: French Constitutional
Law and the Supreme Administrative Court's Acceptance of the Primacy of Community Law
over Subsequent National Statute Law, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 499, 501-02 (1991).
41. Id. at 502-03.
42. See MAURICE DUVERGER, INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES FT DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL
651-52 (5th ed. 1960).
43. 1946 CONST. pmbl., 1.
44. Id.
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[( 15] Subject to reciprocity, France shall consent to those limitations on
sovereignty necessary for the organization and defense of peace 4 5
A series of contingent events would later give Paragraph 15 great impor-
tance in the constitutional law of the Fifth Republic.
The text of the 1958 Constitution contains no specific "bill of rights."
Instead, the text includes a few rights-related provisions and, like the 1946
Preamble, the 1958 Preamble makes reference to earlier constitutional
documents:
The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man
and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of
1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of
1946 ... 46
The drafters of the 1958 Constitution chose to adopt what one participant
called a "preamble of references" 4 7 for several reasons. In part, the choice
was practical: time was short, and drafting a new declaration of rights and
principles would lead to divisive debates and delay. Moreover, it was said
to be contrary to French tradition to have a bill of rights drafted by a ruling
Government (as the new Constitution would be) rather than an elected
constituent assembly. Third, most of the drafters regarded the Preamble as
motivational rather than legally binding. Under these circumstances,
incorporation by reference could reassure voters in the upcoming referen-
dum, without compromising the institutional reforms that de Gaulle and
Debre were pursuing. Some also considered the mention of prior bills of
rights as a means of complying with a mandate in the statute that had
authorized the drafting of a new Constitution.4 8
Whether the reference to the 1946 Preamble included Paragraph 15,
or indeed whether it included all the social rights, was not clear to every-
one. At a few points in the drafting history, questions of this kind were
raised,4 9 and somewhat vague assurances were given.5 0 The president of
the consultative committee expressly linked Paragraph 15 to the project of
European integration.5 1 The notion that sovereignty could be limited by
voluntary adhesion to an international organization might have been one
45. Id. 1 14, 15.
46. 1958 CONST. pmbl. In 2005, the Preamble was modified to add to this sentence
a reference to another bloc of norms, "the Charter of the Environment of 2004," which
was adopted as part of the same amendment, but not incorporated into the text of the
Constitution. See Loi constitutionnelle 2005-205 du ler mars 2005, JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANcAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF FRANCE], Mar. 2, 2005, p. 3697.
47. DPS 1I, supra note 38, at 448 (remarks of Paul Coste-Floret on "pr~ambule de
rifrences"); see Bruno Genevois, Le priambule et les droits fondamentaux, in ECRTuRE,
supra note 35, at 483, 485.
48. Genevois, supra note 47, at 484. The legislation had set forth a few parameters
for the future Constitution, including a mandate that the judiciary should remain inde-
pendent to assure the observance of essential liberties as defined by the preamble of the
1946 Constitution and by the Declaration of the Rights of Man, to which it referred.
49. See DPS II, supra note 38, at 77, 255; DPS Ill, supra note 38, at 288; Genevois,
supra note 47, at 489.
50. DPS II, supra note 38, at 95; DPS II, supra note 38, at 289.
51. DPS II, supra note 38, at 77.
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of the "principles of national sovereignty" indicated by the 1958 Preamble,
particularly after an unexplained change in the text from "principle" to
"principles."52
The original purpose of Paragraph 15 in 1946 had been to authorize
French participation in the United Nations, in conformity with the obliga-
tions of the U.N. Charter.5 3 The possible relevance of that paragraph's
acceptance of "limitations on sovereignty" to arrangements for regional
cooperation in Europe had been raised in 1954 in connection with the
debate on the European Defense Community.5 4 When the referendum on
the new Constitution was held in September 1958, Jean Monnet pointed to
the preservation of Paragraph 15 and its implications for European inte-
gration as one of the reasons for voting in favor.55 But these interpreta-
tions were debatable, and prevailed only later when the Conseil
constitutionnel had attributed legal force to the 1958 Preamble and the texts
it referenced.56
It should be emphasized here, as it will be again later, that, prior to
1992, the French Constitution contained no provision specifically address-
ing European regional cooperation in general, or European Community
law in particular. Articles expressly dealing with Europe were added only
in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, when the Conseil constitutionnel held
for the first time that ratifying a treaty would require a constitutional
amendment.5 7 Prior to that time, constitutional analysis concerning
Europe proceeded on the basis of broader provisions concerning interna-
tional law, treaties, and international cooperation.
C. Article 54 and Treaty Ratification
The 1958 Constitution included an important mechanism for assur-
ing the supremacy of the Constitution-and thereby national sovereignty-
over treaties. (For simplicity, I will refer to treaties here, although the pro-
cedure covers a potentially broader category of "international commit-
ments" (engagements internationaux)).5 8 Article 54 allows the submission
52. Cf. Genevois, supra note 47, at 489 n.2 (noting the change).
53. See Thibaut de Berranger, L'alinea 15 du Preambule de 1946, in LE PREAMBULE DE
LA CONSTITUTION DE 1946: HISTOIRE, ANALYSE ET COMMENTAIRES 357, 359 (Gerard Conac et
al. eds., 2001).
54. See id. at 366; Georges Vedel, Letter to the Editor, LE MONDE,June 15, 1954, at 6,
reprinted in La querelle constitutionnelle sur la Communaute Europeenne de Defense, 16
DROITS 101, 112 (1992). Vedel was a professor of constitutional law and later an impor-
tant member of the Conseil constitutionnel.
55. See Jean Monnet, M. Jean Monnet explique dans une declaration au "Monde" pour-
quot it votera finalement "oui", LE MONDE, Sept. 11, 1958, at 1, 3; Berranger, supra note
53, at 357, 359-60.
56. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
57. See infra Parts III.A.2.d, 1.A.2.f.
58. Moreover, in the semi-presidential system of France, a technical distinction exists
between "treaties" (traites), which are "ratified" by the President, and "accords"
(accords), which are "approved" by the Government (usually the Minister of Foreign
Affairs). The terms are not always used precisely, and they do not track the distinction
between agreements that do and do not require legislative authorization. See Pierre
Michel Eisenmann & Catherine Kessedjian, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in
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of treaties to the Conseil constitutionnel for a ruling on their compatibility
with the Constitution before their ratification, and provides that if the Con-
seil constitutionnel finds a clause in conflict with the Constitution, then the
treaty cannot be ratified without a prior constitutional amendment. 59 The
current text reads:
If the Constitutional Council, on a reference from the President of the
Republic, from the Prime Minister, from the President of one or the other
assembly, or from sixty deputies or sixty senators, has declared that an inter-
national commitment contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, author-
ization to ratify or approve the international commitment in question may
be given only after amendment of the Constitution. 6 0
(The phrase authorizing deputies or senators to initiate a reference under
Article 54 was added in 1992.)61
Article 54 originated in a suggestion by the Legal Adviser of the For-
eign Ministry, Andre Gros, that prior debates on the constitutionality of
certain treaties might motivate the inclusion of a provision similar to one in
the Netherlands constitution. 62 Michel Debre implemented this suggestion
in his mid-July drafts, specifying that the authorization to ratify a treaty
with a clause contrary to the Constitution could result only from a consti-
tutional amendment. 63 The express mention of referral to the Conseil con-
stitutionnel was accepted as a friendly amendment clarifying the intent of
the provision.64
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, UNITED
KINGDOM 1-2 (Monroe Leigh & Merritt R. Blakeslee eds., 1995). 1 will generally use the
term "treaty" in the broad sense of international law, embracing all international agree-
ments, whether they are traites or accords. Nonetheless, the distinction between traites
and accords will become relevant in one passage. See infra note 294 and accompanying
text.
59. Technically, there may be three available courses of action: to refrain from ratify-
ing the treaty, to amend the Constitution and then ratify the treaty, or to ratify the treaty
subject to reservations excluding the constitutionally unacceptable obligations, assum-
ing the particular treaty permits such reservations.
60. 1958 CONsT. art. 54.
61. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
62. See Projet de lettre relatif aux relations internationales du 26juin 1958, in DPS I,
supra note 35, at 287, 289. A provision had been added in 1953 to the Netherlands
constitution, enabling treaties that conflicted with the constitution to be ratified with the
approval of a two-thirds vote in both chambers of the legislature (the same supermajority
required for a constitutional amendment). See Jonkheer H.F. van Panhuys, The Nether-
lands Constitution and International Law, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 537, 550 (1953). Andre Gros
was the Legal Adviser (Jurisconsulte) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1947 until
1963, when he was elected to the International Court of Justice. Debre praised him in
his memoirs as a patriot, a Gaullist, and an ally in the struggle with the disciples ofJean
Monnet in the drafting process. See DEBRE, supra note 31, at 383-84.
63. See Avant-projet de Constitution du 15juillet 1958, art. 46, in DPS 1, supra note 35,
at 429, 437. At several stages of the drafting, the rule also applied to treaties that contra-
dicted organic statutes (which could then be ratified only after amendment of the
organic statute), but this parallel restriction was ultimately dropped. See DPS 111, supra
note 38, at 369.
64. See DPS II, supra note 38, at 125, 134-35. The modification was proposed by
the MRP deputy Paul Coste-Floret, subsequently a member of the Conseil constitutionnel.
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The operative significance of Article 54 may be judged in part by the
contrast between the procedures required for ratifying a treaty and the pro-
cedures required for amending the Constitution. Briefly put, both treaty
ratification and constitutional amendment are easier in France than in the
United States. Legislative authorization to ratify a treaty usually involves
an ordinary statute; if the Senate demurs, the National Assembly can still
enact the statute by a simple majority in the National Assembly.65 Moreo-
ver, Article 49(3) permits the Government to take the extraordinary step of
making the adoption of a bill an issue of its responsibility before the
National Assembly, in which case the bill becomes law unless the National
Assembly denies the Government its confidence.6 6 Amending the Consti-
tution is more difficult, because it requires the concurrence of simple
majorities in the National Assembly and the Senate, and then a final adop-
tion in a joint session or "Congress" (Congres) by the moderate
supermajority of three-fifths.67 Given that the voters in the Congress are
the same people who voted in the chambers, the amendment process can
move relatively quickly.68 The President also has a different option:
65. See 1958 CONST. art. 45(4); ELGIE, supra note 2, at 157-58; Jean Dhommeaux, Le
role du parlement dans I'elaboration des engagements internationaux: Continuite et change-
ments, 103 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1448, 1475-78 (1987) (describing the use of this
procedure for treaties).
Some international agreements can be adopted by the executive without any role for
either branch of the legislature (thus, even more easily), but the extent to which Article
54 applies to such agreements is unsettled. See infra Part III.A.1. In some cases, a refer-
endum may substitute for legislative approval. Eisenmann & Rivier, supra note 12 at
261 -62; see 1958 CONsT. art. 11 (permitting the President to submit to referendum the
approval of a treaty that "although not contrary to the Constitution, would affect the
functioning of the institutions"). As of 2008, only three such referenda have been held:
in 1972 and 1992 (successfully, on the admission of the UK, Ireland and Denmark to
the EEC, and on the Maastricht Treaty, respectively), and in 2005 (unsuccessfully, on
the European Constitution Treaty). France ratified the Lisbon Treaty, which replaced
the European Constitution Treaty, in 2008, without a referendum. See Laurence
Burgorgue-Larsen, Article 53, in LA CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE 1308,
1310 n.14 (Luchaire et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009). The 1992 and 2005 referenda were held
after constitutional amendments had eliminated any contrariety between the treaties
and the constitution. A special rule was added in 2005 (and amended in 2008) contem-
plating a referendum on the future admission of member states to the EU (e.g., Turkey).
See infra note 521.
66. See BELL, supra note 11, at 116-18. This provision was amended in 2008 to limit
the frequency with which the Government can employ this tactic. See 1958 CONST. art.
49(3).
67. 1958 CoNsT. art. 89. Until 2008, the Constitution did not address the absolute
or relative sizes of the Senate and the National Assembly, but there have always been
fewer senators than deputies altogether, and, therefore, the senators have been numeri-
catty inferior in the Congress. The July 2008 amendment set maximum numbers for the
two chambers: 577 for the National Assembly and 348 for the Senate. 1958 CONST. art.
24.
68. The Congress method of amendment has traditionally involved a joint meeting
of the two chambers at Versailles rather than Paris (although the Constitution does not
expressly demand this relocation). As examples of the swiftness that will be discussed
later, the highly contentious amendment authorizing ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty was adopted less than three months after the Conseil constitutionnel declared it
necessary; an August 1993 decision protecting the right to asylum was overturned in
less than four months; and the 2008 amendment authorizing the ratification of the Lis-
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instead of convening the Congress, the President can choose to submit the
amendment to popular referendum, where a majority of votes will suf-
fice. 69 The Congress method has been employed most frequently-for all
but two of the twenty-four amendments adopted through 2008.70
Thus, Article 54-when it is invoked-can substantially raise the hur-
dles to the ratification of a treaty but does not pose an insuperable barrier.
The amending process has not been inhibited by a culture of reverence for
the text per se: the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has been amended
more frequently since 1958 than the U.S. Constitution has since 1792.n1
And, unlike the German Basic Law, the French Constitution places few
limits on the amending power. Substantively, it forbids only amendments
that would undo "the republican form of government"; and, as will be dis-
cussed later, the Conseil constitutionnel eventually denied that it had juris-
diction to enforce even that limitation on the constituent power.72
bon Treaty on the European Union followed less than two months after the Conseil
confirmed than an amendment was necessary.
69. 1958 CONST. art. 89. A third procedure, by which the President bypasses the
legislature and submits a desired constitutional amendment directly to popular referen-
dum under Article 11 of the Constitution, has been used only twice, by President de
Gaulle: in 1962 (for direct election of the President) and in 1969 (unsuccessfully, for
decentralization and for restructuring of the Senate). De Gaulle made each referendum
a vote on confidence in himself, and resigned when the 1969 referendum failed. See
Gerard Conac & Jacques Le Gall, Article 11, in LA CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN-
CiAISE 402, 453-57 (Luchaire et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
Whether the Constitution really authorizes this method is traditionally disputed. The
Conseil constitutionnel confidentially advised de Gaulle that it did not, and after he pro-
ceeded anyway, the Conseil dismissed a referral of the resulting law on the ground that it
lacked jurisdiction to review provisions adopted by referendum. CC decision No. 62-
20 DC, Nov. 6, 1962. See LES GRANDES DELIBtRATIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL
1958-1983, at 99, 113 (B. Mathieu et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter GRANDES DELIBERA-
TIONS] (publishing the Conseil's deliberations on this affair).
70. In fact, the Article 89 referendum has been used only once: for the amendment
in 2002 that shortened the term of the President from seven years to five years in order
to decrease the likelihood of cohabitation. De Gaulle submitted amendments directly to
a non-Article 89 referendum in 1962 (successfully) and in 1969 (unsuccessfully). See
supra note 69.
Counting amendments is a bit tricky, because sometimes a single amending law (loi
constitutionnelle) contains unrelated provisions, and sometimes more than one amend-
ing law is approved at the same Congress. Amendments are normally incorporated into
the text of the Constitution rather than listed separately at the end as in the United
States. The figure twenty-four results from treating each adopted amending law as a
unit, as is conventional in France. The constitutional amendment adopted in July 2008
consisted of forty-seven sections, modifying or adding more than forty articles of the
Constitution.
The text of Article 89 appears to make the referendum rather than the Congress the
normal method, but practice has been otherwise. Moreover, the President has discretion
over whether to proceed after the two chambers have voted, and some proposed amend-
ments have been abandoned at that stage.
71. In contrast to the twenty-four times the 1958 Constiution has been amended, the
U.S. Constitution has only been amended seventeen times since 1792.
72. See CC decision No. 2003-469 DC, Mar. 26, 2003, discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 391-392. Procedurally, amendments are not permitted during a vacancy of
the Presidency or a state of emergency. See 1958 CONsT. arts. 7, 16, 89(4); CC decision
No. 92-312 DC, Sept. 2, 1992; Pascal Jan, Article 89, in LA CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUB-
LIQUE FRANCAISE 1991, 1993 (Luchaire et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
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III. Constitutional Restrictions- In Practice
The operation of the constitutional constraints in practice has
reflected the interplay of domestic politics and external pressures with the
institutional structure. After the death of Georges Pompidou in 1974, the
Presidency passed into non-Gaullist hands-first, the more Euro-friendly
Valery Giscard d'Estaing and then the Socialist Fran<ois Mitterrand-
before returning to the neo-Gaullists Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.
France's options in diplomacy and law were affected by external factors
such as decolonization, the oil price shock of 1974, the collapse of the
post-war monetary system, international economic competition, the rise of
the human rights regime, the activism of the European Court of Justice,
and the demise of the Soviet bloc.
This part of the Article examines the evolution of constitutional prac-
tice between 1958 and 2008 by dividing that half-century into two periods:
up to and after 1992. The episode justifying this division involved the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union. In 1992, the Conseil constitutionnel
found for the first time that an international commitment could not be
ratified without a constitutional amendment, and, as a result, provisions
specifically addressing European integration were added to the 1958 Con-
stitution.73 The basic theme for the first period is how deeply France was
able to commit itself internationally without a constitutional amendment.
The basic theme for the second period is how the permissive legacy of the
first period received further development after the Conseil constitutionnel
had begun to require constitutional amendments for certain treaties; it will
appear that the Conseil and the courts continued prior accommodations to
international agreements, and found new ones, while also creating some
moderate impediments.
Before commencing the first period, a few additional comments about
political institutions may be helpful. It turned out that the Fifth Republic
would experience several forms of divided government. Sometimes the
President's party (or coalition) has enjoyed solid support in both the
National Assembly and the Senate. At other times, a party or coalition
opposed to the President holds the majority in the National Assembly and,
therefore, supplies the Prime Minister and the Government. This "cohabi-
tation" of adverse executives occurred three times before a constitutional
amendment rendered it less probable.74
Additionally, a President and Prime Minister from the same party or
coalition may lack the support of the Senate, which was created as a delib-
erative counterweight to the National Assembly. The Senate is indirectly
73. See infra Parts III.A.2.d, Ill.A.2.f.
74. A constitutional amendment adopted in 2000 reduced the President's term of
office from seven years to five years, facilitating coordination of elections for the Presi-
dent and the National Assembly and thereby decreasing the likelihood that cohabitation
will recur. See ELGIE, supra note 2, at 126. The three cohabitations in the Fifth Republic
were Mitterrand/Chirac (1986-1988), Mitterrand/Balladur (1993-1995), and Chirac/
Jospin (1997-2002).
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elected by "colleges" composed mainly of local and regional officials.75
Throughout the period from 1958 to 2008, overrepresentation of rural
areas in the electoral scheme resulted in a structural right-wing majority,
though often not a specifically Gaullist majority.7 6 The Senate developed
an unexpected oppositional role in the years of de Gaulle's presidency, and
the three Presidents of the Senate prior to 1998 were all from small center
or center-right parties. The rightward slant of the Senate made it harder for
parties of the left to achieve constitutional amendments than for parties of
the right, and in fact, no constitutional amendments were adopted during
Frangois Mitterrand's first decade as President.77
The centrist character of the Senate President over four decades has
other implications for this article, because the 1958 Constitution vested
that office with the power to appoint three of the nine members of the
Conseil constitutionnel.78 Gaston Monnerville, who served as Senate Presi-
dent from the beginning until 1968,79 and Alain Poher, who served from
1968 until 1992,80 ensured that members more favorable to European inte-
gration than the Gaullists of their period participated in the Conseil's deci-
sions. This contingency had consequences that were probably not foreseen
by Michel Debre when he designed the institution.
A united President and Prime Minister may also face resistance from
their own supporters. Party discipline is not rigid in France, and individ-
ual parties-let alone coalitions-have been internally divided on impor-
tant issues, including the accommodation of national sovereignty and
international cooperation. Nonetheless, it was noted in 2003 that the Gov-
ernments of the Fifth Republic had ultimately succeeded in receiving legis-
lative authorization for a treaty whenever they requested it.8 ' On seven
occasions between 1992 and 2008, the Conseil constitutionnel held that rati-
75. See STEVENS, supra note 6, at 168.
76. See, e.g., ELGIE, supra note 2, at 153-55. When the package of constitutional
amendments adopted in July 2008 was being drafted, an initial proposal to link repre-
sentation in the Senate more closely to population was first diluted by the Government
and the National Assembly, and then rejected altogether by the Senate. See Pierre de
Montalivet, Les cadres nouveaux de la democratie representative, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE-
EDITION GENERALE, No. 31-35, July 30, 2008, ' 28 & n.27.
77. After a minor amendment on electoral procedure in 1976, the next successful
amendment was the authorization of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1992.
See infra Part III.A.2.d. (Mitterrand was elected President of the Republic in 1981 and in
1988.)
78. 1958 CONsT. art. 56.
79. Monnerville had served as head of the second chamber for most of the Fourth
Republic, and continued that role in the Fifth, where his criticisms of de Gaulle's use of
power aroused the GeneraPs personal hostility. Poher appointed Monnerville to the
Conseil constitutionnel in 1974.
80. Poher had served as President of the European Parliament in the era when that
body was drawn from national legislatures, before assuming the presidency of the Sen-
ate. As Senate President, he twice acted as interim President of France, after the resigna-
tion of de Gaulle in 1969 and after the death of Pompidou in 1974.
81. See Eisenmann & Rivier, supra note 12, at 261 n.30 (noting that the last treaty to
be defeated in parliament was the European Defence Community, which preceded the
Fifth Republic). This success rate may, however, reflect care not to request authoriza-
tion for a treaty that lacks majority support. President Chirac subsequently miscalcu-
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fication of a treaty would require a constitutional amendment, and the
amendment duly followed in six of the seven cases.82
A. Prior to the 1992 Maastricht Amendment
The first three decades of the Fifth Republic demonstrated the limited
ability of the constitutional constraints to protect the supremacy of the
Constitution and to resist the lure of supranationality. International com-
mitments were rarely referred to the Conseil constitutionnel under Article
54, and the Conseil's standards for reviewing the treaties that were referred
grew increasingly accommodating. Meanwhile, Article 55 became a power-
ful tool by which the civil/criminal courts, and subsequently the adminis-
trative courts, enforced the expanding body of European Community and
European human rights law.
The discussion of the first period (A) begins with procedural features
of the Article 54 mechanism (1), then turns to the substantive standards
applied in the sequence of referrals culminating in the first Maastricht
decision (2). It next considers the increasing power given to treaties under
Article 55, including their prevalence over subsequent statutes, their inde-
pendent interpretation by the administrative courts, and the narrowing of
Debres reciprocity proviso (3). Interim conclusions are drawn (4) before
passing to the years following the Maastricht amendment (B).
1. Article 54: Procedure
Procedural features of the Article 54 referral mechanism, as it was
drafted and as it was interpreted, undermined its potential to protect the
1958 Constitution against inconsistent international commitments. The
opportunity to make referrals was restricted, and few referrals occurred;
the Conseil constitutionnel defined the scope of its review in a manner that
further diminished the opportunity; and the a priori nature of the inquiry
made the mechanism ineffective against unforeseen interpretations of the
treaties.
First, Article 54 authorized but did not require submission of treaties
to the Conseil constitutionnel when constitutional doubts arise. The 1958
Constitution did provide for mandatory submission of two categories of
norms to the Conseil constitutionnel, the "organic statutes" (lois organi-
lated in submitting the European Constitution Treaty to a referendum in 2005, which
failed.
82. See CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992 (Maastricht Treaty on European
Union); CC decision No. 97-394 DC, Dec. 31, 1997 (Amsterdam Treaty on the European
Union); CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999 (Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court); CC decision No. 99-412 DC, June 15, 1999 (Charter of Regional or Minority
Languages); CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004 (European Constitution
Treaty); CC decision No. 2005-524/525 DC, Oct. 13, 2005 (optional protocol to ICCPR
abolishing the death penalty); CC decision No. 2007-560 DC, Dec. 20, 2007 (Lisbon
Treaty). The one exception was the regional language charter; the Socialist Prime Minis-
ter Lionel Jospin favored it, but the Gaullist President Jacques Chirac declined to seek an
amendment. See infra Part III.B.3.a.
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ques)8 3 specified for fleshing out certain constitutional structures, and the
rules of procedure (reglements) of the National Assembly and the Senate.
But international commitments, like ordinary statutes, were subject to
optional referral.84 That was a blessing for the Conseil constitutionnel,
given the large number of instruments covered, and no narrower category
of obligatory treaty referrals was identified.
Second, the range of "international commitments" subject to referral
under Article 54 was, and remains, unclear. Some contend that Article 54
applies only to those international agreements for which Article 53
requires legislative authorization, while others contend that it also applies
to the larger category of treaties that the executive may conclude on its
own, or other forms of international commitment.8 5 The practice of the
Conseil constitutionnel in some of the first Article 54 referrals lends support
to both interpretations. 86 So far, the Conseil has never rejected an Article
54 referral on the ground that the text referred was not an "international
commitment."
Third, a very limited set of public actors were authorized to make the
referral. Originally, the Constitution gave only the President, the Prime
Minister, and the Presidents of the Senate and the National Assembly the
power to refer either laws or treaties to the Conseil constitutionnel.87 When
Article 61 of the Constitution was amended in 1974 to empower sixty dep-
uties or sixty senators to refer statutes to the Conseil constitutionnel, no
change was made to Article 54. Nonetheless, the Conseil constitutionnel cir-
cumvented this limitation, at least in part, by permitting deputies and sen-
ators to refer statutes that authorized the ratification of a treaty, and by
allowing challenge to the authorizing statute to include a challenge to the
content of the treaty.88  (Later, in 1992, an amendment to Article 54
expressly empowered sixty deputies or sixty senators to refer.89) Thus, the
opposition, or dissenting factions within the majority, could also secure
review of the constitutionality of a proposed treaty, so long as they were
83. See, e.g., 1958 CONsr. art. 25 (organic statute to specify the term, number, com-
pensation, and qualifications of the legislative assemblies); 1958 CONsT. art. 47 (organic
statute to specify procedures for enacting government finance laws); 1958 CONsT. art.
63 (organic statute to specify the organization and procedure of the Conseil constitution-
nel). The official translation on the Conseil constitutionnel's website refers to these as
"institutional acts," but I will use the term "organic statutes" in the belief that it is less
likely to confuse the reader.
84. 1958 CONST. arts. 54, 61; see Elgie, supra note 2, at 184.
85. See, e.g., ELISABETH ZOLLER, DROIT DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES 269-70 (1992)
(broader than Article 53); DOMINIQUE RoussEAu, DROIT DU CONTENTIEUX CONSTITUTIONNEL
206 (8th ed. 2008) (broader than Article 53); Francois Luchaire, Article 54, in LA CONSTI-
TUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE 1060-61 (Luchaire et al. eds. 1987) (limited to Arti-
cle 53); Christine Maugd6, Le Conseil constitutionnel et le droit supranational, 105
Pouvo1Rs 53, 54-55 (2003) (limited to Article 53); cf. supra note 12 (listing the catego-
ries of treaties subject to legislative approval under Article 53).
86. See infra Part 111.A.2.a.
87. 1958 CONST. art. 61; STEVENS, supra note 6, at 59.
88. See CC decision No. 76-71 DC, Dec. 29-30, 1976 (announcing this possiblity);
CC decision No. 80-116 DC, July 17, 1980 (applying it).
89. 1958 CONST. art. 54; see infra text accompanying note 271.
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sufficient in number. In practice, the Article 61 route enabled opponents
to raise the same type of claims that the Conseil would have decided under
Article 54.90
Such referrals have in fact been quite rare. In the period from 1958 to
1992, there were only eleven referrals of treaties and treaty-ratification stat-
utes under Article 54 and Article 61 combined.9 1 Important treaties with
apparent constitutional consequences for France were not referred. For
example, the European Convention on Human Rights escaped referral, as
did seven of its Protocols;9 2 only one Protocol, concerning the death pen-
alty, was referred. Major global human rights treaties ratified by France
during this period, including the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women, the Convention Against Torture, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child,93 similarly escaped referral. On the
European Community front, the Single European Act of 1986, which
increased the powers of EC institutions in order to facilitate completion of
the internal market by 1992, was also ratified without referral.94 This situ-
ation is in some respects comparable to the referral of statutes: although
referrals have been more frequent, certain statutes raising visible constitu-
tional questions passed without review because politicians did not wish to
take a position against them.9 5
90. Rousseau observes, however, that in Article 61 proceedings the Conseil has felt
empowered to limit its review to the objections raised in the referral, whereas in Article
54 proceedings the Conseil has felt obliged to identify and resolve possible objections
sua sponte. RoussEAU, supra note 85, at 203.
91. There were three Article 54 referrals by the President, one by the Prime Minister,
six Article 61 referrals by groups of legislators, and one Article 54 referral by a group of
legislators after they acquired that authority in 1992. Even this estimate is high, since it
includes three referrals relating to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and one attempted
referral of a statute approving a non-international convention between the French Gov-
ernment and its overseas territory of New Caledonia. See CC decision No. 83-160 DC,
July 19, 1983, cons. 1.
92. Admittedly, most of these Protocols were procedural rather than substantive.
The European Social Charter and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
also escaped referral.
93. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (rati-
fied by France in 1990); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (ratified by
France in 1986); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women, Dec. 18, 1977, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (ratified by France in 1983);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(ratified by France in 1980); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (ratified by France in 1980); International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified by France in 1971).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 206-215.
95. Two examples commonly mentioned in the literature are the 1990 law prohibit-
ing Holocaust revisionism (the Loi Gayssot) and the 1993 overhaul of the Criminal Code.
See GUILLAUME DRAGO, CONTENTIEUX CONSTITUTIONNEL FRANCAIS 435-36 (1st ed. 1998).
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A few statistics may put this issue in perspective. A 1985 report by the
Conseil d'Etat estimated that between 300 and 400 international agree-
ments entered into force each year, mostly unpublished, with thirty to forty
submitted to the legislature for authorization, including five to ten major
multilateral conventions. 96 In the same period, roughly eighty-five agree-
ments were published each year.97 The seventh legislative term
(1981-1986) resulted in the enactment of 524 statutes, 174 of which
authorized international agreements.98 In 1993 (just after this first
period), fifty-three international agreements were published, eighteen of
which had received legislative authorization.99 Meanwhile, only five refer-
rals to the Conseil constitutionnel under Article 54 had occurred from 1958
to 1992, plus a similar number of referrals of statutes authorizing ratifica-
tion (or approval). 00 By contrast, in the 1980s, the Conseil constitutionnel
was reviewing on average more than ten statutes per year on the basis of
optional referrals, not including the mandatory referrals of organic stat-
utes.101 Not until 1992 did the Conseil constitutionnel hold for the first
time that entering into the international commitment before it would
require a constitutional amendment.' 0 2
Fourth, the window for challenge under Article 54 was deliberately
restricted. Treaties could be questioned before ratification, but, once rati-
fied, the treaties could no longer be referred to the Conseil constitutionnel.
The restricted opportunity for challenge resembled the system of a priori
review established for statutes under Article 61, although the window for
treaties was larger. Treaties could be referred under Article 54 before or
during their consideration by the legislature, whereas statutes (including
statutes authorizing treaties) could be referred under Article 61 only dur-
ing the brief period between parliamentary adoption and promulgation. 0 3
Fifth, the Conseil constitutionnel restricted the potential of the Article
54 procedure to protect the constitutional system against international
impingements by strictly concentrating its review on the incremental
effects of new treaties. The Conseil does not fully measure the substance of
a new treaty provision against constitutional standards. Rather, it evalu-
ates only the additional content of the new provision given existing treaty
96. Conseil d'Etat, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT FRAN(AIS: ETUDE DU CONSEIL D'ETAT
9 (1986).
97. Dhommeaux, supra note 65, at 1452-53.
98. These figures are drawn from the website of the Assembke Nationale. Histoire de
I'Assemblee nationale: 8. La Cinquieme Republique (depuis 1958), ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE,
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/histoire-1958.asp (last visited Mar. 31,
2012) (scroll down for table).
99. See Eisenmann & Kessedjian, supra note 58, at 1, 5 (noting that the 53 published
agreements included 10 multilateral agreements, 40 bilateral agreements, and 3 agree-
ments with international organizations).
100. Again, this includes multiple referrals of the Maastricht Treaty, and one referral
of a statute approving a "convention" with an overseas territory.
101. See LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 163 (Michel Verpeaux & Maryvonne Bonnard
eds., 2007) (table).
102. See CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992 (discussed infra Part I.A.2.d).
103. See 1958 CONST. arts. 54, 61; DRAGO, supra note 95, at 396.
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obligations. Prior treaties, whether or not they had been reviewed by the
Conseil before ratification-and very few of them had been-had already
acquired force and could not be challenged. This principle was asserted in
the Conseil's first Article 54 proceeding, regarding the financing of the
European Communities, where the Conseil observed somewhat opaquely
that the treaties of 1951 and 1957 establishing the European Communities
had been regularly ratified and published, and since that moment had
"entered into the field of application of Article 55 of the Constitution."1 0 4
This language has been understood as observing that the treaties had taken
effect as internal law, indeed as internal law superior to statute, and could
no longer be reviewed by the Conseil constitutionnel.0 5
The Conseil reaffirmed this incremental approach to the review of trea-
ties even after it had adopted a different practice in reviewing ordinary stat-
utes. 106 Although the Constitution created only a narrow window for pre-
promulgation review of statutes, the Conseil constitutionnel devised a
method for expanding that window by using later amending statutes as a
vehicle for examining the statutes that they amend. More specifically, in a
decision involving emergency legislation for New Caledonia in 1985, the
Conseil announced that, when new legislation modified, completed, or
changed the area of applicability of a statutory provision already in force,
the Conseil's review of the new legislation could include evaluating the con-
stitutionality of the prior provision.' 0 7 The Conseil subsequently refused,
however, to apply this technique to the review of treaties modifying earlier
treaties. In a 1992 decision concerning the Maastricht Treaty, the Conseil
asserted that the principle of compliance with treaties in force, pacta sunt
servanda, was one of the rules of international law to which France had
pledged conformity in Paragraph 14 of the 1946 Preamble, referenced by
the 1958 Preamble, and that Article 55 of the 1958 Constitution gave rati-
fied treaties domestic authority superior to law. As a result, the Conseil
limited its examination under the Article 54 procedure to the new content
added by the later treaty.108
104. See CC decision No. 70-39 DC, June 19, 1970, cons. 5 (discussed infra Part
II.A.2.a). The reader may have noticed that these treaties even entered into force before
the adoption of the 1958 Constitution and its Article 55.
105. See, e.g., PATRICK GATA, LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL ET L'INSERTION DES ENGAGE-
MENTS INTERNATIONAUX DANS L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNE 75 (1991).
106. 1 say "reaffirmed" because some of its earlier decisions, by commenting on the
validity of treaties already in force while reviewing statutes implementing them, had
caused observers to hope or fear that the Conseil would be willing to declare a provision
of a ratified treaty inconsistent with the Constitution. See, e.g.,Jol Rideau, Constitution
et droit international dans les Etats membres des Communautes europtennes: Reflexions
generales et situation frangaise, 2 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 259,
272-78 (1990).
107. See CC No. 85-187 DC, Jan. 25, 1985, cons. 7-10. The first time that this doc-
trine actually led to the invalidation of a statutory provision was in 1999. See infra Part
III.B.2.
108. See CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992. The Conseil has expressed this
principle of limited review in subsequent (post-1992) decisions by means of the formula
that "[t]hose provisions of the Treaty which merely reiterate undertakings already
entered into by France are however excluded from any such examination as to their
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Sixth, as a rare exception to the underutilized procedure, the Conseil
constitutionnel will not review the constitutionality of a treaty that has been
approved by a referendum.109 That restraint reflects its longstanding prac-
tice with regard to statutory referenda. It rests partly on a theory of textu-
ally limited jurisdiction, and partly on the theory that referenda are direct
expressions of national sovereignty.110
Finally, it should be observed that, even when it is employed, the effi-
cacy of the a priori review procedure in forestalling conflicts between trea-
ties and the Constitution depends upon the ability of the Conseil
constitutionnel and its informants to predict future developments. Unantic-
ipated contradictions could arise from later interpretations of the treaty,
from changes in circumstances affecting the treaty's practical meaning, or,
indeed, from later interpretations of the Constitution. The a priori review
of the constitutionality of statutes poses similar disadvantages, but they are
intensified in the case of treaties, where the Conseil constitutionnel has less
ability to control or influence the course of future interpretation."'
2. Article 54: Substance
The Conseil constitutionnel received its first Article 54 referral in 1970,
while the Gaullists still governed. The resulting decision stated a theme
that would echo through the Conseil's jurisprudence: that, to be consistent
with the 1958 Constitution, treaties must not infringe upon the "essential
conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty."" 2 Six years later, as a
non-Gaullist President charted a new course for European policy, the Con-
seil struggled with the decision whether to find an agreement invalid, or to
uphold it while articulating standards that could protect national sover-
eignty against threats that would materialize in the future. It chose the
latter option. In the years that followed, as Gaullist power ebbed, the Con-
seil continued to uphold treaties, sometimes by refashioning the standards
that demonstrated their consistency with the Constitution. Momentum
built up sufficiently during this period that, by the time the Conseil finally
found a treaty that did violate the Constitution, the majorities necessary for
adopting the corresponding amendment were available.
conformity with the Constitution." CC decision No. 2007-560 DC, Dec. 20, 2007, cons.
10.
109. See supra note 65 (on authorization by referendum).
110. See CC decision No. 92-313 DC, Sept. 23, 1992, cons. 2. The doctrine of
nonreview of referenda originated as the explanation for lack of jurisdiction over chal-
lenges to the arguably unconstitutional referendum on direct election of the President in
1962. See CC decision No. 62-20 DC, Nov. 6, 1962, cons. 5.
111. In the statutory context, the Conseil constitutionnel often employs a technique of
upholding a statute subject to a reserve of interpretation. In other words, it holds that
the statute would not conflict with the Constitution so long as it receives a particular
interpretation. See BELL, supra note 11, at 53-54. A single national court or tribunal,
however, cannot dictate the international interpretation of a treaty.
112. CC decision No. 70-39 DC, June 19, 1970, cons. 9.
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a. Step One
The first decision under Article 54 involved a pair of linked engage-
ments negotiated within the context of the European Communities. The
EEC Treaty had contemplated that activities of the EEC, including agricul-
tural subsidies that greatly benefitted France, would initially be financed
by contributions of the member states, but that this system would later be
replaced by assignment of forms of tax revenue to the Community as its
own resources." 3 In April 1970, the Council of the EEC" 4 adopted a
Decision laying out the framework for transition to the Community's own
resources, most prominently a value-added tax to be defined at the Com-
munity level." 5 The French government understood this Council Deci-
sion as an agreement subject to legislative approval. The deal also involved
the Treaty of Luxembourg, which increased the role of the Parliamentary
Assembly in the Community budget process."' 6 These agreements pro-
voked arguments by some Gaullists in the National Assembly, led by for-
mer Justice Minister Jean Foyer, that the enhancement of EEC power
usurped legislative power and impaired national sovereignty, and therefore
required a constitutional amendment.11 7 To quell objections within his
own party, Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas referred the Council
Decision and the Luxembourg Treaty to the Conseil constitutionnel under
Article 54.118
The Conseil found nothing in the Council Decision or the Treaty that
would necessitate a constitutional amendment, but it made several impor-
tant points on the way to this conclusion. First, the Conseil regarded the
Council Decision as a "measure of application" giving practical effect to a
113. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 200, 201, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
114. It will be regrettably necessary to distinguish among several similarly named
bodies: the Council of Ministers of the EEC (subsequently the Council of Ministers of
the European Union, referred to here as "EEC Council" or "EU Council"), an institution
of the EEC (subsequently EU); the European Council, an intergovernmental conclave of
the heads of member state governments of the EEC (subsequently EU); and the Council
of Europe, a separate regional organization whose membership is wider than that of the
EEC or EU, and under whose auspices the European regional human rights system
operates.
115. See Conseil Decision du 21 avril 1970 relative au remplacement des contributions
financieres des Etats membres par des ressources propres aux Communautes, 70/243/
CECA, CEE, Euroatom, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES, Apr. 28, 1970,
No. L 94/19. The Council Decision and the Luxembourg Treaty also involved the
financing of the European Atomic Energy Community, but I omit it from the text in
order to simplify the discussion.
116. See Traite portant modification de certaines dispositions budgetaires, JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES, Jan. 2, 1971, No. L 2.
117. See Charles Rousseau, Jurisprudence frangaise en matitre de droit international
public, 75 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 239, 241-44 (1971) (discuss-
ing the politics of the decision). The French Communist Party, which was always hostile
to Western European integration, also opposed the agreements. See id.; GUYOMARCH ET
AL., supra note 25, at 94.
118. See Rousseau, supra note 117.
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policy decision inherent in the EEC Treaty.11 9 To the extent that critics
objected per se to the assignment of taxing power within France to the
EEC, that impairment of national sovereignty had already been accepted in
the EEC Treaty and could no longer be challenged. As the Conseil put it,
the EEC treaty had already been lawfully ratified and published and had
entered into the field of application of Article 55 of the Constitution.1 20
Second, an agreement conferring specific taxing authority on the EEC
dealt with a matter within the range of legislative powers under the Consti-
tution, and, therefore, required legislative approval of the agreement under
Article 53. However, delegation of authority by an approved agreement
would not contravene the Constitution's vesting of legislative powers in the
parliament. At the same time, the Conseil did not broadly approve the dele-
gation of legislative powers. It stated in a conclusory fashion that the par-
ticular agreement at issue did not by its nature or magnitude "infringe
upon the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty"
(porter atteinte . . . aux conditions essentielles d'exercice de la souverainete
nationale).121 This phrase, obscure in scope, would play a large role in
later decisions, but, at the moment, it reserved for the future the Conseil's
power to decide when international commitments went too far in impair-
ing national sovereignty.
Similarly, the Conseil upheld the Luxembourg Treaty, observing that
the treaty reallocated powers internally within the EEC (an issue not
addressed by the French Constitution), but also adding that the treaty did
not affect the balance of power between the EEC and the member states.122
It thus reserved judgment on institutional changes that would significantly
affect that balance of power.
Third, the Conseil cited the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution among
the legal sources that it had considered in reaching its decision (the
"visas"). That citation endorsed the legal character of the Preamble,
although the decision was rather ambiguous about what content in the Pre-
amble it deemed relevant. Perhaps it might have reinforced the principle of
national sovereignty discussed in the decision, or conveyed the permissibil-
ity of limiting national sovereignty by means of reciprocal treaties, as con-
templated by Paragraph 15 of the 1946 Preamble, incorporated through the
1958 Preamble. The recent publication of the Conseil's 1970 deliberations
shows that one non-Gaullist member, Frangois Luchaire, expressly made
the latter argument,123 but the extent to which his colleagues agreed
remains unclear. Some commentators regarded the question as unresolved
before later decisions of the Conseil more explicitly identified Paragraph 15
119. It is now known that this conclusion was not unanimous. One member of the
Conseil, Marcel Waline, interpreted the EEC Treaty as not firmly committing France to
provide the Community with its own resources, and therefore viewed the approval of the
Council Decision as the determinative step that would necessitate a constitutional
amendment. See GRANDEs DELIBERATIONS, supra note 69, at 203-04.
120. See CC decision No. 70-39 DC, June 19, 1970, cons. 5.
121. Id. cons. 9.
122. See id. cons. 2.
123. See GRANDEs DEULBERATIONS, supra note 69, at 202.
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as authorizing treaties that lifmit national sovereignty.' 2 4
The decision upholding the two commitments enjoyed overwhelming
support within the Conseil. One member disagreed on the merits, and
Luchaire abstained on the final vote because he thought that the Council
Decision was not an international commitment within the Conseil's juris-
diction under Article 54.125
b. The Crossroads of 1976
A key opportunity to apply Article 54 arose from the debate over direct
election of the "European Parliament." The Conseil constitutionnel came
within a single vote of blocking an engagement to implement the EEC
Treaty, on the grounds that creating a form of democratic legitimation for
the EEC would be inconsistent with the principles of national sovereignty
embodied in the 1958 Constitution.1 26 This section will discuss the epi-
sode in some detail, both because of its importance and because unpub-
lished documentation of the Conseil's decision has recently become
available. 127 The documentation reveals how a divided Conseil sought to
accommodate moderate initiatives toward European integration without
losing its ability to restrict them in the name of national sovereignty. In
retrospect, the Gaullists' concession may have been more effective as a
short-term tactic than as a long-term strategy.
The treaty establishing the EEC had created an Assembly of parlia-
mentarians, designated by national parliaments from among their own
members, and had contemplated a later shift to direct election of the
Assembly by popular vote.' 28 (The Assembly named itself the "European
Parliament" in 1962, although the member states did not officially approve
that name until 1986.)129 Article 138(3) of the EEC Treaty provided:
The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suf-
frage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States. The
124. See CC decision No. 76-71 DC, Dec. 29-30, 1976, cons. 2 (invoking Paragraph
15); CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992, cons. 13 (same); Louis FAVOREU & Loic
PHILIP, LES GRANDES DECISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 264-65 (1st ed. 1975)
(regarding the question as unsettled as of 1975).
125. See GRANDES DLuBERATIONS, supra note 69, at 206. The dissident member, Pro-
fessor Marcel Waline, did not view the relevant clause of the EEC Treaty as a firm com-
mitment to provide a revenue source to the EEC, and therefore viewed its
implementation as a new commitment that could (and did) require a constitutional
amendment. Id. at 203.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 166-172.
127. An organic statute enacted in 2008 made the internal documentation of the Con-
seil constitutionnel publicly accessible after a period of twenty-five years. A selection of
the comptes rendus of major cases from 1958 to 1983 was published in 2009. See
GRANDES DELIBERATIONS, supra note 69. That volume mentions the 1976 decision, e.g.,
id. at 253-54, but does not include its compte rendu, probably because of its length. The
case files from those years are available in the Archives Nationales.
128. A later treaty merged the Assemblies of the three European Communities (EEC,
Coal and Steel, and Euratom) in 1967, but for simplicity I will refer only to the EEC in
the text. The Conseil framed the legal issues in its decision in terms of the EEC Treaty.
129. See JEAN-CLAUDE Pns, THE LIsBoN TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITIcAL ANALYSIS 115
(2010).
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Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote, shall determine the provi-
sions which it shall recommend to Member States for adoption in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional rules.1 30
President de Gaulle and his successor Georges Pompidou, however, were
hostile to direct election of the Assembly, and they stalled approval by the
Council, at times invoking the technical objection that agreement on a gen-
uinely uniform procedure had not yet been reached.1 3 1 The obstacles to
uniformity included disputes over majority rule or proportional representa-
tion, national or regional constituencies, election dates, and eligibility
rules. But the deeper issues were France's preference for an inter-govern-
mental model of EEC policymaking and France's opposition to an Assem-
bly with pretensions to popular sovereignty.
The situation changed with the election of President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing. Although he was constrained by his party's coalition with the
Gaullists, Giscard favored a more cooperative European policy.132 In
December 1974, a Paris summit of EEC heads of state agreed to move for-
ward on direct election of the Assembly. The details were negotiated over
the ensuing months, but disagreements about issues such as proportional
representation and subnational constituencies persisted. In September
1976, the Council decided to begin direct elections in 1978, but to allow
national procedures to govern the conduct of the first election.' 3 3
The efforts to institute direct elections excited opposition in France,
especially from traditional Gaullists and Communists. Some critics,
including Michel Debre, insisted that direct election of the European
Assembly would contravene the Constitution. 1 34 The mix of arguments
ranged from political theory concerning the nature of sovereignty to predic-
tions of long-term consequences and technical analyses of clauses of the
treaties and the Constitution.
For Debr, democratic legitimacy was possible only within a national
framework; universal suffrage and national sovereignty were intimately
linked.135 Once popularly elected, the Assembly-which had already
usurped the title "European Parliament"-would assert or demand addi-
tional powers that a majority coalition at a supranational level could not
130. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 113, art.
138(3).
131. See Valentine Herman, Direct Elections: The Historical Background, in THE LEGISLA-
TION OF DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 14 (Valentine Herman & Mark
Hagger eds., 1980); Dominique Remy & Karl Hermann Buck, France: The Impossible
Compromise or the End of Majority Parliamentarism?, in THE LEGISLATION OF DIRECT ELEC-
TIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 103 (Valentine Herman & Mark Hagger eds., 1980).
132. The presidential election came in the midst of the legislative term, and the Gis-
cardians had fewer seats in the National Assembly than the Gaullists. Giscard named
Jacques Chirac as his first prime minister and Chirac became the leader of the Gaullists.
Relations between them were tense, and Chirac eventually resigned as Prime Minister in
August 1976.
133. See Herman, supra note 131, at 14. The election was subsequently postponed to
1979. Id. at 27.
134. Michel Debre, Souverainete et legitimite, LE MONDE, Dec. 9, 1976, at 1.
135. See id.
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legitimately exercise. 13 6 The distinctive interests of France would be sub-
merged and the ability of Europe to resist Atlanticist influence (or U.S.
domination) would be reduced. 137 Moreover, if direct elections were to be
implemented through regional constituencies, the indivisibility of the
Nation would be threatened and separatism would be fostered. 138 In legal
terms, the 1958 Constitution guaranteed national sovereignty and defined
the conditions of its exercise. Under Article 3, only the French people and
their representatives could exercise sovereignty. Furthermore, the Consti-
tution strictly determined the occasions in which direct election of repre-
sentatives could occur.' 3 9
Other legal arguments turned on the specific terms of the proposal
adopted by the Council of the EEC in September 1976. The proposal was
not reciprocal, because some new member states would not be held to
identical obligations. The proposal also left too much discretion to mem-
ber states in implementation and, therefore, did not supply the "uniform
procedure" contemplated by Article 138 of the EEC Treaty. For some ana-
lysts, this divergence from the Treaty meant that the proposal represented a
new international engagement subject to constitutional review rather than
a "measure of application" of a treaty already in force that would be immu-
nized from review under the Conseil's 1970 decision.140 To others, even
measures of application remained subject to review if they infringed upon
the essential conditions of the exercise of national sovereignty.141 For
some, permitting non-uniformity entailed a lack of reciprocity, so that the
new engagement could not be justified as a reciprocal limitation of sover-
eignty authorized by Paragraph 15 of the 1946 Preamble. 14 2
Defenders of the proposal dismissed these arguments as either politi-
cal rather than legal, or legally erroneous.143 In their view, the principle of
direct election had been accepted in the EEC Treaty before the 1958 Consti-
tution was drafted, and could no longer be challenged.14 4 Neither the prin-
ciple nor the details of the proposal violated a proper understanding of
sovereignty as recognized in the 1958 Constitution and the 1946
Preamble.14 5
President Giscard d'Estaing sought to defuse the legal aspect of the
debate by referring the new EEC instruments to the Conseil constitutionnel
136. See id. at 11.
137. Michel Debr , L'aventure Recommence. LE MONDE, Dec. 18, 1975, at 1, 10.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Debre, supra note 134, at 11.
140. Jacques Robert, L'Europe et le droit, LE MONDE, Nov. 21-22, 1976, at 17.
141. Jacques Boitreaud, L'election de I'Assemblee europeenne et la Constitution fran-
aise, LE MONDE, Nov. 24, 1976, at 13. Boitreaud had served as the first Secretary Gen-
eral of the Conseil constitutionnel.
142. Robert, supra note 140, at 17.
143. See, e.g., Franois Luchaire, Faut-il reviser la Constitution?, LE MONDE, Nov. 6,
1976, at 10. Luchaire had served as a member of the Conseil constitutionnel at the time
of the 1970 decision on the Community's own resources.
144. Id.; Georges Vedel, Bilan d'une controverse, LE MONDE, Dec. 25, 1976, at 5.
145. Franqois Luchaire, Faut-il modifier la Constitution? (suite), LE MONDE, Dec. 11,
1976, at 8; Vedel, supra note 144, at 5 (regarding the details).
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under Article 54 and asking it to determine whether the Constitution
needed to be amended before the commitments could be approved.146 At
this period, the Conseil consisted of six members appointed by Gaullists
and three centrists appointed by presidents of the Senate; Giscard had not
yet had the opportunity to add any members.147 In accordance with the
usual practice, the Conseil President, Roger Frey, chose one member as rap-
porteur to study the question and present an analysis of the legal issues
along with a draft decision. The rapporteur on this occasion was Frangois
Goguel, a distinguished political scientist and former Senate official, who
was appointed to the Conseil by Pompidou.' 48
When the Conseil met to deliberate, Goguel delivered a lengthy report
favoring a conclusion of unconstitutionality.149 He expressed several,
though not all, of the criticisms previously articulated by Debr6, and a few
of his own. The Conseil's scope of review, he argued, extended both to the
principle of direct elections for the Assembly and to the details of imple-
mentation.' 50 Goguel explained that the prior ratification of the EEC
Treaty did not prevent Conseil review, because Article 138 left open
whether proposals for direct elections would be adopted by ordinary legis-
lation or by constitutional amendment; it merely said that plans for direct
election would be recommended to Member States "for adoption in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional rules." 151 The September 1976
Act purported to make members of the European Assembly representatives
of the peoples of their respective states, and, thereby, conflicted with Arti-
cle 3(1) of the Constitution, which identified the representatives of the peo-
ple as a means for the exercise of national sovereignty. European Assembly
members could not be recognized as exercising French national sover-
eignty.152 Furthermore, Article 3(3) decreed that the Constitution would
delineate the occasions for the exercise of direct and indirect suffrage; the
Constitution made no provision for European elections. Universal suffrage
was the exercise of national sovereignty, and was inherently a matter of
constitutional dimension.153
In addition to these textual conflicts, Goguel argued that the Act con-
tradicted the "silence" of Article 34, which enumerated legislative powers
but did not specify the authority to regulate European elections.' 54 He did
not believe, however, that the European incompatibility rules for candi-
146. Technically, the instruments referred consisted of a Council Decision of Septem-
ber 20, 1976, and the annexed "Act" setting forth the details of the proposal.
147. See GRANDES DELIBeRATIONS, supra note 69, at 456 (showing the composition of
the Conseil at the time of the decision).
148. CC, Compte rendu, decision No. 76-71 DC, at 1 (copy on file with the author)
[hereinafter Compte rendu]. This account is based on the summary record (compte
rendu) of the deliberations, unpublished but available in the Archives Nationales. The
record is not a literal transcript of everything said by the participants.
149. Id. at 2-34.
150. Id. at 10-12.
151. Id. at 11.
152. Id. at 19-20.
153. Id. at 20-21.
154. Id. at 23-24.
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dates conflicted with the national incompatibility clause contained in Arti-
cle 23, because the two norms really addressed two different subjects.1 5 5
Nor did he believe that the absence of full reciprocity afforded a valid objec-
tion to the permissibilityof the commitment.1 56
For these reasons, Goguel concluded that a constitutional amendment
should be necessary before France could accept the proposal for direct
elections. Beyond that, he thought that the Conseil's decision should
include reminders that treaties could not be superior to the Constitution
and that the European institutions possessed only limited competences.15 7
The decision should also point out the specific ways in which the Constitu-
tion would need to be amended if the President chose to go forward. Oth-
erwise, there would be a danger that France would adopt a broad
constitutional amendment, as other countries had, prospectively permit-
ting transfers of power by ordinary law or treaty, in anticipation of future
European developments.15 8
Goguel's report met with an unusual reception. Paul Coste-Floret, a
centrist member of the Conseil who had been involved in the drafting of
both the 1946 and 1958 constitutions, presented a counter-report that he
had written, responding to the arguments of the public debate and denying
the necessity of a constitutional amendment.' 5 9 For Coste-Floret, the shift
to direct election of the European Assembly would neither threaten the
principle of national sovereignty nor infringe particular articles of the Con-
stitution. The new commitments concerned only the method of selection
of the Assembly and did not increase its powers.16 0 The member states
remained free to resist any requests by the Assembly for additional pow-
ers.161 Furthermore, he argued that the 1958 Constitution was drafted
against the background of the EEC Treaty and was not intended to override
it.16 2 Article 3 of the Constitution described how national sovereignty was
exercised within the Republic, and did not deal with questions concerning
the European Assembly, which does not exercise sovereignty.163 Similarly,
other articles of the Constitution addressing national elections did not
implicate the structure of European elections.164 Moreover, Coste-Floret
argued that even if relevant, reciprocity did not require uniformity of
obligations.165
155. Id. at 22.
156. Id. at 27.
157. Id. at 28.
158. Id. at 30-31. Goguel had devoted several pages of his report to a description of
relevant provisions of other member state constitutions, some of which he interpreted as
broadly authorizing transfers of power to international institutions in derogation of the
national constitution. Id. at 12-18.
159. Id. at 35-44.
160. Id. at 37-38.
161. Id. at 38.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 40-41.
164. Id. at 43-44.
165. Id. at 42-43.
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An intense discussion followed, with both proposals receiving support
from other members. Frey insisted that the Conseil's authority extended
only to declaring the need for a constitutional amendment, not to sug-
gesting what its content should be.166 Several members worried that a
constitutional amendment would indeed be adopted, either by the parlia-
mentary route or by referendum.167 Coste-Floret argued that the Conseil
could better assure the protection of national sovereignty by a well-rea-
soned decision explaining the consistency of the commitment with the
Constitution than by declaring it inconsistent. 168 When the Conseil took a
vote on Goguel's conclusion of unconstitutionality, the outcome was a tie:
four in favor, four opposed, and one abstaining.169 The abstainer was
Pierre Chatenet, a Gaullist whose experience as President of Euratom had
left him distrustful of the European Assembly, but who described himself
as genuinely uncertain as to which solution presented greater dangers.170
Under the Conseil's procedures, the vote of President Frey broke the tie,171
and he had joined with the three centrists in finding no conflict. He then
agreed to redraft a proposed decision explaining the new conclusion.172
The deliberations resumed the next day, and made significant revi-
sions to Frey's draft.' 73 Goguel was not able to reopen the questions
decided the previous day, and the modified version was approved by a five-
to-four vote, with Chatenet's active participation.' 74
The resulting decision expressed its principles in seven numbered
paragraphs (consideirants).175 The first emphasized the limited purpose of
the referred commitments, to make provisions for direct election of the
166. Id. at 49, 54.
167. Id. at 49, 55-56 (remarks of Brouillet, Chatenet, Coste-Floret, and Goguel).
168. Id. at 55.
169. Id. at 57. The same passage indicates that the Conseil had reached consensus
that both instruments were international engagements subject to its authority under
Article 54 and that its review extended to all aspects of the engagements. Id. These two
conclusions were left implicit in the decision.
170. Id. at 47, 57-58. It is unclear whether Chatenet's abstention might have been
influenced by an earlier incident in the public debate, when he had signed a manifesto
of the Movement for the Independence of Europe (i.e., independence from the United
States and the Soviet Union). One paragraph of the manifesto argued that direct elec-
tion of the European Assembly should be implemented only in strict compliance with
the terms of Article 138. The Socialist caucus in the National Assembly then wrote to
the Conseil, arguing that Chatenet had violated his duty of restraint by commenting on
an issue likely to come before it. See Pierre Avril & Jean Gicquel, Chronique constitution-
nellefranfaise, 1 PouvoIRs 205, 215 (stating that Chatenet should have recused himself);
Le groupe socialiste reproche a M. Chatenet d'avoir enfreint son "obligation de reserve", LE
MONDE, Feb. 7, 1976, at 5; Nouveau manifeste pour 'independence de I'Europe, LE MONDE,
Jan. 21, 1976, at 6. However, he did participate in the discussion preceding the vote on
December 29, and took part in the vote on December 30, and the compte rendu does not
reflect any attention to this issue.
171. Article 56(3) of the Constitution gives the vote of the president determinative
effect in case of a tie. 1958 CONsr. art. 56(3).
172. Compte rendu, supra note 148, at 58.
173. Id. at 60-70. The compte rendu includes both Goguel's draft decision and Frey's
new draft.
174. Id. at 69-70.
175. CC decision No. 76-71 DC, Dec. 29-30, 1976.
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Assembly by universal suffrage.!7T The second, taken from Goguel's draft,
asserted that, although Paragraph 15 of the 1946 Preamble, confirmed by
the 1958 Preamble, authorized reciprocal limitations of sovereignty, no
constitutional provision authorized transfers of all or part of the national
sovereignty to any international organization whatsoever.' 77 The third
emphasized that nothing in the referred commitments enlarged the enu-
merated powers of the European Communities or the Assembly, or modi-
fied the nature of the Assembly, which remained composed of
representatives of each of the peoples of the member states.I'7 The fourth
asserted that direct election of the Assembly neither created a sovereignty
nor created institutions inconsistent with respect for national sovereignty;
nor did it infringe upon the powers of the Republic and its legislature; that
any change could result only from a new amendment of the treaties, which
would be subject to Articles 52 through 55 and 61 of the Constitution (and
thus referral to the Conseil for a new ruling).' 79 The fifth found that noth-
ing in the referred commitments required or permitted election procedures
that would put at issue the indivisibility of the Republic, but rather these
procedures must respect all constitutional principles.180 The sixth
observed that the sovereignty defined in Article 3 of the Constitution could
only be national, both in its foundation and in its exercise, and only the
representatives elected within the framework of the Republic could be
regarded as exercising it.'s' The seventh observed that the Assembly was
an international institution external to the framework of the Republic, not
exercising national sovereignty, and, therefore, outside the scope of provi-
sions of Articles 23 and 34 relevant to national elections.' 8 2 Conse-
quently, no clause of the referred commitments was contrary to the
Constitution.
The decision thus dismissed the threat to national sovereignty by mini-
mizing the effect of the commitments and attempted to deny any trans-
formative character to the directly elected Assembly. It confirmed the
continuing force of Paragraph 15 of the 1946 Preamble, but drew a distinc-
tion between permitted limitations of sovereignty and forbidden transfers
of sovereignty. It avoided provoking an overbroad constitutional amend-
ment, and tried to preserve or even expand the potential role of the Conseil
in evaluating further European developments. 833 Meanwhile, it accepted
176. Id. cons. 1.
177. Id. cons. 2.
178. Id. cons. 3.
179. Id. cons. 4.
180. Id. cons. 5.
181. Id. cons. 6.
182. Id. cons. 7.
183. The decision expanded the Conseil's role, because it signaled that the parliamen-
tary minorities could refer laws authorizing the treaties under Article 61.
The first attempt, in 1978, involved the procedural objection that the Government had
sought authorization for one modification of France's responsibilities to the IMF without
also submitting a related earlier agreement; the Conseil upheld the separate submission
of the later engagement, while also observing that the earlier one did not infringe
national sovereignty. CC decision No. 78-93 DC, April 29, 1978. Another procedural
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the argument that certain constitutional norms applied only to the opera-
tion of the French government, and not to the operation of international
institutions created in part by France.
The Conseil's compromise ruling paved the way for legislative approval
of direct elections, but it did not satisfy all of the critics, and the path was
not smooth. The fact that the vote was five-to-four leaked immediately,
despite the formal secrecy of the deliberations. 18 4 Michel Debre continued
to warn of dangers to French sovereignty, and he pointed out that even if
the Conseil's exposition bound the various branches of the French state, it
did not bind the European institutions.1 85  Concerned by dissension
within his own party, the Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac sought to post-
pone legislative consideration of the agreement. Giscard's Government
had to resort to the exceptional procedure of making the authorization bill
an issue of its responsibility under Article 49(3) of the Constitution; the
Gaullists then faced the choice between joining in a motion of censure of
the Government, which would force immediate elections, or letting the bill
automatically become law.186 The bill thus passed the National Assembly
by default, and received the explicit approval of the Senate, where the Gaul-
list bloc was smaller and withheld its vote.18 7 Whether Giscard could ever
have mustered the supermajority necessary for a constitutional amend-
ment, if the Conseil had found one necessary, is uncertain. At the time,
some authors assumed that he could not have,' 88 although the members of
the Conseil apparently believed that an amendment would have been likely
to succeed.
Debre was surely right that direct election would bolster the Assem-
bly's claims to legitimacy, and would make more likely the conferral of
additional powers that would undermine French national sovereignty in
the long term. The Conseil majority was apparently unwilling to resist
beginnings, to let the potential of future threats to sovereignty dictate cur-
rent conclusions about constitutionality. Instead, it tried to define broad
principles, trusting the executive and legislative branches to protect
national interests, and waiting to adjudicate imminent threats to national
sovereignty when later agreements were referred. Arguably, that approach
challenge, which will not be discussed in text, concerned the failure to consult the terri-
torial assembly of New Caledonia before seeking legislative approval of an ILO Conven-
tion applicable there; the Conseil held that the constitutional requirement of consultation
did not apply to the treaty. See CC decision No. 88-247 DC, Jan. 17, 1989.
184. See Andre Laurens, L'avenir du Parlement europden, LE MONDE, Jan. 1, 1977, at 1,
4. (This article misallocated the votes, however, placing Chatenet among the dissenters
and Henry Rey in the majority.)
185. See, e.g., Michel Debre, La Tricherie, LE MONDE, May 2, 1977, at 1, 3.
186. See JOHN FITZMAURICE, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 69-70 (1978); Remy & Buck,
supra note 131, at 114.
187. Remy & Buck, supra note 131, at 115-16.
188. See Louis Favoreu & Loic Philip, Election au suffrage universel direct des Membres
de l'assemblee europeenne, 93 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 129, 130-31 & n.1 (1977) (also
doubting the viability of a referendum).
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embodied the proper interpretation of Article 54.189 The risks attendant
on that interpretation materialized in 1986, when a political compromise
prevented referral of the Single European Act, as will be discussed in the
next section.
c. The Road to Maastricht
The Conseil attempted to clarify some of the essential content of
national sovereignty in a few decisions of the fifteen years that followed,
thus far, always concluding that impermissible infringements had not
occurred. In 1980, a group of Communist deputies challenged a fairly
minor treaty between France and Germany on mutual judicial assis-
tance. 190 As the Conseil had suggested in 1976, the deputies used the pas-
sage of a law authorizing ratification of the treaty as a vehicle for referral of
the treaty issues under Article 61. The challenge might best be seen as
another attempt to resist beginnings, against the background of negotia-
tions exploring a "common European area of justice."'91 The Conseil
examined claims that the treaty violated judicial independence and
national sovereignty, and threatened the right to asylum, by giving effect to
orders of German courts in France;' 92 it had been argued in the earlier
debates that the treaty would lead to German police conducting searches in
France. 193 The Conseil responded that these claims overstated the content
of the treaty, which actually preserved opportunities for French courts to
withhold compliance with foreign requests. But it made explicit that the
treaty did not infringe "the rule, which derives from the principle of
national sovereignty," that requested acts of judicial assistance in penal
matters can be performed in France only by the French judicial authorities,
as defined by French law, acting in the forms prescribed by French law.' 9 4
Thus, both national sovereignty and judicial independence were secured.
In 1981, a major turning point in French politics occurred. First,
Franois Mitterrand was elected President; then, the Socialists won an
absolute majority in the National Assembly, returning them to Government
for the first time since the 1950s.195 This reversal of polarity led to many
developments in French constitutional law. One consequence of immedi-
ate interest here was the statutory abolition of the death penalty in 1981,
followed by the negotiation of a new Protocol to the European human
rights convention outlawing capital punishment. Ratification of the Proto-
189. Indeed, Paul Coste-Floret himself had proposed the language in Article 54 that
created the referral procedure.
190. CC decision No. 80-116 DC, July 17, 1980.
191. See Charles Valle, A propos de la decision du Conseil constitutionnel du 17 juillet
1980, 85 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 202, 205 (1980); COUNCIL oF
THE EUROPEAN UNION, LIVING IN AN AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE 6-8 (2005)
(describing emergence of EC intergovernmental cooperation in law enforcement).
192. Judicial independence is guaranteed under Article 64 of the Constitution; the
right to asylum was declared in Paragraph 4 of the 1946 Preamble.
193. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, May 21, 1980, 2d sitting, at 1166
(remarks of M. Robert Montdargent).
194. CC decision No. 80-116 DC, July 17, 1980, cons. 4.
195. GORDON WRIGHT, FRANCE IN MODERN TIMES 426-27 (1995).
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col would preclude future legislative majorities from reinstituting the death
penalty in peacetime; 196 authorization to ratify could be (and ultimately
was) granted over the objection of the Senate.197 The opposition, promi-
nently including Michel Debre,1 98 insisted that the power to impose capital
punishment was too important an element of national sovereignty to
renounce, and that definitive abolition would infringe the President's emer-
gency powers under Article 16 of the Constitution.
In response, President Mitterrand referred the Protocol to the Conseil
constitutionnel under Article 54.199 The Conseil constitutionnel succinctly
declared the treaty consistent with the Constitution.200 It observed that
France could legally withdraw from the treaty in the future by applying the
denunciation clause of the European Convention. (Depending on the cir-
cumstances, this might involve some delay, and might require denuncia-
tion of the European Convention itself.) The Conseil asserted that the
commitment to abolish the death penalty in peacetime was not incompati-
ble with "the duty of the state to ensure respect of the institutions of the
Republic, the continuity of the life of the nation, and the guarantee of the
rights and liberties of citizens."20 1 For these reasons, it concluded that the
Protocol did not infringe upon the essential conditions of the exercise of
national sovereignty, or otherwise violate the Constitution.202
This opaque decision raised a series of questions. Was a denuncia-
tion clause necessary and/or sufficient to reconcile some or all treaties
with national sovereignty? (Later decisions suggest that denunciation
clauses are sometimes necessary and not always sufficient.)20 3 Did the
decision, which did not expressly mention the President's emergency pow-
ers under Article 16, mean to imply that the Protocol did not restrict the
196. Article 2 of the Protocol permits states to provide for the death penalty "in
respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war."
197. See Louis Favoreu, La decision du Conseil constitutionnel du 22 mai 1985 relative
au protocole No. 6 additionnel a la Convention europeenne des Droits de l'homme, 31
ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 868, 869 (1986). As previously mentioned,
Article 45(4) of the Constitution enables the National Assembly, at the Government's
request, to pass a bill into law after unresolvable disagreement with the Senate. This
procedure applies to ordinary legislation, including authorization to ratify a treaty, but
not to certain "organic statutes" and not to constitutional amendments.
198. See Favoreu, supra note 197, at 871. Debre not only objected to the Protocol
when it was first introduced, but moved in the National Assembly to reject it on constitu-
tional grounds even after the Conseil constitutionnel had upheld it. See ASSEMBLEE NATION-
ALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, June 21, 1985, 2d sitting, at 1874-75. Nearly all the
Gaullist and Giscardian deputies (but not Giscard) voted in favor of his motion. Id. at
1888.
199. This was only the third time that Article 54 had been used, not counting the few
indirect referrals by means of Article 61.
200. CC decision No. 85-188 DC, May 22, 1985. (The Conseil returned to the death
penalty issue twenty years later, as will be discussed.)
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See CC decision No. 91-294 DC, July 25, 1991 (denunciation clause not neces-
sary in Schengen implementation agreement); CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22,
1999 (denunciation clause not sufficient for ICC Statute); CC decision No. 524-525 DC,
Oct. 13, 2005 (denunciation clause necessary for Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR).
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President's emergency powers, or that it did not impermissibly restrict
them?20 4 Did the tripartite standard of duty regarding institutions, the
nation, and rights spell out the essential conditions of national
sovereignty? 205
The Conseil missed an opportunity to further clarify the essential con-
ditions of national sovereignty when a political accommodation prevented
referral of the next major step in European integration. The Single Euro-
pean Act of 1986 combined a series of modifications of the EEC Treaty,
primarily designed to facilitate the accomplishment of a unified internal
market by the end of 1992.206 It replaced requirements of unanimity by
qualified majority voting in several relevant fields, increased the role of the
European Parliament in Community legislation,20 7 and broadened the
Community's authority to legislate by means of regulations with direct
effect rather than by means of directives dependent on national implemen-
tation.2 08 These changes intensified the supranational character of the
EEC, and the expansion of qualified majority voting exposed France to the
risk of being subjected to rules that it expressly opposed. Traditional Gaul-
lists, including Michel Debre, considered the Single European Act incom-
patible with the French constitution, and prepared to fight against its
ratification. 2 09
The ratification process, however, occurred during an unusual period
in French politics. The Single European Act had been negotiated by a
Socialist government, but shortly after the text was finalized and signed,
legislative elections in France led to a right-wing majority in the National
Assembly and the first "cohabitation" between a President (Mitterrand)
and Prime Minister (Chirac) of opposing parties. 210 Chirac pursued a
strategy of alliance rather than competition with Giscard's party, and now
favored progress on European integration and economic liberalization. 2 1 '
As the time for parliamentary approval neared, Chirac put pressure on
his party not to obstruct the treaty. Debre agreed to withdraw his motion
in the National Assembly to reject the treaty as unconstitutional. 21 2 The
Communist deputies maintained their own equivalent motion, but only
204. SeeFavoreu, supra note 197, at 874; RONNY ABRAHAM, DROIT INTERNATIONAL, DROIT
COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DROIT FRANcAIS 62-63(1989).
205. Favoreu, supra note 197, at 874, ABRAHAM, supra note 204, at 62-63.
206. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter Single Euro-
pean Act].
207. It also made official the change in title from "Assembly" to "European Parlia-
ment." Id., art. 3, § 1 ("The institutions of the European Communities, henceforth des-
ignated as referred to hereafter . . . .").
208. See generally George A. Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for
the Community?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL'L L. 529 (1988-1989); C.D. Ehlermann, The
Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 361 (1987).
209. See infra text accompanying notes 212-214.
210. KNAPP, supra note 23, at 344-45, 357.
211. See GUYOMARCH ET AL., supra note 25; KNAPP, supra note 23, at 357-58.
212. See M. Chirac met fin a quelques manifestations antieuropeennes au RPR, LE
MONDE, Nov. 20, 1986, at 13; ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, Nov. 20,
1986, 1st sitting, at 6615.
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they voted for it; Debre and his allies voted against.213 Later that day, in the
final debate on the bill authorizing ratification, Debr& and Jean Foyer spoke
at length against the constitutionality of the treaty, and then declined to
vote.214 Thus, due to Gaullist acquiescence, the "most comprehensive revi-
sion to date of the [EEC] Treaty" 215 came into force without an examina-
tion by the Conseil constitutionnel. Whether the Conseil as then composed
would have vindicated Debre's objections or denied them, possibly by
inflecting its jurisprudence, can only be guessed.
Sovereignty challenges to a treaty returned to the Conseil in 1991, with
the Schengen implementation agreement. 216 In the original Schengen
accords, a subset of the European Community members had set the goal of
gradually eliminating routine controls at the borders between them;217 the
later implementation agreement adopted concrete commitments toward
achieving this goal, including enhancement of law enforcement to compen-
sate for the suppression of border checks, and the adoption of common
visa policies regarding non-EC visitors.218 Although the Gaullist caucus
supported ratification of the implementation agreement, a dissident faction
led by Pierre Mazeaud referred the authorizing statute to the Conseil,219
objecting both to the agreement's weakening of France's borders and to
several of the compensatory measures. The Conseil rejected a long series of
challenges to specific provisions, as well as to the general regime of the
agreement.220
213. COMPTE RENDU INTtGRAL, supra note 212, at 6615-17 (remarks of M. Robert
Montdargent); id. at 6630-31 (analysis of vote).
214. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, Nov. 20, 1986, 2d sitting, at
6641-43 (remarks of M. Michel Debre); id. at 6648-50 (remarks of Jean Foyer, with
approving interjections from Debre); id. at 6669 (listing eight members of the Gaullist
party (RPR), aside from the presiding officer, who were present but not voting).
215. Bermann, supra note 208, at 529.
216. CC decision No. 91-294 DC, July 25, 1991.
217. Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual aboli-
tion of checks at their common borders, June 14, 1985, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 1, 13-18. The
1985 accord was never submitted to the French parliament for its approval; authoriza-
tion was sought only for the later implementation convention.
218. Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985, between
the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common
borders, June 19, 1990, 2000 OJ. (L 239) 1, 19-62 [hereinafter Convention implement-
ing the Schengen Agreement]. At this stage, the Schengen regime rested on a multilat-
eral international agreement among certain European states; several years later, the
regime was incorporated into European Community law.
219. Mazeaud had introduced a motion in the Assembly to reject the treaty as an
unconstitutional infringement of national sovereignty, but the motion received few votes.
However, with the support of deputies outside the Gaullist party, Mazeaud reached the
threshold of sixty deputies needed for a referral to the Conseil. By 1991, Michel Debre
was nearly eighty and no longer sat in the Assembly. After Jacques Chirac became Presi-
dent, he appointed Mazeaud to the Conseil constitutionnel, and, later, to its presidency.
220. Not without irony, the deputies also challenged the implementation agreement
as violating the right to asylum under Paragraph 4 of the 1946 Preamble. The Conseil
held that the treaty did not impair, but rather preserved the right of asylum. Only a few
years later, the Conseil's efforts to protect the right to asylum against similar measures
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In finding the new border regime consistent with national sovereignty,
the Conseil elaborated upon on the tripartite standard that it had employed
in the 1985 death penalty case. The essential conditions of the exercise of
national sovereignty included "the duty of the state to ensure respect of the
institutions of the Republic, the continuity of the life of the nation, and the
guarantee of the rights and liberties of citizens."2 2 1 However, the Conseil
found that relaxing border controls was not equivalent to suppressing the
borders of the state or ceding territory, and so did not threaten the "institu-
tions of the Republic"; nor was the state thereby abdicating its duty to guar-
antee the rights of its citizens to security. 2 22 The Conseil was more
receptive to the claim that an agreement could threaten the "life of the
nation" by removing national control over migratory flows, and ultimately
control over access to French nationality, but the Conseil denied that this
agreement had that effect. In sharing control of short-term visa policies
with the Schengen partners, France retained sufficient power over the
movement of non-EC visitors, and did not relinquish any power over
French nationality law.2 2 3 Thus, the implementation agreement did not
violate the tripartite standard.
The Conseil rejected all arguments that the implementation agreement
accomplished a (forbidden) transfer of sovereignty rather than a (permissi-
ble) limitation of sovereignty. 22 4 The agreement gave other Schengen
states effective power to authorize the entry of non-EC nationals into
France, but only within certain temporal limits and subject to potential
veto by French authorities. The Conseil also rejected the argument that the
agreement abandoned national sovereignty because it lacked a denuncia-
tion clause; the Conseil found that the absence of a denunciation clause
was not objectionable per se, particularly because the rules of the treaty
could not be modified without the consent of France.2 25 The Conseil's
phrasing did not make clear whether it was distinguishing or discarding
the reasoning it had used in the 1985 death penalty case, which had
emphasized the option of denunciation as a safety valve for national sover-
eignty, even though a well-defined prohibition was involved.
A softening of attitude also appeared in the Conseil's acceptance of
provisions concerning foreign police action on French soil. Among its
other compensating measures, the implementation agreement allowed for-
eign police to engage in surveillance and pursuit of a criminal who crossed
the open border into France, though they could accomplish arrests and
searches only by requesting the French police for assistance.2 2 6 Mazeaud
resulted in severe criticism from the right and a constitutional amendment. See infra
text accompanying notes 360-364.
221. CC decision No. 91-294 DC, July 25, 1991, cons. 9.
222. Id. cons. 11, 17. Note the characteristic claim that a treaty threatens the rights of
citizens by limiting the power of the state to protect them.
223. Id. cons. 13-15.
224. Id. cons. 19-23, 25-26, 38-39.
225. Id. cons. 56-58.
226. Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, supra note 218, at arts.
39-43.
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had strongly objected to the intrusion of foreign police as violating the
principles of the Conseil's 1980 decision on the Franco-German judicial
assistance treaty. 227 Nonetheless, the Conseil found that the restricted
authority to continue law enforcement action into France did not disre-
spect national sovereignty or transfer sovereignty to foreign officers, and
that the treaty itself required foreign police to comply with individual liber-
ties applicable in France. 228
One aspect of the implementation agreement troubled the Conseil
enough to raise the issue sua sponte. The agreement created an intergov-
ernmental Executive Committee to oversee the accurate implementation of
its terms, acting by unanimous vote of the parties.229 Decisions of the
Executive Committee were subject to no judicial control. The Conseil for-
mally reconciled this structure with constitutional principles by observing
that the decisions of this Committee had no direct effect in France, and
that measures taken by French authorities in response to those decisions
would themselves be reviewable in court. 230 Once more, then, the Conseil
neutralized a potential constitutional issue by characterizing an institution
as external to the Republic and outside the scope of the applicable constitu-
tional provision.
Thus, by 1991, the Conseil constitutionnel had upheld every interna-
tional commitment referred to it, including regional innovations under-
taken both within and outside the regime of European Community law. Its
sparse case law had partly sketched, not always consistently, the essential
boundary of national sovereignty that could not be infringed without a
constitutional amendment.
d. The First Maastricht Decision
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 both amended the prior Community
treaties and added a new Treaty on European Union. Responding to post-
Cold War changes in Europe, the agreement accelerated integration in
order to anchor reunified Germany more firmly in the EC, and to reform
legislative processes in anticipation of new accessions. 231 Major innova-
tions included provisions on political union, creating a European citizen-
ship and increasing Community powers over migration of third-country
nationals, and provisions on economic and monetary union, progressing
227. See ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, June 3, 1991, 1st sitting, at
2668 (remarks of M. Pierre Mazeaud), available at http://archives.assemblee-nation-
ale.fr/9/cri/1990-1991-ordinaire2/070.pdf.
228. CC decision No. 91-294 DC, July 25, 1991, cons. 38-40.
229. Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, supra note 218, at arts.
131-32.
230. CC decision No. 91-294 DC, July 25, 1991, cons. 62; see also Xavier Pretot, La
conformite a la Constitution de la loi autorisant I'approbation de la Convention
d'application de I'Accord de Schengen, 28 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 194,
209-211 (describing this holding as ambiguous concerning which actions needed to be
reviewable and why).
231. See GUYOMARCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 39.
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in stages to the adoption of a common currency.2 32 The treaty also
expanded the powers of the European Parliament and adopted a co-deci-
sion procedure that gave that body a full veto over the enactment of certain
measures. 2 33 Additional powers over labor policy, implemented in part by
qualified majority voting, resulted from a Social Protocol that omitted the
United Kingdom. 23 4 The European Union umbrella also covered a "second
pillar" of intergovernmental cooperation on common foreign and security
policy, and a "third pillar" of cooperation in justice and home affairs. 23 5
The Maastricht treaty prompted controversy and constitutional soul-
searching in other European countries, and produced three decisions of
the Conseil Constitutionnel, including the first-ever finding that ratification
of a treaty would require a constitutional amendment. Nonetheless, the
Conseil's initial Maastricht decision is as remarkable for what the Conseil
deemed constitutional as for what it deemed unconstitutional.
The drafting of the Maastricht Treaty extended over several years, and
its referral to the Conseil was long anticipated. That expectation gave the
Conseil the opportunity to prepare for deliberations on a large and complex
set of instruments within the one-month deadline set by the Conseil's
organizing statute.2 3 6 The decision confirmed that the Conseil would
restrict its evaluation to the new commitments entailed by the treaty, and
would not address the constitutionality of commitments already in force
under prior treaties (such as the Single European Act, which had never
been submitted to its review). The Conseil justified this restriction by refer-
ence to the norm of respect for treaty obligations, pacta sunt servanda,
which the Conseil treated as having constitutional significance, as an aspect
of France's conformity to public international law contemplated by Para-
graph 14 of the 1946 Preamble, and by reference to the status given to
treaties by Article 55 of the 1958 Constitution.23 7 It thus declined to
extend to treaties the practice it had adopted for statutes in 1985, of exam-
ining the constitutionality of an earlier statute while reviewing a new stat-
ute that amended it.2 3 8
The Conseil invoked Paragraph 15 of the 1946 Preamble, which it now
interpreted as permitting "transfers of competences" to international orga-
nizations on the basis of reciprocity, instead of permitting only "limita-
232. See Roger J. Goebel, The European Community and Eastern Europe: "Deepening"
and "Widening" the Community Brand of Economic Federalism, 1 NEw EUR. L. REV. 163,
202-04, 207 (1993).
233. Id. at 209-11.
234. Id. at 210.
235. Id. at 205-06; Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in
the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT'L U.. 846, 848
(1994).
236. See Bruno Genevois, Le Traite sur I'Union europeenne et la Constitution: A propos
de la decision du Conseil constitutionnel no. 92-308 DC du 9 avril 1992, 8 REVUE FRANCAISE
DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 373, 377 (1992) (explanation of the decision by the secretary
general of the Conseil).
237. CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992, cons. 7-8.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
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tions of sovereignty" as in previous decisions. 2 39 The Conseil did not
literally say that it was approving "transfers of sovereignty," but it no longer
relied on the distinction between limitations and transfers of sovereignty
that it had articulated in 1976 and had purported to apply in subsequent
cases. 24 0 Instead, it evaluated the effects of the power transferred in order
to determine whether that transfer infringed upon the essential conditions
of the exercise of national sovereignty, taking into account the nature of the
subject matter and also the modality by which the transferred power would
be exercised.24 1
Applying its new criteria, the Conseil found two aspects of the treaty
incompatible with national sovereignty. First, the Conseil addressed mone-
tary policy. The monetary union created by the treaty would progress in
three stages to the adoption of a common currency (i.e., the euro). The
initial two stages involved coordination of monetary policy, limits on infla-
tion and reduction of deficits. At the third stage, once the conditions of
convergence had been met, individual national currencies would be
replaced by a common currency, monetary policy would be supervised by
an independent European Central Bank, and exchange rates with third-
states would be regulated at the EU level (partly by unanimity and partly
by qualified majority voting). The Conseil found that, at this third stage,
the modalities of decision-making would deprive France of its own powers
over monetary and exchange policy, a domain implicating the essential
conditions of the exercise of national sovereignty. 24 2
Second, the Conseil addressed visa and immigration policy. New pro-
visions regarding entry and movement of non-EU citizens gave the EU
authority to determine as common policy which third countries' nationals
would be required to obtain visas before crossing the EU's external bor-
ders. Until 1996, the EU Council would make such determinations by
unanimity, with an exception allowing qualified majority voting on urgent
restrictions lasting six months in response to a mass influx; from 1996
onward, the EU Council would adopt common visa policies by qualified
majority. The Conseil concluded that qualified majority voting on emer-
gency measures was acceptable, but that the shift from unanimity to quali-
fied majority as the general rule would pose too great a risk to national
239. CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992, cons. 13. In addition, the Conseil
treated the requirement of reciprocity in Paragraph 15 as purely formal; the fact that the
treaty would not come into force until all the member states had ratified it, irrespective
of the variations in their obligations, satisfied this requirement. Id. cons. 16.
240. Commentators had criticized this distinction, and it became increasingly untena-
ble as a description of the authority that France was granting to the European
Community.
241. See Genevois, supra note 236, at 386; see also Nolle Lenoir, Les rapports entre le
droit constitutionnel franais et le droit international a travers le filtre de l'article 54 de la
Constitution de 1958, in DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT INTERNE DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE
COMPAREE DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL ET DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 11, 21 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy
ed., 2001) (characterizing the Conseil's approach since 1992 as "essentiellement pragma-
tique") (Lenoir was a member of the Conseil constitutionnel from March 1992 to March
2001).
242. CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992, cons. 43.
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sovereignty. 2 43
The Conseil also departed somewhat from the approach of the 1985
death penalty decision by treating the protection of rights and liberties of
citizens as a separate factor in evaluating a treaty, rather than as a compo-
nent of the essential conditions of national sovereignty.2 44 Taking note of
the express recognition of individual rights in the Maastricht Treaty2 4 5 and
the combined availability of supranational and national courts to enforce
individual rights, the Conseil concluded that the Treaty would not infringe
constitutionally guaranteed rights.246 The basis of this optimistic predic-
tion is unclear, as the decision does not address possible divergences
between rights recognized at the European level and rights guaranteed by
the French constitution, and the Conseil had not yet elucidated the extent of
French courts' power (or the Conseil's own power) to enforce French consti-
tutional rights against the implementation of European norms.2 4 7
Examining the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding EU citi-
zenship, the Conseil found one specific conflict regarding the eligibility of
non-nationals to vote and to stand for office in municipal elections.
Because municipal officials formed part of the colleges that chose mem-
bers of the national Senate, municipal elections implicated national sover-
eignty, which must be exercised by citizen suffrage under Article 3.248 On
the other hand, the participation of EU citizens in electing France's repre-
sentatives to the European Parliament raised no constitutional problem,
because the Conseil continued to externalize the European Parliament as a
body that did not exercise national sovereignty and whose electoral regime
was not specified by the French constitution.2 4 9
This limited critique of European citizenship fell far short of the objec-
tions raised by opponents of the treaty, including former Conseil member
Frangois Goguel. 25 0 He saw the very concept of European citizenship as
243. Id. cons. 49. In the official translation, "the abandonment of the unanimity rule
from 1 January 1996 as provided by Article 100C(3) could, in spite of Article 100C(4)
and (5), generate a situation in which the exercise of national sovereignty was
jeopardised."
244. Id. cons. 17-18.
245. The Maastricht Treaty committed the European Union to "respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention ... and as they result from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community
law." Treaty on European Union tit. 1, art. F(2), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 191), 31
I.L.M. 253 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
246. CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992, cons. 17-18.
247. The Secretary General's explanation of the decision suggested that the Conseil
was consciously influenced by the approaches of the German and Italian Constitutional
Courts to the approximation of national rights standards by European rights. See
Genevois, supra note 236, at 384. A decade would pass before Conseil decisions openly
addressed this question. See infra text accompanying notes 510-515.
248. CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992, cons. 24-26. The problem thus arose
from the interaction of Articles 3, 24, and 72, and not from the theory that Article 3
prohibited the participation of non-nationals in municipal elections per se, as critics of
the treaty had argued.
249. CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992, cons. 31-35.
250. See Francois Goguel, La souverainetg nationale menacee, LE FIGARO, Apr. 9, 1992,
at 2F. As noted above, Prof. Goguel was the author of the initial, unsuccessful report for
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erecting a supranational sovereignty dangerous to French national sover-
eignty.251 He also argued that inclusion of non-nationals in the European
Parliament electorate violated the Conseil's 1976 explication of the Euro-
pean Parliament as separately representing each of the peoples of the mem-
ber states, rather than representing a (nonexistent) European people.252
Moreover, the enhancement of the democratic credentials of the European
Parliament, through the adoption of the rhetoric of European citizenship
and the Parliament's increased legislative role in the co-decision procedure,
escaped the Conseil's censure.
It should be emphasized that, although the Conseil's decision did not
explicitly analyze every provision of the treaty, it offered a comprehensive
statement of the constitutional conflicts that it perceived, and declared the
rest of the treaty consistent with the Constitution.2 5 3 The Conseil could
not anticipate what form a constitutional amendment eliminating the con-
flicts would take, and it was obliged to identify all the problems that
needed to be addressed.254 The Conseil later confirmed that this declara-
tion of the validity of the remainder of the treaty amounted to a binding
conclusion with the effect of res judicata (la chose jugee).255
Thus, the Conseil's first Maastricht decision involved both the first
occasion on which it had found a conflict between a treaty and the Consti-
tution, and a further loosening of the standards by which potential con-
flicts were to be evaluated. Transfers of policymaking power to
international organizations would be permitted, depending on the extent
and manner of their impact on national sovereignty (especially core com-
ponents of national sovereignty). Political union at the EU level, including
the symbolic recognition of a European citizenship, efforts to mobilize a
European politics, and greater partnership of the European Parliament in
legislation, did not require a prior constitutional amendment. But replace-
ment of the franc by a common currency, majority voting on visa policy,
and local alien suffrage, did require an amendment.
Many critics of the Maastricht Treaty were not satisfied with the Con-
seil's decision, and the struggle over the treaty continued in the debate on
the constitutional amendment, the subsequent referendum on ratification,
and two further appeals to the Conseil constitutionnel.25 6 The Conseil's sec-
ond and third Maastricht decisions will be discussed in subsection f. For
now, it should be observed that the 1992 amendment cleared the way to
ratification by adding a new set of Europe-specific articles to the Constitu-
the decision on direct election of the European Assembly in 1976. See supra Part
Ill.A.2.b.
251. Goguel, supra note 250.
252. Id.; accord, Louis Favoreu & Patrick Gaia, Les decisions du Conseil constitutionnel
relatives au traite sur I'Union europeenne, 11 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL
389, 396-97 (1992) (this portion of the article is by Favoreu).
253. CC decision No. 92-308 DC, Apr. 9, 1992, cons. 51.
254. See Genevois, supra note 236, at 358.
255. CC decision No. 92-312 DC, Sept. 2, 1992, cons. 36, 41, 43; see infra Part
Il.A.2.f.
256. See infra Part 11.A.2.f.
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tion, and not by rewriting the articles of the 1958 Constitution that caused
the conflict.2 5 7 For the first time, the consent of the popular sovereign to a
form of European integration became explicit in the French Constitution.
e. The Distance Traveled
Thus, by April 1992, with no relevant constitutional amendment, the
Conseil constitutionnel had:
- given treaties even greater immunity from post-hoc review than statutes,
elevating pacta sunt servanda to a constitutional principle capable of compet-
ing with or overriding other constitutional principles;
- abandoned its earlier distinction between limitations of sovereign powers
and transfers of sovereign powers as a touchstone of constitutionality;
- allowed in incremental stages the evolution of the European Parliament
as a majoritarian democratic component of the EC legislative process;
- accepted the concept of European citizenship;
- accepted the use of majority voting for temporary adoption of policy in
some areas that it identified as central to national sovereignty;
- avoided application of some constitutional rules to European elections in
France by treating the European Parliament as an external institution;
- begun relying on European courts as guarantors of constitutional rights;
- approved the elimination of routine border controls, in a treaty lacking a
denunciation clause;
- permitted foreign police to pursue suspects into French territory; and
- accepted the use of a human rights treaty to preclude reintroduction of
the death penalty.
Moreover, the Conseil had reached all of these conclusions by relying on
general provisions of the Constitution concerning international coopera-
tion, not Europe-specific provisions, which did not yet exist. On occasion,
the Conseil had accepted proposed treaties as consistent with national sov-
ereignty on a "this far, but no farther" basis, and then subsequently relaxed
its strictures. The Conseil had produced all these holdings in Article 54
proceedings and in equivalent challenges to authorization statutes under
Article 61, with the awareness that other important treaties were avoiding
referral altogether.
The Conseil at last found in Maastricht some treaty provisions that it
could not reconcile with the Constitution, partly with regard to local suf-
frage, but primarily because of excessive sacrifices of sovereignty in the
fields of monetary and migration policy. Ratification would require invo-
cation of the amending process, and would revive the long-postponed ques-
tion of how an amendment that did compromise the "essential conditions
of the exercise of national sovereignty" could be adopted.
257. See Loi constitutionnelle 92-554 du 25 juin 1992 ajoutant A la Constitution un
titre "Des Communautes europeennes et de l'Union europeenne", J.O., June 26, 1992,
p. 8406. The amendment also added some unrelated provisions, adopted as com-
promises in the ratification process, see infra Part III.A.2.f.
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f. Postscript: Maastricht II and III
The constitutional debate over the Maastricht Treaty did not end with
the Conseil's decision, or even with the adoption of the constitutional
amendment designed to authorize ratification of the treaty. Opponents of
the treaty offered a mix of political, substantive, and procedural arguments
aimed at preventing ratification. Ultimately, these arguments failed, but
not until the Conseil constitutionnel had issued two more decisions and a
referendum had narrowly approved the treaty.
Now that the Article 54 procedure had finally resulted in the demand
for a constitutional amendment, questions arose about the form that the
amendment would take. The government favored the least intervention
necessary to permit ratification, and proposed two short, separate articles
authorizing the transfer of competences in accordance with the treaty and
the modification of electoral rules for European citizens in local elec-
tions.258 The amendment would be adopted through the usual parliamen-
tary process, passage of identical texts by majorities in the National
Assembly and the Senate, followed by a three-fifths vote in a joint session at
Versailles.259
But critics argued that this process should not, or even could not, be
employed, and that the amendment should be submitted to a popular refer-
endum. 260 Some claimed merely that the effects of the treaty were too
important for the decision to be made by political elites, and that the peo-
ple should be involved in the process. Others argued that the effect on
fundamental constitutional principles was so great that only the sovereign
people had the power to adopt the amendment.261 This latter argument,
sometimes characterized as positing the existence of "supraconstitutional"
norms that would invalidate the proposed amendment, rested on constitu-
tional theory rather than on constitutional text or precedent.262
Critics also objected to the addition of separate authorizing articles, as
contrasted with systematic revision of the provisions of the Constitution
that conflicted with the treaty. Professor Louis Favoreu argued that
amendment by addition would improperly create a bifurcated or self-con-
tradictory constitution.2 6 3 Some opponents apparently hoped that oblig-
ing the government to tamper directly with provisions of the Preamble or
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen would excite public
258. See Alec Stone, Ratifying Maastricht: France Debates European Union, 11 FRENCH
POL. & Soc'y 70, 75 (1993).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
260. In technical terms, some arguments called for the use of the referendum alterna-
tive rather than the joint session alternative to approve a parliamentary proposal under
Article 89, while others called for an Article 11 referendum, bypassing the parliament
altogether. Arguably, the Article 11 route, employed by de Gaulle in 1962, was, itself,
unconstitutional. See supra note 69.
261. See Constance Grewe, La revision cons titutionnelle en vue de la ratification du
traite de Maastricht, 11 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 413, 416 (1992).
262. See id. at 426; Stone, supra note 258, at 76.
263. See Louis Favoreu, Constitution reviste ou Constitution Bis?, LE FIGARO, Apr. 21,
1992, at 8.
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opposition to the treaty2 6 4 (or to the Government). 265 In the National
Assembly, Gaullist traditionalist Philippe Seguin moved to reject the pro-
posed constitutional amendment as itself unconstitutional for a combina-
tion of these reasons. 26 6 Defenders of the treaty rebutted the theory of
supraconstitutionality, and reproached Seguin for inconsistency with the
position taken by the Chirac Government, of which he had been a member,
on the Single European Act of 1986.267 S~guin's motion failed, but
received substantial support.2 68 Chirac himself, it appears, reluctantly
supported the Maastricht treaty, which was badly dividing his party, and
he was concerned not to alienate pro-European voters. 26 9
As the legislative debate continued, the proposed amendment grew
more complex.2 70 Both chambers insisted on compensating enhancements
to their powers, and the Socialists as usual lacked a majority in the Senate.
One such compromise was the modification of Article 54 to permit sixty
deputies or sixty senators to refer an international commitment to the Con-
seil constitutionnel.2 71 Another gave both chambers the authority (which
they otherwise lacked under the 1958 Constitution) to adopt nonbinding
resolutions addressing the merit of proposed European legislation.2 72 The
264. See, e.g., ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, May 5, 1992, 2d sitting,
at 864 (remarks of M. Philippe Seguin).
265. It should be kept in mind that some members of the parliamentary minority did
not actually oppose ratification, but used the process to impose political costs on the
Socialist majority.
266. See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, May 5, 1992, 2d sitting, at
864 (remarks of M. Philippe Seguin).
267. See id. at 878-79 (remarks of M. Michel Pezet); id. at 881 (remarks of M. Charles
Millon). In 1986, Seguin had been Minister for Social Affairs in the Chirac Government.
268. See Stone, supra note 258, at 76-77; L'examen de projet de revision constitution-
nelle: L'effet Seguin, LE MONDE, May 8, 1992 (describing the diverse motives of those who
voted in favor of the motion).
269. See, e.g., GUYOMARCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 86-87; KNAPP, supra note 23, at
132-33.
270. See Stone, supra note 258, at 78-81; Grewe, supra note 261, at 431-38.
271. See Loi constitutionnelle 92-554 du 25 juin 1992 ajoutant t la Constitution un
titre "Des Communautes europeennes et de l'Union europenne" art. 2, J.O., June 26,
1992, p. 8406 (amending Article 54). Although the Conseil constitutionnel had already
permitted groups of deputies or senators to challenge treaties by challenging authorizing
legislation, adding them to Article 54 gave further procedural advantages, including
access to the Conseil at an earlier stage of the political debate.
The constitutional amendment also required that laws structuring overseas territories
be enacted as organic statutes (lois organiques). Id. art. 3 (amending Article 74). The
provision of the amendment concerning participation of EU citizens in local elections
was modified to specify that the operative rules must be adopted by an organic statute
passed in identical terms by the two chambers. See 1958 CONST. art. 88-3.
272. More specifically, Article 88-4 required the Government to provide the chambers
with the texts of proposed European community acts "of a statutory nature" (i.e.,
addressing matters within parliamentary authority under the 1958 Constitution), and
authorized the chambers to adopt resolutions addressing such texts. See Franqois
Luchaire, L'Union europeenne et la Constitution (Deuxieme partie), REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
933, 965-67 (1992). In one of its earliest decisions, the Conseil constitutionnel had held
that, where not specifically authorized by the Constitution, adoption of nonbinding res-
olutions on issues of policy by the National Assembly amounted to improper interfer-
ence with the province of the executive. See CC decision No. 59-2 DC, June 17, 18, 24,
1959; BELL, supra note 11, at 300-01. The scope of the chambers' authority to adopt
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National Assembly also added a provision declaring French as the national
language, reacting primarily against the prevalence of English in business,
science, and European institutions.2 7 3 Meanwhile, a referendum in Den-
mark had rejected the Maastricht Treaty, and the amendment was reworded
to finesse the possibility that a substitute treaty without Denmark would be
needed. Two key provisions of the resulting amendment read as follows:
Article 88-1
The Republic shall participate in the European Communities and in the
European Union, composed of states which have chosen to exercise certain
of their competences in common in accordance with the treaties which cre-
ated them.
Article 88-2
Subject to reciprocity and according to the terms laid down by the treaty on
European union signed on 7 February 1992, France consents to the transfer
of competences necessary for the creation of European economic and mone-
tary union as well as for the determination of the rules relating to the cross-
ing of the external frontiers of member states of the European
Community.27 4
Evidently, Article 88-2 avoided giving open-ended permission to make
future transfers of power in later treaties, but did not fully specify what
powers it did transfer, operating by reference instead. 27 5 Article 88-1,
added in the National Assembly, was intended to declare and define the
relationship between France and the European Union;2 76 its practical sig-
nificance has changed over time.2 7 7
resolutions was significantly expanded in 2008, but still has limits. See 1958 CONsT. art.
34-1.
273. See, e.g., ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, May 12, 1992, 1st sit-
ting, at 1019 (remarks of M. Edmond Alphandery); Roland Debbasch, La reconnaissance
constitutionnelle de la langue frangaise, 11 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL
457 (1992); Lynne Wilcox, Coup de Langue: The Amendment to Article 2 of the Constitu-
tion: An Equivocal Interpretation of Linguistic Pluralism?, 2(3) MODERN & CONTEMP. FR.
269 (1994). Despite support expressed in the debate for regional languages within
France (such as Breton, Alsatian, Provenqal, and Basque), the amendment quickly
became a possible limit on linguistic regionalism. See Debbasch, supra at 466-68; Wil-
cox, supra at 276-77; see also infra Part II.B.3.a.
274. 1958 CONsT. art. 88-2, translation in BELL, supra note 11, at 260 (1992 version,
subsequently amended).
275. 1958 CONsT. art. 88-3, translation in BELL, supra note 11, at 260 (1992 version,
subsequently amended), addressing local suffrage for European citizens, also operated
by reference:
Subject to reciprocity and according to the terms laid down by the treaty on
European union signed on 7 February 1992, the right to vote and to be elected
in municipal elections may be granted only to citizens of the Union resident in
France. These citizens may not hold the office of mayor or deputy mayor, nor
participate in the nomination of senatorial electors or in the election of senators.
An organic law voted in the same terms by the two chambers shall determine the
provisions for implementing this article.
276. See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, May 12, 1992, 3d sitting, at
1074 (remarks of M. Alain Lemassoure); id. at 1076 (remarks of Mme Elisabeth Guigou,
minister for European affairs).
277. See infra text accompanying notes 480-482, 556-560.
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Although President Mitterrand obtained final passage of the constitu-
tional amendment from a joint congress of the two chambers (with the
Gaullist party abstaining), he decided to seek popular approval of the rati-
fication of the Maastricht Treaty by referendum. Seguin and Charles Pas-
qua led a vigorous opposition campaign, joined by Michel Debre.27 8
Before the vote could take place, a group of Gaullist senators led by Pasqua
used their new access rights under Article 54 to bring the treaty back
before the Conseil constitutionnel. They presented a variety of claims that
the constitutional amendment was invalid, and that, even if it were valid, it
did not cure all conflicts between the treaty and the Constitution.2 7 9
The Maastricht II decision rejected all arguments against the treaty.
As for the validity of the constitutional amendment, the Conseil replied that
the constituent power was sovereign and could choose how to frame its
constitutional amendments, whether as modifications of prior provisions
or as the addition of specific provisions explicitly or implicitly derogating
from them.280 Although the Constitution provided some procedural limi-
tations on the amending power, and required that the republican form of
government be preserved, it otherwise left the amending power free to
abrogate or modify constitutional values.281 Regarding the underlying
question of how far constitutional amendments could go in approving suc-
cessive infringements of national sovereignty, the Conseil treated the
inquiry as hypothetical in the present posture, and declined to address
it. 28 2
Objections merely repeating points that the Conseil had decided,
expressly or silently, in the first Maastricht decision were rejected as res
judicata. New claims concerning alleged gaps between the constitutional
amendment and the treaty failed on the merits.28 3
The referendum was accordingly held on September 20, 1992, and the
treaty was very narrowly approved by a vote of 51 to 49 percent.284 Anti-
Maastricht deputies immediately challenged the constitutionality of the
popularly-enacted law, referring it to the Conseil constitutionnel under Arti-
278. See GUYOMARCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 86-87; KNAPP, supra note 23, at 133.
279. See Saisine par 60 senateurs - 92-312 DC, CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, http://
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-
date/decisions-depuis-1959/1992/92-312-dc/saisine-par-60-senateurs.103100.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2012). Professor Stone Sweet notes that Professor Favoreu drafted
the second and third referrals. See Stone, supra note 258, at 88 n.35. The discussion in
text highlights key arguments, and is not comprehensive.
280. CC decision No. 92-312 DC, Sept. 2, 1992, cons. 19.
281. id.
282. Id. cons. 44-45.
283. The Conseil denied that the optional form in which new Article 88-3 granted
legislative power to enfranchise European citizens in local elections created an addi-
tional conflict between the Constitution and the treaty. Id. cons. 26-29. And it rejected
the argument that Denmark's current unwillingness to ratify the treaty raised a constitu-
tional obstacle to ratification. Id. cons. 12-13. (Denmark ultimately ratified the Maas-
tricht Treaty after extracting additional concessions and holding a second referendum in
May 1993.)
284. See Stone, supra note 258, at 83; CC, Proclamation des resultats du referendum du
20 septembre 1992, Rec. 91 (13,162,992 in favor; 12,623,582 opposed).
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cle 61. The Conseil dismissed the referral on September 23, 1992, reaffirm-
ing its much-criticized 1962 decision that it had no power to rule on the
constitutionality of laws enacted by referendum. 285
3. The Reconstruction of Article 55
As previously described, the superiority in principle of treaties over
statutes under the 1958 Constitution was weakened in practice at the out-
set of the Fifth Republic by the unwillingness of the courts to enforce a
treaty that contradicted a subsequent statute, and was expressly qualified
in Article 55 by the requirement of reciprocal compliance. Shifts in juris-
prudence, however, revolutionized the practice. The civil/criminal courts
first took on the role of ensuring that treaties prevailed over subsequent
statutes, followed by the administrative courts; the administrative courts
accepted their independent responsibility to interpret treaties rather than
leaving their meaning to the executive; and the courts began creating excep-
tions to the reciprocity proviso that have vitiated the purpose that Michel
Debr had designed it to achieve.
a. Article 55 and Subsequent Statutes
As we have seen, Article 55 did not specify how the theoretical pri-
macy of treaties over statutes in the hierarchy of norms would be given
effect. Within the framework of the 1958 Constitution, the obligation of a
later statute to respect an earlier treaty might have been left to the self-
restraint of the legislature, addressed by Article 61 referral of an offending
statute to the Conseil constitutionnel, or adjudicated as occasions arose
through litigation in civil and administrative courts.
Initially, however, these courts did not feel empowered to give treaties
priority over subsequent statutes. Judicially enforcing later treaties over
earlier statutes could be justified on the ground that the later treaty
reflected a superseding expression of the sovereign will, just as a later stat-
ute would have. 286 But judicially enforcing an earlier treaty over a subse-
quent statute placed the judges in the position of controlling legislative
power, analogous to enforcement of constitutional norms against the legis-
lature, and contradicted traditional French attitudes toward the role of the
judiciary in the separation of powers.287 As the commissaire du gouverne-
ment argued in a leading case of the Conseil d'Etat, "if the legislator has
manifested a precise will, if the national statute insinuates itself as a neces-
sary intermediary between the Treaty and the application required of it, no
provision of the Constitution, Article 55 in particular, excuses the judge
from respecting that will."28 8 In its administrative capacity, advising on
285. See CC decision No. 92-313 DC, Sept. 23, 1992; see supra note 69.
286. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 237.
287. See Patrick Wachsmann, L'article 55 de la Constitution de 1958 et les conventions
internationales relatives aux Droits de 1'Homme, 114 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1671,
1675-76 (1998).
288. Syndicat general defabricants de semoules de France, 1970 COMMON MKT. L. REP.
395, 404-05 (1970) (decided 1968) (conclusions of Commissaire du gouvernement
Vol. 45304
2012 The Brakes that Failed
draft bills, the Conseil d'Etat could call attention to contradictions between
a proposed statute and an earlier treaty, but once the statute was enacted,
the administrative judges must follow the statute in deciding a case. 2 9
The creation of the Conseil constitutionnel provided a new (not strictly
"judicial") forum in which failures to respect Article 55 might be addressed
after the legislature had voted on a subsequent statute but before its pro-
mulgation. When groups of sixty legislators received the power to refer
statutes for constitutional review, the first such referral occurred in the
highly sensitive context of a challenge to a statute liberalizing the regula-
tion of abortion. The dissenting deputies alleged infringement of constitu-
tional rights and violation of the right to life as protected by the European
Convention on Human Rights, and, therefore, of Article 55.290 In
response, the Conseil constitutionnel held that its own jurisdiction extended
to issues of constitutionality, not of conformity to treaties, which had a
different normative character. 291 The decision arguably implied that such
claims should be raised instead before the civil/criminal and administra-
tive courts.292
The Conseil's refusal to review statutes for their conformity to particu-
lar treaties has been defended on practical grounds: given the vast number
of potentially conflicting treaties and the short time frame within which
the Conseil constitutionnel must rule (one month at most), assigning the
Conseil the task of reviewing a priori the conformity of newly-enacted stat-
utes with treaties would overload its capacity.293 Retail enforcement of
Article 55 was better performed on a case-by-case basis in the civil/crimi-
Questiaux). The term commissaire du gouvernement refers to a member of the Conseil
d'Etat assigned the role of presenting an objective analysis of the case and a proposed
result, corresponding to the avocat-general in the Cour de Cassation. The title commis-
saire du gouvernement was recently replaced by rapporteur public in order to stress the
impartiality of the role, after criticism of the institution by the European Court of
Human Rights. See infra note 579.
289. See Syndicat general de fabricants de semoules de France, supra note 288, at 406.
290. Jacques Robert, La decision du Conseil constitutionnel du 15 janvier 1975 sur
I'interruption volontaire de grossesse, 1975 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 873,
874-75.
291. CC decision No. 74-54 DC, Jan. 15, 1975. The dissenting legislators were actu-
ally members of the majority center-right coalition. The law had been enacted with the
support of the opposition. The Conseil constitutionnel rejected the other constitutional
objections on the merits.
292. See, e.g., FAVOREU & PHILIP, supra note 124, at 371. It is now known that Fran-
gois Goguel, the rapporteur on this case, stated this view in his report. See GRANDES
DELIBERATIONS, supra note 69, at 268-70. The relevant portion of his draft decision,
which was not explicit on this point, was adopted without modification. Id. at 278. This
documentation may cast some doubt on Karen Alter's account aligning the Conseil con-
stitutionnel with the Conseil d'Etat in resistance to the supremacy of European law in the
1970s. See KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING
OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 145-58 (2001).
293. See, e.g., Bruno Genevois, Faut-il maintenir la jurisprudence issue de la decision
no. 74-54 DC du 15 janvier 1975?, 7 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 95 (1999).
Goguel mentioned the magnitude of the task in his report, and so did the Conseil's Presi-
dent Roger Frey in the discussion, as Genevois surely knew, having had access to the
records as Secretary General of the Conseil. See GRANDEs DELIBERATIONS, supra note 69,
at 269, 275.
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nal and administrative courts, where individual litigants had the opportu-
nity to point out inconsistencies.
The Conseil eventually distinguished between such case-by-case
enforcement and direct or wholesale violation of Article 55 by means of a
statute openly challenging the principle of the primacy of treaties, which
would lie within the Conseil's jurisdiction. In 1986, Michel Debra, pro-
testing the Government's failure to submit a border control accord between
France and Germany to the legislature for authorization, inserted language
in an immigration statute making the statute's procedures subject only to
"duly ratified and not denounced" international conventions.2 9 4 The Con-
seil constitutionnel invalidated this statutory language as improperly
attempting to narrow the scope of Article 55.295
Meanwhile, the Cour de Cassation, the highest of the civil/criminal
courts, had responded quickly to the Conseil constitutionnel's decision in
the abortion case by accepting its own authority to apply earlier treaties in
preference to later conflicting statutes. 296 The Conseil d'Etat, however, as
the highest administrative court, resisted this conclusion for over a decade,
continuing until 1989 to rely on the theory that an administrative court
could not look past a later statute to a treaty that it allegedly violated. 297
In the watershed case Nicolo, the commissaire du gouvernement gave
several reasons for revising the Conseil d'Etat's concept of its role under the
1958 Constitution. 298 The Conseil constitutionnel's definition of its own
powers under Article 55 assuaged concern that the Conseil d'Etat would be
effectively judging the constitutionality of statutes if it gave preference to
294. See Dhommeaux, supra note 65, at 1460-61. Technically, this language could be
understood as limiting the primacy of conventions to those "ratified" by the President,
and not those "approved" by a minister. See supra note 58. Dhommeaux explains that
the phrase was poorly drafted and was really intended to deny primacy to conventions
not duly "authorized" (by the legislature). Dhommeaux, supra note 65, at 1461. The
accord that provoked the amendment was a bilateral agreement between France and
Germany, predecessor to the Schengen agreements discussed above. See Accord entre le
gouvernement de la Republique frangaise et le gouvernement de la Republique fdrale
d'allemagne relatif a la suppression graduelle des contr6les a la frontiere Franco Alle-
mande, July 13, 1984, Fr.-Ger., J.O. Aug. 3, 1984, p. 2565.
295. CC decision No. 86-216 DC, Sept. 3, 1986, cons. 5.
296. See Cour de cassation, Administration des Douanes v. Societe CafesJacques Vabre,
[1975] 2 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 336, 368-69 (1975). The arguments of the procureur
general emphasized the recent decision of the Conseil constitutionnel, id. at 358-60, and
also referred to the internationalist intentions of the proponents of Article 55 and its
predecessors in the 1946 Constitution, id. at 361-62, while urging the court to base its
decision directly on the principle of the preeminence of European Community law, id. at
363-64. The court's decision placed greater reliance on Article 55 than the procureur
general suggested. Id. at 368-69.
297. In the interim, the Conseil constitutionnel gave renewed encouragement to the
administrative courts to apply treaties in preference to subsequent legislation, first by
language included in its 1986 decision on DebrCs amendment, see CC decision No. 86-
216 DC, Sept. 3, 1986, cons. 5-6; and then by example, examining the compatibility of a
subsequent statute with the European Convention on Human Rights in the course of
deciding an election challenge in its non-constitutional capacity. See CC decision No.
88-1082/1117, Oct. 21, 1988, cons. 3-5; ALTER, supra note 292, at 159.
298. Conseil d'Etat, Nicolo, [1990] 1 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 173 (1990) (conclusions
of Frydman, commissaire du gouvernement) (decided 1989).
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earlier treaties, and revealed a gap in treaty enforcement that the adminis-
trative courts needed to fill. 29 9 The discrepancy between the approach of
the civil /criminal courts and that of the administrative courts made the
gap in public law cases more anomalous,3 0 0 and illustrated the "profound
questioning of the supremacy of statute under the Fifth Republic."30 1
More generally, "lilt cannot be repeated often enough that the era of the
unconditional supremacy of internal law is now over," particularly, but not
only, with regard to European Community law.3 02 Thus, both develop-
ments in France's international (and European) relations and the dimin-
ished status of Parliament justified an increased role for the administrative
courts in treaty enforcement.
The Nicolo decision has been explained as resulting from both politi-
cal realignment and the changed institutional context of the Conseil
d'Etat.303 By the mid-1980s, President Mitterrand had renounced socialist
experimentation and turned to European integration as a strategy for
improving France's economic situation.304 Jacques Chirac, the Prime Min-
ister from 1986 to 1988, also abandoned the traditional Gaullist anti-Euro-
pean stance and economic protectionism.3 0 5 The Government encouraged
a more cooperative attitude toward Europe in the Conseil d'Etat, through
policy initiatives and arguably through personnel changes. 3 06 The
councilors themselves came to recognize that the expansion of European
Community activity meant that they could achieve more impact by influ-
encing European policy than by reacting against it.
b. Article 55 and Treaty Interpretation
The civil/criminal and administrative judges' review of the consis-
tency of legislation with prior treaties has had particular impact in the area
of individual rights, including questions of government structure that can
be framed in human rights terms. France belatedly ratified the European
Convention on Human Rights in 1974,307 and accepted the right of indi-
viduals to bring cases against it before the Commission and the European
299. Id. at 181-82.
300. Id. at 182-83.
301. Id. at 184.
302. Id. at 183.
303. See, e.g., ALTER, supra note 292, at 158-66; Michel Mangenot, The Conseil d'Etat
and Europe: Adapting the French Administrative State, in FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE
EUROPEAN UNION 88, 90 (Helen Drake ed., 2005).
304. See STEVENS, supra note 6, at 262.
305. See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 419-20.
306. See ALTER, supra note 292, at 162; Mangenot, supra note 303, at 91.
307. See Alain Pellet, La ratification par la France de la convention europtenne des droits
de l'Homme, 90 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1319, 1320-21 (1974). President Georges
Pompidou laid the groundwork for ratification of the European Convention on Human
Rights before his death. Subsequently, Alain Poher, as interim President, completed the
ratification of the Convention. France also ratified the first, fourth, sixth, and seventh
protocols during this period. These protocols add substantive rights to the Convention.
As discussed earlier, the sixth protocol on the death penalty led to an Article 54 decision
of the Conseil constitutionnel, which held that no constitutional obstacle to ratification
existed.
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Court of Human Rights in 1981.308 While the civil/criminal and adminis-
trative courts already had the authority to apply both constitutional rights
and international human rights provisions in evaluating executive and judi-
cial action, the modern interpretation of Article 55 enables judges to mea-
sure current legislation against the standards set by the European
Convention.
The willingness of both the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d'Etat to
enforce treaties at the expense of later legislation gave increased impor-
tance to the question of how the treaties were to be interpreted. Traditional
French approaches to the separation of the judicial and executive functions
had identified treaty interpretation as largely an executive function relating
to the conduct of foreign affairs.30 9 In practice, the courts varied in their
application of this conception. For the administrative courts, ambiguous
treaty provisions should be referred to the ministry of foreign affairs for a
definitive interpretation that would bind the court, while provisions
deemed unambiguous could be applied without seeking such guidance
under the doctrine of the "acte clair."310 Chambers of the Cour de Cassa-
tion applied a similar doctrine, but some had developed an additional rule
that the courts could interpret treaty provisions implicating only private
interests, rather than public concerns, without reference to the ministry.311
These regimes of executive interpretation did not apply, however, to
questions of European Community law. There, the courts accepted that
the treaty mechanism of preliminary reference of interpretative questions
to the European Court of Justice displaced the system of reference to the
executive.312 Moreover, the Conseil d'Etat may have followed an implicit
rule against referring questions under the European Human Rights Con-
vention to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - unlike the Cour de Cassation,
the Conseil d'Eat never made such a referral.313
308. See Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad & Anne Weber, The Reception Process in
France and Germany, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEMS 107, 109 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008). The acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the court occurred early in Frangois Mitterrand's first term.
309. G.R. Delaume, De I'application et de I'interpretation des Traites par les Tribunaux
interne dans les relations franco-americaines, 80 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 584,
591 (1953).
310. See Conseil d'htat, supra note 96, at 29-30. Clarity, not surprisingly, was in the
eye of the beholder. The report also observed that the "acte clair" doctrine lent itself to
literalist and restrictive interpretations of treaties. Id.
311. See Denis Alland, Jamais, parfois, toujours: Reflexions sur la competence de la Cour
de Cassation en matiere d'interpretation des conventions internationales, 100 REVUE GENER-
ALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 599, 603 (1996); see also Delaume, supra note 309, at
615 (discussing interpretive practice in the Fourth Republic).
312. See Conseil d'Etat, supra note 96, at 30. Both the Cour de Cassation and the Con-
seil d'Etat, however, made broad use of the "acte clair" exception in European Commu-
nity law, and the Conseil d'tat did not refer a question to the European Court ofJustice
until 1970. See ALTER, supra note 292, at 144; 0. Audeoud et al., The Application of
Community Law in France: Review of French Court Decisions from 1974 to 1981, 19 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 289, 291 (1982).
313. See ABRAHAM, supra note 204, at 96-97 (suggesting that the Conseil d'Etat already
assumed full authority to construe lawmaking treaties such as the European Conven-
tion); Jean-Paul Costa, L'application par le Conseil d'Etat frangais de la convention
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The Conseil d'Etat repudiated its traditional understanding of the dis-
tribution of interpretive authority in the GISTI decision of 1990.314 Hence-
forth, the interpretation of treaties would be regarded as a judicial function
of the administrative courts, paying due respect to the information sup-
plied by the executive. The analysis of the commissaire du gouvernement
emphasized several factors favoring this reversal. The French practice of
binding ministerial interpretation in contested cases was unique in Europe,
arguably inconsistent with the requirement of an impartial and indepen-
dent court under the European Human Rights Convention, and in tension
with principles of judicial independence otherwise applicable in France.3 15
Moreover, now that the Conseil d'Etat enforced the supremacy of treaties
over statutes, to allow the executive to dictate the meaning of treaties would
enable the ministry to trump subsequent legislation.316 Although the
GISTI decision involved bilateral treaties between France and Algeria, the
commissaire du gouvernement urged the Conseil d'&at to adopt the
approach for treaties in general.3 17 The Conseil d'E2tat should not prohibit
the administrative courts from seeking the ministry's views, but rather
should eliminate the binding effect of the response.3 18
The arguments in the GISTI decision foreshadowed the response of the
European Court of Human Rights, which would indeed hold in 1994 that
the Conseil d'Etat's prior practice of absolute deference to ministerial inter-
pretations violated Article 6(1) of the European Convention.319 In the
wake of that decision, the chambers of the Cour de Cassation also modified
their own approach, but these developments occurred in the second period
discussed later.
The acceptance of independent authority to interpret treaties further
strengthened the effect of "supranational" institutions in France. It redrew
the boundaries between judicial and executive power with regard to inter-
national obligations in general, and led to stricter enforcement of obliga-
tions under the European Human Rights Convention, in particular. 320 (It
is important to recall that European human rights law represented a dis-
tinct body of law from European Community law from the perspective of
1958 or 1990, although their interrelations have deepened over the
europeenne des droits de I'Homme, 8 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 395, 397
(noting that the Conseil d'Ptat had never referred a European Convention question to the
ministry); Alland, supra note 311, at 634 (discussing Cour de cassation's deferral to the
ministry of foreign affairs on the scope of the prohibition against retroactive criminal
legislation under article 7 of the European Convention).
314. CE Ass., June 29, 1990, reprinted in 94 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIc 879, 879 (1990) [hereinafter GISTI] (conclusions of Abraham, commissaire du
gouvernement). The commissaire du gouvernement on this occasion was Ronny Abraham,
the author of the treatise cited in the preceding footnote, and subsequently a judge of the
International Court of Justice.
315. Id. at 901-03.
316. Id. at 899-900.
317. Id. at 904.
318. Id. at 905.
319. Beaumartin v. France, 296-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
320. See Abdelgawad & Weber, supra note 308, at 139-40.
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decades that followed.) Over time, the French courts have become increas-
ingly accepting of the legal interpretations-sometimes surprising and
unwelcome-of the European Court of Human Rights, while still retaining
some space for dialogue and occasional resistance. 32'
The consequences with regard to other treaties have been mixed. Spe-
cifically, the global human rights treaties ratified by France have played a
smaller role. Thus far, at least, litigants raise them less frequently, and
courts sometimes find that treaty provisions, or entire treaties, lack direct
effect (i.e., in U.S. terms, are not self-executing). 322 Courts also feel freer
to adopt narrower interpretations of treaty language than those favored by
global human rights bodies, which have less power, both de jure and de
facto, than the European regional courts.323
Before leaving the topic of treaty interpretation, it should be observed
that a different process of interaction between the European human rights
system and the French constitutional system also arose in the course of the
1980s, namely, the influence of European human rights jurisprudence on
the interpretation of constitutional rights by the Conseil constitutionnel.
This influence is not obvious on the face of the Conseil's decisions, which
rarely cite the Conseil's own prior decisions, let alone external sources. 324
Nonetheless, a report submitted on behalf of the Conseil to a 1993 confer-
ence identified three areas in which the European Court of Human Rights
had influenced its case law:3 25 first, the pluralist character of freedom of
expression within a democracy; second, the extension of fundamental prin-
ciples of criminal procedure to other proceedings imposing punitive sanc-
tions; and third, an interpretation of the rights of criminal defense to
321. See id. at 138-39.
322. See, e.g., Roger Errera, L'application de la Convention de l'ONU relative aux droit
de P'enfant (CDE) et l'incidence de la Convention europeenne des droits de P'homme (CEDH)
sur les droits de l'enfant dans la jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat, 17 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME 329, 333 (2005) (discussing the practice of deciding provision by
provision whether obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child have
direct effect, and giving examples of other human rights treaties denied direct effect).
323. See, e.g., Wachsmann, supra note 287, at 1679-89 (discussing the Conseil
d'Etat's narrower interpretation of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights).
324. See BELL, supra note 11, at 51 (noting that the Conseil constitutionnel tends to
repeat language from prior cases rather than cite them, except for reasons such as dem-
onstrating res judicata effect). The first time that the Conseil constitutionnel expressly
cited a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in one of its decisions was in
2004; but the Conseil constitutionnel had special reasons for citing the judgment. See CC
decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004; see also infra note 509 and accompanying
text.
325. Rapport de la d61egation frangaise, Protection constitutionnelle et protection inter-
nationale des droits de l'homme: Concurrence ou complementaritd?, in IXE CONFERENCE DES
COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES EUROPtENNES (Paris, 10-13 mai 1993), at 319, 343 (citing
decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel from 1982 to 1990). Professor Favoreu observed
that the report was presumably written by the Secretary General of the Conseil constitu-
tionnel, Bruno Genevois. Louis Favoreu, La prise en compte du droit international et com-
munautaire dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, in L'lNTERNATIONALITE DANS
LES INSTITUTIONS ET LE DROIT: CONVERGENCES ET DEFIS: ETUDES OFFERTEs A ALAIN PLANTEY
33, 37 (1995).
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include a fair procedure guaranteeing the equality of rights of the opposing
parties (in Strasbourg parlance, the principle of "equality of arms"). 3 26
Although the borrowing of European human rights concepts may have
been limited and implicit during this first period, it became more common
and more openly acknowledged in the years after 1992.327
c. The Decline of the Article 55 Reciprocity Proviso
Judicial interpretation severely undermined the requirement of reci-
procity, which Michel Debre had designed to limit the enforcement of trea-
ties by making their authority depend on compliance by treaty partners. In
1975, at the same time that the Cour de Cassation held that it could enforce
the superiority of treaties over subsequent statutes under Article 55, it also
concluded that the exception for lack of reciprocity had no application to
enforcement of European Community law.3 28 Rather, "in the Community
legal order the failings of a member-State of the European Economic Com-
munity to comply with the obligations falling on it by virtue of the Treaty
of 25 March 1957 are subject to the procedure laid down by Article 170 of
that Treaty and so the plea of lack of reciprocity cannot be made before the
national courts."32 9 Even as to bilateral treaties, the civil chamber of the
Cour de cassation sharply limited the impact of the reciprocity proviso by
holding that courts were not authorized to address such objections unless
the executive had taken the initiative to denounce the treaty or suspend its
application. 3 30 The Conseil d'Etat, meanwhile, adopted the approach of
resolving doubts about the reciprocal application of a treaty by referring it
to the ministry of foreign affairs for a determination that the court would
then treat as binding.3 3 1 Such referrals, however, never involved European
Community law or human rights treaties, and a 1985 study published by
the Conseil d'Etat expressed the idea that "[clertain multilateral conven-
tions exclude by their very nature any idea of reciprocity: the conventions
concluded under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation,
the European human rights convention, and more generally, often those
conventions that may be regarded as law-making treaties."3 3 2 Thus, the
326. Christos Rozakis, The Right to a Fair Trial in Civil Cases, 4 JUD. STUD. INST. J. 96,
101-02 (2004).
327. See infra Part 11I.B.6.
328. Cour de cassation, Administration des Douanes v. Societe Cafes Jacques Vabre,
[1975] 2 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 336, 369 (1975).
329. Id.
330. Cour de cassation civ., Mar. 6, 1984, 111 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 859,
864 (Kryla). For a case in which the executive had taken such an initiative, see Cour de
cassation le civ., Mar. 23, 1994, Bull. Civ. 1, No. 105 (N'Guyen Duy Thong).
331. CE Ass., May 29, 1981, Rec. Lebon 220 (Rekhou) (referring to a bilateral treaty
between France and Algeria). The Conseil d'Etat continued to regard ministerial deter-
minations of reciprocity as binding, even after it had recognized independent judicial
authority to interpret ambiguous treaty provisions in the 1990 GISTI decision. See supra
text accompanying note 314. Later, the European Court of Human Rights held that the
binding character of the executive determination violated principles of judicial indepen-
dence; the Conseil d'Etat finally overruled its prior decision in 2010. See infra Part
III.B.7.
332. Conseil d'Etat, supra note 96, at 17.
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treaties that presented the greatest potential to penetrate the national legal
order were being excused from the sanction of the reciprocity proviso.
During this first period, the Conseil constitutionnel did not rule on pos-
sible exceptions to the reciprocity proviso. That would come later. The
one important clarification concerned the consequences of the proviso. In
1980, a group of opposition deputies challenged an amendment to an
excise tax on alcoholic beverages, which had been adopted to ensure com-
pliance with a judgment of the European Court of Justice condemning pro-
tectionist discrimination.333 The deputies argued that other European
states still imposed comparable discriminations and that, therefore, the
reciprocity that would require compliance was absent, and the statute was
unconstitutional. The Conseil constitutionnel rejected this claim, explaining
that Article 55 dealt only with the choice of applicable law between a treaty
and a conflicting statute, and that any possible lack of reciprocity did not
restrict the authority of the legislature to enact a compliant statute.334 In
deciding on these grounds, the Conseil constitutionnel left open the possibil-
ity that the reciprocity proviso might apply to European Community law,
but did not address it.
4. Interim Conclusion
By 1992, the effort in the 1958 Constitution to entrench Gaullist con-
ceptions of national sovereignty against future inroads by a more interna-
tionally inclined legislative majority had failed on numerous fronts. The
Article 54 procedure as written contained loopholes, and the Conseil consti-
tutionnel had narrowed one loophole by authorizing the parliamentary
opposition to refer treaties, but opened another by constitutionalizing the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. The substantive standards applied under
Article 54 suffered from ambiguity and were susceptible to drift over time.
The compromise between monism and dualism that underlay Article 55
proved unstable, and the pressures of participation in the EEC led to the
ascendancy of the monist elements, with consequences that extended
beyond European Community law. European human rights rules affected
both the structure and the outcome of litigation, and had started to influ-
ence the interpretation of constitutional rights.
The five-to-four decision on direct election of the European Assembly
suggests the contingency of the course of events. In 1976, the Gaullist
majority on the Conseil constitutionnel could have played the role of guardi-
ans of tradition against the innovations of a newly elected regime, by
requiring a constitutional amendment. The result might have been to
block the democratization process at the European level, or to write more
specific hedges against Europe into the Constitution itself; alternatively, it
might have been a constitutional green light. Partly to avoid the latter risk,
333. CC decision No. 80-126 DC, Dec. 30, 1980, cons. 3; see Case 168/78, Comm'n v.
France, 1980 E.C.R. 347, 351. This was not the only provision of the statute that the
group of opposition deputies challenged, nor the only ground on which they challenged
this provision.
334. CC decision No. 80-126 DC, Dec. 30, 1980, cons. 5-6.
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the Conseil upheld the conformity of the treaty, and wrote principles into
its decision instead, including the prohibition on transfers of sovereignty.
While the Conseil constitutionnel continued to approve incremental
innovations over the following decade, the momentum toward Europe kept
growing. The Gaullists also suffered electoral defeat, and their representa-
tion on the Conseil dwindled. With Mitterrand as the adversary and the
Giscardians more as potential allies than as rivals, Chirac promoted a ver-
sion of Gaullism less hostile to European integration. The Conseil d'Etat
was converted into an enforcer of European norms. As Debre had pre-
dicted, and now protested, the intergovernmental vision of European
authority yielded ground to the claims of the European Parliament and the
efficiency of qualified majority voting.
Michel Debre evaluated the Conseil constitutionnel's performance in his
memoirs: the institution was good, but people with the wrong understand-
ing of national sovereignty were serving on it.3 35 Another observer, Profes-
sor tlisabeth Zoller, suggested that Article 54 could not serve the purpose
for which it was originally designed, because defining the substance of
national sovereignty was a political and not a legal task.33 6 The unexpected
end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, and the opening to the
East provoked the quantum jump to political and monetary union. By the
time that the Conseil constitutionnel-with no Gaullist appointees-finally
found a treaty that required a constitutional amendment, the necessary
three-fifths majority was available among the political elites.
Looking forward from 1992, the Maastricht amendment might be
viewed in two different ways, legally and politically. From the political per-
spective, it provided express constituent consent to European integration
for the first time. It Europeanized the 1958 Constitution. Indeed, the
Maastricht ratification process gave a double legitimation, first through a
constitutional amendment by the people's representatives, and then
through a narrow referendum victory (far less than three-fifths) endorsing
political and monetary union and all that had gone before it. An external
observer might say that the fundamental decision was taken to sacrifice the
Gaullist conception of sovereignty for the benefits of European integration.
Further adjustments to the EU would be technicalities; they might or might
not legally require a supermajority vote, but they would not raise issues of
political legitimacy. In spirit, the amendment would have accomplished
the type of open-ended authorization for the European sphere that the Con-
335. DEBRE, supra note 31, at 414 (1988) ("11 m'est arrive de regretter l'orientation du
Conseil notamment a propos du principe fondamental de la souverainete nationale car
il est des principes qui ne souffrent aucun compromis. Je l'ai dit et le redirai, mais je
dois reconnaitre dans l'ensemble la valeur de la jurisprudence. D'oil l'importance
accrue du choix des hommes qui composent le Conseil. La regle est ginerale: il n'est
d'institution qui vaille qu'a cette condition.").
336. ZOLLER, supra note 85, at 291-92 ("Au terme de l'&volution, il est douteux que le
contr6le de constitutionnalite des engagements internationaux pr&vu par Larticle 54 de
la Constitution puisse effectivement servir les fins pour lesquelles il fut initialement
institue .... Le fond du probleme est que la definition de la souverainete appartient au
souverain.").
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seil constitutionnel had been concerned to prevent in its 1976 decision on
direct elections.
That interpretation contrasts strongly with the legal perspective, which
is closer to the way the internal political debate was phrased. Legally, the
Maastricht amendment provided a limited constitutional authorization for
Europe, accompanied by compensating protections for the national legisla-
ture and for the national culture. The amendment did go beyond Mitter-
rand's initial minimalist proposal, but the abstract statement in Article 88-
1 was designed to rationalize and restrict the effect of the authorization,
not to provide open-ended consent. From this perspective, future transfers
of power to Europe would continue to raise issues of principle regarding
the boundaries of national sovereignty.
Unfortunately, from the legal perspective, the Maastricht amendment
provided little new guidance as to how the future issues should be resolved.
The text of the amendment could be interpreted as approving the Conseil
constitutionnel's analysis in Maastricht I. If so, that approval could be
understood as encouragement to muddle through, applying an opaque
standard to identify permissible "transfers of competences" and perhaps to
make further innovations as needed.
The Maastricht amendment also conferred a degree of retrospective
constitutional legitimation on the European human rights regime. Politi-
cally, the express commitment in the Maastricht Treaty to respect for fun-
damental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention could be
understood as transmitting constituent approval to the Convention and its
substantive protocols,337 not merely within the limited sphere of Commu-
nity law (as then defined) but in general. From the legal perspective, how-
ever, the consent was narrower, and could not account for the pervasive
effects of Convention rights in such fields as criminal law enforcement and
judicial administration.
The explicit recognition of European union provided a textual basis as
well as a political basis for distinguishing constitutional doctrines about
Europe from constitutional doctrines about international law in general.
In the period that followed, the Conseil constitutionnel would be slow to give
effect to that distinction. The legacy of the earlier interpretations would
persist.
B. Since the Maastricht Amendment
The convergence of political elites that made the passage of the Maas-
tricht amendment possible continued to support further steps toward Euro-
pean integration and international cooperation in the period following
1992. Traditional Gaullists became a dwindling minority, accompanied by
other bands of Euroskeptics on the left and on the right.33 8 Now that con-
337. The Maastricht Treaty committed the European Union to "respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention ... and as they result from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community
law." Maastricht Treaty, supra note 245, art. F.2.
338. See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 134-37.
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stitutional amendments were more feasible, Article 54 referrals served
more often as a means of defining the amendments that would follow than
as a serious threat to treaty ratification. 33 9 Meanwhile, the body of Euro-
pean human rights law expanded in the post-Cold War environment, and
its influence in French law intensified.3 40
The primacy claims of supranational law provoked some resistance in
this second period, and a few secondary doctrines were developed on
behalf of France's constitutional identity. The general outcome, however,
is that the treaties govern, by France's constitutional consent.
The discussion of this second period examines the infrequency of
Article 54 proceedings (1), and the extent of protection for already-ratified
treaties (2), before looking substantively at the Conseil's Article 54 deci-
sions (3). Because the Conseil's decisions produced several findings of con-
flict between treaties and the Constitution, the discussion then considers
the constituent power's use of its freedom to choose the form of the amend-
ments that resulted (4). Next, the discussion turns to the limited effect of
introducing Europe-specific articles into the Constitution (5), and the
stronger influence of European human rights law on constitutional inter-
pretation (6). After describing the further consolidation of the Article 55
doctrines (7), the discussion ends with a concluding summary (8).
1. Infrequent Use of Article 54
After 1992, referrals of international engagements to the Conseil consti-
tutionnel continued to be rare. From 1993 to 2008, there were eight refer-
rals under Article 54, and two referrals of laws authorizing treaties under
Article 61.341 While this is about twice the rate as in the earlier period, it
is still less than one per year and only a tiny fraction of the engagements
made. Dissenting legislators have used the new authority granted by the
Maastricht amendment only once to refer international commitments
under Article 54.342 In 2003, 103 international agreements were pub-
lished, including twenty-nine multilateral conventions, two agreements
with international organizations, and seventy-two bilateral treaties; forty-
four of the 103 received legislative authorization. 3 43 The Conseil d'Etat
reported in 2000 that each year France entered into about 200 bilateral
agreements, and that legislative authorization was obtained for approxi-
339. See infra Part III.B.1.
340. ELGIE, supra note 2, at 206-08.
341. In 2010, after the second period, there was another Article 61 referral of a law
authorizing a treaty. The Conseil constitutionnel held that a bilateral treaty between
France and Romania for the return of unaccompanied children included an alternative
procedure that violated the right to an effective judicial remedy. CC decision No. 2010-
614 DC, Nov. 4, 2010.
342. See infra text accompanying notes 432-438. This does not mean, however, that
legislators would not have referred more treaties if referrals had not already been made
by the President or the Prime Minister. The two Article 61 referrals by legislators con-
cerned issues of legislative authorization procedure rather than the content of the trea-
ties. See infra note 346-349.
343. Eisenmann & Rivier, supra note 12, at 253, 260.
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mately forty to sixty treaties.344 Statistics of the National Assembly indi-
cate that laws authorizing treaties amounted to almost half its legislative
output.3 45
The few referrals that did occur, however, had greater impact than in
the earlier period, producing six findings of unconstitutionality and result-
ing in five constitutional amendments. To summarize, the period began
with two unsuccessful procedural challenges to the authorization of trea-
ties affecting overseas territories.3 46 The Conseil constitutionnel confirmed
the need for further constitutional change before three major proposed
revisions of the European Union treaties (the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997,
the ill-fated European Constitution Treaty in 2004, and the substitute Lis-
bon Treaty in 2007).347 Ratification of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court also required an amendment.348 The Conseil found consti-
tutional defects in the European Charter of Regional or Minority Lan-
guages, 349 but not in the linguistic aspects of an accord on European
patents.350 The simultaneous referral of two treaties further entrenching
the abolition of the death penalty yielded disparate conclusions, on the
grounds that one of them could never be denounced.35 1
While the Conseil found constitutional amendments necessary
because of infringements upon national sovereignty, it also objected to the
conferral of new powers on the national parliament, and found conflicts
with specific constitutional norms regarding the official character of the
French language,352 the equality of citizens,3 53 the indivisibility of the
Republic,354 and official immunity from prosecution.3 55
344. See, e.g., CONSEIL D'ETAT, supra note 33, at 19-21. The report gives no separate
annual figure for multilateral treaties.
345. See Histoire de 'Assemblee nationale, supra note 98.
346. See CC decision No. 93-318 DC,June 30, 1993 (challenging the authorization of
a Franco-Mongolian investment treaty); CC decision No. 93-319 DC, June 30, 1993
(challenging the authorization of ILO Convention 139). In these two companion cases,
the Conseil rejected the argument that, as a result of a constitutional provision adopted in
the compromise permitting ratification of the Maastricht treaty, treaties applicable in
overseas territories could be authorized only by organic statutes rather than by ordinary
statutes. See supra note 271.
347. CC decision No. 97-394 DC, Dec. 31, 1997; CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov.
19, 2004; CC decision No. 2007-560 DC, Dec. 20, 2007. See also infra Part IIl.B.3.b.
348. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999; see also infra Part I1.B.3.a.
349. CC decision No. 99-412 DC, June 15, 1999; see also infra Part III.B.3.a. This
decision provided the only occasion in the period between 1958 and 2008 in which the
Conseil's evaluation of a treaty led to the abandonment of the ratification process.
350. CC decision No. 2006-541 DC, Sept. 28, 2006 (reviewing the London Agreement
on European patents); see also infra Part III.B.3.a. Aside from the procedural challenges
discussed supra notes 346-349 and accompanying text, this decision involved the only
occasion in this period on which legislators referred a treaty to the Conseil. In fact, the
London Accord was referred to the Conseil by the Prime Minister, as well as by sixty
deputies.
351. CC decision No. 2005-524/525 DC, Oct. 13, 2005 (reviewing Protocol No. 13 to
the European human rights convention and the Second Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); see also infra Part III.B.3.a.
352. CC decision No. 99-412 DC, June 15, 1999; see also infra Part III.B.3.a.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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Another significant EU treaty, the Treaty of Nice, was ratified without
referral to the Conseil constitutionnel in 2001. Negotiated under time pres-
sure during the French presidency of the European Council, the Treaty of
Nice made a series of changes to the institutions of the European Union
aimed at increasing the EU's flexibility before numerous new member
states were admitted from the former Eastern Bloc.35 6 The treaty reallo-
cated voting proportions in both the European Parliament and the Council,
and further extended the use of qualified majority voting where unanimity
had previously been required. The shift to majority voting raised serious
questions under the Conseil constitutionnel's jurisprudence, and a small
group of left Euroskeptics associated with Jean-Pierre Chevenement moved
to reject the treaty on constitutional grounds in both the National Assem-
bly and the Senate.3 57 Nonetheless, the Gaullists and the Socialists united
in support of a treaty sponsored by their leaders (President Jacques Chirac
and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, in the third cohabitation). 35 8 Ulti-
mately, the constitutional critics lacked the numbers to meet the threshold
for a referral.
Two other treaty-related amendments should be mentioned here to
round out the description of the second period: the 1993 asylum amend-
ment, and the 2003 amendment regarding the European Arrest Warrant.
The asylum amendment did not arise from a new treaty, but rather from a
constitutional dispute about the effects of a treaty that the Conseil constitu-
tionnel had already upheld. The Conseil determined in 1991 that the
Schengen implementation convention was consistent with the constitu-
tional guarantee of asylum because the convention permitted, but did not
require, France to leave the protection of an asylum seeker to another state
party designated as responsible under itsrules.3 59 In July 1993, the new
center-right Government enacted legislation authorizing immigration offi-
355. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999; see also infra Part III.B.3.a.
356. See Roger J. Goebel, The European Union in Transition: The Treaty of Nice in Effect;
Enlargement in Sight; A Constitution in Doubt, 27 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 455 (2004).
357. See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, June 5, 2001, 2d sitting, at
3844-45 (remarks of M. Jean-Pierre Chevanement); SENAT, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, June
28, 2001, 1st sitting, at 16 (remarks of M. Jean-Yves Autexier).
358. See Sophie Roquelle, Les deputes s'appretent a ratifier sans enthousiasme le traite
de Nice, LE FIGARO (June 6, 2001), available at http://www.lefigaro.fr (search for the
article's title to find it in the archives). Former President Giscard d'Estaing led his party
to abstain on the Treaty of Nice, but he criticized it as inadequate rather than unconsti-
tutional. See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, June 12, 2001, 2d sitting, at
4084-85 (remarks of M. Valry Giscard d'Estaing); id. at 4088-89 (reporting the votes
of various parliamentary groups on ratification).
359. CC decision No. 91-294 DC, July 25, 1991. Paragraph 4 of the 1946 Preamble
provided: "Any person persecuted for his activities on behalf of freedom has the right of
asylum in the territories of the Republic." 1946 CONsT. pmbl., translated in BELL, supra
note 11, at 263. The Schengen implementation convention addressed the protection of
refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees
for a potentially broader category of persons having well-founded fear of persecution on
the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particu-
lar social group. The Schengen provisions were partly designed to assign responsibility
for a claim for refugee protection to the state that had allowed the third-country national
to cross the external borders of the Schengen group.
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cials to exercise the Schengen option and to deny refugee processing to
claimants for whom another state was responsible.3 6 0 After opposition
senators and deputies referred the statute to the Conseil constitutionnel, the
Conseil held that exclusion from refugee processing on such grounds vio-
lated the constitutional asylum guarantee, and that the statute must be
interpreted as making refugee processing obligatory for the subcategory of
claimants covered by the constitutional guarantee. 3 61 This holding largely
vitiated the benefit of the change, and several leading Gaullists responded
with strong criticism, some of which called into question the legitimacy of
the Conseil's methods of review. 3 62 Mitterrand acquiesced in the demand
for a constitutional amendment overturning the Conseil's decision. The
November 1993 amendment added a new article 53-1 to the series of con-
stitutional provisions dealing with treaties. It generically authorized
Schengen-style agreements to allocate responsibility for asylum adjudica-
tion with suitable European partners.3 63 The amendment was understood
as replacing the individual right to asylum by a discretionary power to grant
asylum for persons within its scope. In December 1993, legislation giving
effect to the amendment was enacted without referral to the Conseil
constitutionnel.3 64
The 2003 amendment regarding the European Arrest Warrant did not
involve the Conseil constitutionnel at all. The European Arrest Warrant is a
streamlined mechanism for transferring accused criminals from one EU
state to another without the limitations of a traditional extradition pro-
cess; 36 5 one might compare it to interstate rendition within the U.S. federal
system. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, earlier slow pro-
360. In the parliamentary elections of March 1993, the Gaullists and Giscard's UDF
won an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly; in fact, the Gaullists fell only
slightly short of an absolute majority by themselves. The result was the second cohabita-
tion, between Mitterrand (who was nearing the end of his second presidential term) and
the Gaullist prime minister Edouard Balladur.
361. CC decision No. 93-325 DC, Aug. 13, 1993, cons. 86, 88, 95. The Conseil also
found several other provisions of the statute concerning immigration control and proce-
dure unconstitutional; however, only the asylum holding led to a constitutional
amendment.
362. See, e.g., JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL CULTURES 228-30 (2001); DRAGO, supra note
95, at 435-36. The leader of the challenge to the Schengen implementation convention,
however, defended the Conseil's later decision as following properly from the earlier one.
Le debat sur le droit d'asile Pierre Mazeaud (RPR) est "hostile" a une revision constitution-
nelle, LE MONDE, Sept. 17, 1993, at 24.
363. 1958 CONsT. art. 53-1 ("The Republic may enter into agreements with European
States which are bound by undertakings identical with its own in matters of asylum and
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for the purpose of determin-
ing their respective jurisdiction as regards requests for asylum submitted to them. How-
ever, even if the request does not fall within their jurisdiction under the terms of such
agreements, the authorities of the Republic shall remain empowered to grant asylum to
any Foreigner who is persecuted for his action in pursuit of freedom or who seeks the
protection of France on other grounds.").
364. See Olivier Schrameck, La decision du 13 aoat 1993: Impressions et leons d'un
tonnerre estival, 25 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 44, 45 (2008).
365. See Nicola Vennemann, The European Arrest Warrant and Its Human Rights Impli-
cations, 63 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 103
(2003); Jan Wouters & Frederik Naert, Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extra-
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gress culminated in the rapid adoption of an EU Council Framework Deci-
sion. The French Government then sought the advice of the Conseil d'Etat
on implementing legislation for the Framework Decision, and the Conseil
d'Etat opined that the new procedure had only one constitutional flaw. 36 6
The Framework Decision eliminated the principle that extradition would
be refused for political offenses, which the Conseil d'Etat viewed as a "fun-
damental principle recognized by the laws of the Republic" within the
meaning of the 1946 Preamble.3 6 7 The Conseil d'Etat advised that a consti-
tutional amendment would be necessary before implementing legislation
could be enacted. The Framework Decision was already in force as EU
secondary legislation, not requiring any national ratification, and for that
reason it was considered impossible to seek the Conseil constitutionnel's
opinion under Article 54.368 The Government followed the Conseil d'Etat's
recommendation and easily obtained a constitutional amendment, adding
a paragraph to Article 88-2 authorizing legislative implementation of a
European arrest warrant in accordance with acts taken on the basis of the
Treaty on European Union.36 9
2. Protection of Treaties in Force
In the post-Maastricht period, the Conseil constitutionnel continued to
hold that treaties already in force were immune from its review, and that
review of new international commitments had to be limited to the provi-
sions that were new. The Conseil stated this principle more clearly than
ever in its decision on the European Constitution Treaty, insisting that
"[t]hose provisions of the Treaty which merely reiterate undertakings
already entered into by France are however excluded from any such exami-
nation as to their conformity with the Constitution."3 70 Meanwhile, the
Conseil continued to apply a different principle in statutory cases by exam-
ining the constitutionality of older statutory provisions when reviewing
newer statutory provisions that modified or extended them.3 7 1 Although
dition Deals: An Appraisal of the EU's Main Criminal Law Measures against Terrorism After
"lII September", 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 909 (2004).
366. Avis of CE Ass., Sept. 26, 2002, No. 368282, reprinted in ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE,
RAPPORT No. 463, 12th legislature, at 33 (2002).
367. While the Conseil d'Etat placed the right not to be extradited for a political
offense on the list of fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic, the
Conseil constitutionnel has never expressed a view on its inclusion. See also CE Ass., July
3, 1996, Rec. Lebon 255 (Kond) (identifying the obligation to deny extradition when it is
sought for a political purpose as another fundamental principle recognized by the laws
of the Republic).
368. See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, REPORT No. 463, 12th legislature, at 19 (2002); cf.
supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (discussing uncertainty about the scope of Article
54).
369. The amendment encountered little opposition, coming primarily from the legis-
lature's Communist group. In the 2008 constitutional amendment authorizing ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty, the provision regarding the European Arrest Warrant was
slightly reworded, and it became the sole remaining sentence in Article 88-2.
370. CC decision No. 2004-404 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 8; see also CC decision No.
2007-560 DC, Dec. 20, 2007, cons. 10 (regarding the Lisbon Treaty).
371. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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the result of this examination was usually a conclusion that the older provi-
sions were valid, the Conseil did declare an older provision unconstitu-
tional in 1999.372
The administrative courts and the civil/criminal courts, in contrast,
developed exceptional doctrines that sometimes call into question the legal
validity of treaties. The first exception concerned the enforceability under
Article 55 of a treaty provision alleged to conflict with both a constitutional
requirement and an administrative decree subsequent to the treaty imple-
menting the relevant constitutional requirement. The issue arose before the
Conseil d'Etat in 1998 through a case involving the qualifications for refer-
endums regarding the status of the overseas dependency of New Caledo-
nia.3 7 3 In accordance with Article 76 of the Constitution, the decree
imposed lengthy residence requirements that excluded many residents who
had arrived more recently from metropolitan France.3 74 Excluded citizens
challenged the qualifications as violations of the European human rights
convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Conseil d'Etat responded that, within the domestic legal order, Article
55 made treaties superior to legislation but inferior to other provisions of
the Constitution; therefore it would not invalidate the qualifications under
Article 55.375 The Cour de Cassation ruled similarly in an analogous case
involving legislative elections in New Caledonia in 2000 .316
Thus far, these holdings represent a narrow exception protecting a
subsequent legal norm from earlier treaties if the statute embodies a consti-
tutional requirement.3 7 7 The Conseil d'Etat does not generally have author-
ity to review the constitutionality of statutes. When a duly ratified treaty
does not conflict with a later norm, the Conseil d'Etat has continued to
deny its authority to review the substantive constitutionality of the
treaty.378
372. CC decision No. 99-410 DC, Mar. 15, 1999. In reviewing an organic statute
concerning New Caledonia, which extended to that territory provisions of a 1985 bank-
ruptcy law that made individuals adjudged bankrupt automatically ineligible for public
office, the Conseil concluded that the 1985 provisions violated the constitutional
requirement of proportional penalties.
373. CE Ass., Oct. 30, 1998, No. 200286 (Sarran), available at http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?oldAction=rechJuriAdmin&idTexte=CETATEXT00000800
8495&fastReqld=493438676&fastPos=1.
374. Articles 76 and 77, added in 1998, incorporated into the Constitution terms of
an agreement negotiated between the French Government and leaders of political move-
ments in New Caledonia in the wake of separatist violence.
375. The qualifications, however, probably did not violate either treaty. See Human
Rights Committee, Gillot v. France, Comm. No. 932/2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/
932/2000 (2002) (upholding the referendum qualifications); Py v. France, 2005-1 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (upholding the qualifications for legislative elections in New Caledonia).
376. Cass. ass. plen., June 2, 2000, Bull. A.P., No. 4, 7 (Fraisse).
377. See Christine Maugie, L'arrtt Sarran, entre apparence et realite, 7 CAHIERS DU
CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (2000) (characterizing the Sarran decision as using the Con-
stitution as a screen between the subsequent norm and the treaty, and denying a broader
power of the Conseil d'Itat to review the constitutionality of treaties more generally).
Mme Mauguid was the commissaire du gouvernement in the Sarran case.
378. See, e.g., CE Sect., July 8, 2002, No. 239366 (Commune de Porta), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichjuriAdmin.do?oldAction-rechJuriAdmin&idTexte=
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With regard to procedural constitutionality, however, the Conseil d'Etat
has gone further, holding since 1998 that it can review whether the execu-
tive, acting alone, has ratified a treaty that ought to have been submitted to
the legislature under Article 53 for its authorization.379 The consequence
of such a finding is not the permanent invalidation of the treaty, but rather
the denial of its domestic legal force until legislative approval has been
obtained. The Conseil d'Etat explains its authority to review this issue as
deriving from a strict interpretation of Article 55, which attributes superior
rank only to treaties that are "duly ratified or approved" (regulierement rati-
fits ou approuves).380 Protecting the prerogatives of the legislature against
the irregular action of the executive in this manner is more consistent with
the traditional role of the Conseil d'Eat as an administrative court than
reviewing the substantive constitutionality of a treaty. The Cour de Cassa-
tion adopted the same approach in 2001, overruling its prior case law and
refusing to apply a bilateral treaty on judicial cooperation in civil matters
between France and Senegal on the ground that the executive had not
obtained legislative authorization, and it was therefore not "duly ratified or
approved."381
These doctrines do impose some limits on the extent to which the
principle pacta sunt servanda immunizes improperly ratified treaties from
later constitutional review. The defects that they control would rarely be so
manifest as to excuse France from complying vis-a-vis a treaty partner.382
CETATEXT000008042657&fastReqld=1873718129&fastPos=1; CE Ass., July 9, 2010,
No. 327663, 26 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 980 (2010) (conclusions of
Keller, rapporteur public) (Federation nationale de la libre pensee), available at http://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?oldAction=rechJuriAdmin&idTexte=
CETATEXT000022487030&fastReqld=1399975832&fastPos=1. In the latter case,
which is technically outside of the second period, the Assembly of the Conseil d'Etat
rejected the proposal of its rapporteur public to extend its authority.
379. CE Sect., Dec. 18, 1998, Rec. Lebon 483 (SARL de parc d'activites de Blotzheim);
see also CE Ass., Mar. 5, 2003, Rec. Lebon 77 (Aggoun); CE Ass., July 9, 2010, No.
327663, 26 REVUE FRAN4AISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 980 (2010) (conclusions of Keller,
rapporteur public) (Federation nationale de la libre pensee), available at http://www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?oldAction=rechuriAdmin&idTexte=CETATEXT
000022487030&fastReqld=1399975832&fastPos-1.
380. CE Sect., Feb. 23, 2000, Rec. Lebon 72 (Banba Dieng).
381. Cass. le civ., May 29, 2001, Bull. civ. I, No. 149, 97 (Agence pour la securite de la
navigation aerienne en Afrique et a Madagascar). The Conseil d'Etat had also declared the
same treaty improperly ratified the year before. CE, Feb. 23, 2000, Rec. Lebon 72
(Bamba Dieng); see also Rogoff, supra note 17, at 446-49.
382. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (explaining when a state can assert the invalidity of its consent to a treaty
as a result of a manifest violation of a fundamentally important rule of its internal law).
France is not a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but recognizes
that provision as codifying customary international law. See CONSEIL D'ETAT, supra note
33, at 10; Gilles Bachelier, Le contr6le des conditions d'introduction en droit interne d'une
convention internationale, in 15 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 315, 321 (1999)
(conclusions of the commissaire du gouvernement on SARL du parc d'activite de
Blotzheim).
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3. Article 54: Substance (bis)
The Maastricht decisions of 1992 articulated the basic framework for
Article 54 review. They also set the precedent that, when the Conseil consti-
tutionnel concluded that a treaty would infringe upon the essential condi-
tions of national sovereignty, a constitutional amendment authorizing the
infringement could follow. This section will examine the further evolution
of the Conseil's substantive standards; first, with regard to the constitution-
ality of general multilateral treaties; then, in relation specifically to the
European Union.
One jurisdictional question left open by the Maastricht II decision
finally received an answer in 2003, in a non-treaty decision of the Conseil.
Opposition senators attempted to challenge a constitutional amendment,
newly adopted in Congress, decentralizing legislative powers to political
subdivisions. They argued that it violated the principle of (internal)
national sovereignty by empowering localities at the expense of the
national legislature, and that it exceeded the limits of the amending power
under Article 89, which prohibits amendments to "the republican form of
government. "33 The Conseil succinctly dismissed the proceeding, con-
cluding that it had no competence, under Article 89 or Article 61 or other-
wise, to pass on the validity of a constitutional amendment.384 That
dismissal put the Conseil firmly on record, a fortiori, against any notion of
enforceable supraconstitutional norms.
a. General Multilateral Treaties
As previously noted, there are five decisions to consider here: one
involving the International Criminal Court, two involving language issues,
and two conjoined decisions involving treaties on the abolition of the death
penalty. These cases produced three findings of conflict between a treaty
and the constitution, including the one occasion on which such a finding
led to the abandonment of a proposed ratification.
The ICC Statute
The Conseil's 1999 decision on the Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) 385 was politically controversial, but not because of atti-
tudes towards international criminal law. The issues raised by the ICC
Statute included the exposure of heads of state to criminal punishment,
and thereby gave the Conseil the opportunity to address the immunity of
the President of the Republic from prosecution at a time when President
Jacques Chirac was being investigated for links to official corruption dur-
ing his service as Mayor of Paris.3 86 Official immunity turned out to be
383. See Saisine par 60 senateurs - 2003-469 DC, CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, http://
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-
date/decisions-depuis-1959/2003/2003-469-dc/saisine-par-60-senateurs.101124.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
384. CC decision No. 2003-469 DC, Mar. 26, 2003, cons. 2.
385. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999.
386. See, e.g., Thierry Brehier, Le Conseil constitutionnel attribue A M. Chirac une
immunite penale, LE MONDE, Jan. 26, 1999, at 5.
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one of several grounds on which the Conseil concluded that a constitu-
tional amendment would be needed before ratification of the Statute.
Framing the analysis, the Conseil observed that Paragraphs 14 and 15
of the 1946 Preamble, together with its Paragraph 1,387 enabled France to
enter into international commitments, including the establishment of a
permanent international court to punish grave crimes against fundamental
human rights affecting the international community.388 The Conseil added
that, given this purpose, the obligations should be independent of compli-
ance by other states, and thus the reciprocity proviso of Article 55 would
not be applicable.389 Still, if the engagement contained a clause contrary
to the Constitution, endangered constitutionally protected rights, or
infringed upon the essential conditions of the exercise of national sover-
eignty, a constitutional amendment would be required before
ratification. 390
Turning first to the problem of immunities, the Conseil perceived a
conflict between the rejection of official immunities for heads of state,
members of governments, and members of parliament in the ICC Statute,
and the express immunities conferred on the President of the Republic,
members of the Government, and members of Parliament in Articles 68,
68-1, and 26 of the Constitution. For example, Article 68 provided that the
President could not be held liable for acts performed in the exercise of his
duties except in the case of high treason, and also that he could be indicted
only by a special procedure in the "High Court of Justice."391 The Conseil
interpreted this provision as making the jurisdiction of the High Court of
Justice exclusive of any other court, domestic or international. 392 It Simi-
larly interpreted the immunities of members of the Government and the
Parliament as not applying solely to domestic prosecutions. 393 Accord-
387. The first paragraph of the 1946 Preamble begins: "On the morrow of the victory
won by free peoples over regimes that tried to enslave and degrade the human person,
the French people proclaims anew that any human being possesses inalienable and
sacred rights." 1946 CONsT. pmbl., translated in BELL, supra note 11, at 263. The Conseil
constitutionnel has derived from this paragraph a constitutional principle of the protec-
tion of the dignity of the human person against any form of servitude or degradation.
See CC decision No. 343-344 DC, July 27, 1994, cons. 2 (adopting this human dignity
principle); CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999, cons. 8 (restating this principle).
388. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999, cons. 12.
389. Id.
390. Id. cons. 13.
391. Id. cons. 16. The "High Court of Justice" was defined in Article 67 as a special
"court" composed of members of the two chambers of Parliament. The Conseil inter-
preted the sentence in Article 68 on the High Court of Justice as indicating that the
President could not be prosecuted before any other court during his term of office, even
for acts not performed in the exercise of his duties (e.g., when he was Mayor of Paris).
Whether or not this interpretation was correct, it excited considerable controversy at the
time.
Articles 67 and 68 were thoroughly rewritten in 2007. The current versions make
explicit that the President cannot be prosecuted or even required to testify during his
term of office (except before the ICC), and establish a procedure for his removal by a
form of impeachment.
392. Id. cons. 16-17.
393. Id.
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ingly, ratification of the ICC Statute would require a constitutional
amendment.
The Conseil next verified that the criminal proceedings under the ICC
Statute were consistent with a long list of constitutional principles applica-
ble to criminal defendants in France. These included, inter alia, the pre-
sumption of innocence, the principle that crimes and penalties must be
defined by law, the principle of non-retroactivity, the rights of defense, the
right to a fair procedure guaranteeing balance as between the rights of the
parties, the prohibition on excessive punishment, and the right to an inde-
pendent and impartial court.39 4 While this discussion was reassuring, the
Conseil did not always make clear which features were required and by pre-
cisely what constitutional principles. 395 Nor did the decision shed light
on why the French Constitution should be understood as making these
principles obligatory for an international criminal tribunal.396
In contrast to this endorsement of the treaty, the Conseil found that the
ICC treaty imperiled the essential conditions of the exercise of national
sovereignty in two respects. First, the Conseil considered the regime of
complementarity. Exercise of ICC jurisdiction in circumstances where the
state evaded its obligations, or where the national judicial system was una-
ble to function, would not infringe national sovereignty.397 But the Conseil
was troubled by the possibility of an ICC prosecution where the national
prosecution was barred by amnesty or by prescription. Although making
such grave crimes imprescriptible would not violate any constitutional
right of the accused,398 the state's power to adopt a limitations period or to
394. Id. cons. 21, 22, 23, 25, 26.
395. See, e.g., id. cons. 24, 28 (concluding opaquely that various provisions of the
Statute did not violate any constitutional rule). It has been suggested that some of the
Conseil's discussion of rights reflected European human rights jurisprudence, and that
some of the elements mentioned there were being recognized as French constitutional
requirements for the first time. See Bruno Genevois, Le Conseil constitutionnel et le droit
penal international, 15 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATiF 285, 305-07 (1999); Oli-
vier Dutheillet de Lamothe, Le Conseil constitutionnel et la Cour europeenne des droits de
l'homme: Un dialogue sans paroles, in LE DIALOGUE DES JUGES: MELANGES EN L'HONNEUR DU
PRESIDENT BRUNO GENEVOIs 403, 410 (2009). Moreover, the principal drafter of the deci-
sion has explained that discussion of rights went beyond the usual practice in Article 54
cases of concentrating on the provisions that conflict with the Constitution in order to
highlight France's success in making ICC procedures more protective of individuals. See
Lenoir, supra note 241, at 11, 17; cf. Jean-Francois Dobelle, La convention de Rome
portant statut de la Cour penale internationale, 44 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 356, 362-65 (1999) (discussing France's negotiating positions and their results).
396. By analogy, European human rights law prohibits extradition to a country where
the accused faces serious danger of inhuman and degrading treatment, but does not
currently prohibit extradition to a country whose criminal justice system does not fully
comply with European standards of fair trial.
397. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999, cons. 32.
398. Id. cons. 20. The Conseil d'Etat, in preparations for the negotiation of the ICC
Statute, had identified the principle of prescription for less grave offenses as a funda-
mental principle recognized by the laws of the Republic, given constitutional force by the
Preambles to the 1958 and 1946 Constitutions. See Antoine Buchet, L'integration en
France de la convention portant statut de la Cour penale internationale: Histoire breve et
inachevee d'une mutation attendue, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE AND DOMESTIc LEGAL ORDERS,
65, 68-69 (Claus Krej3 & Flavia Lattanzi eds., 2000). The Conseil constitutionnel did not
324 Vol. 45
2012 The Brakes that Failed
grant amnesty if it chose was too important a sovereign function; in order
to impose on France the obligation to arrest and surrender an accused who
was covered domestically by amnesty or prescription, a constitutional
amendment would be necessary.39 9 The provisions on investigative coop-
eration and judicial assistance sufficiently protected the state's power to
reject requests where transmitting the information would raise national
security issues. In contrast, the Prosecutor's authority to perform certain
investigative acts on French territory without the presence of French
authorities, including taking evidence from voluntary witnesses and exam-
ining public places, was liable to violate the essential conditions for the
exercise of national sovereignty, and required a prior constitutional amend-
ment.4 0 0 Finally, the Conseil construed the ICC Statute as permitting a
state that had been asked to carry out an ICC sentence of imprisonment to
place conditions on its consent, which could include reserving the power
of the executive to exercise clemency toward the prisoner.40 1 The Conseil
thereby avoided what it considered another possible infringement of the
sovereignty principle and of the express constitutional grant of the pardon
power to the President.4 02
The direct consequence of the decision was the adoption, by nearly
unanimous vote, 403 of an opaque constitutional amendment authorizing
the ratification of the ICC Statute. Article 53-2 provides, "The Republic
may recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court as pro-
vided by the treaty signed on 18 July 1998."404 France, accordingly, rati-
fied the treaty in 2000.
Thus, the Conseil's ICC decision found conflicts between the treaty
and three specific provisions of the Constitution regarding official immu-
confirm or deny the constitutional status of such a principle, but held that it would not
cover the crimes involved in the ICC statute.
399. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999, cons. 34. It is interesting to note,
though outside the usual temporal scope of this article, that the implementing legisla-
tion enacted in 2010 makes genocide and crimes against humanity imprescriptible, but
imposes a thirty-year prescription period on prosecution for war crimes. The Conseil
constitutionnel rejected a challenge to this limitation, replying that any inconsistency
between the statute and the treaty was a matter for the civil/criminal courts to deal with,
and that the differential treatment did not violate the constitutional principle of equality.
CC decision No. 2010-612 DC, Aug. 5, 2010, cons. 5. (It might also be noted that the
ICC Statute does not require the absence of a prescription period for war crimes in the
national courts, but rather makes them imprescriptible before the ICC itself, and treats
the prescription period as a possible reason for exercising international jurisdiction
under the complementarity regime.)
400. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999, cons. 38; see Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 99(4), July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
401. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999, cons. 39-40.
402. Id. cons. 40; see 1958 CONSr. art. 17 (amended 2008).
403. See La Cour penale internationale et la parite entrent dans la Constitution, LE
FIGARO, June 29, 1999 (reporting 856 votes in favor, 6 against).
404. A subsequent constitutional amendment in 2007, changing the national proce-
dures for responding to misconduct by the President, also incorporated a cross-reference
to Article 53-2 as an exception to the President's official immunity. See 1958 CONST. art.
67(1).
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nity, as well as infringements of national sovereignty based on the ICC's
power to circumvent a French amnesty or prescription, and the Prosecu-
tor's authority to conduct non-coercive investigation unaccompanied on
French soil. The Conseil accommodated the weighty purpose of the treaty
by creating an exception to the reciprocity proviso in Article 55; the Conseil
failed to accommodate the treaty's purpose by ruling the immunities inap-
plicable or by characterizing the intrusions on national sovereignty as
minor. The most significant consequence of the decision, however, was
probably its clarification of the domestic law of presidential immunity. The
decision was doubtless welcome to the President, and since the Constitu-
tion would have to be amended anyway-the ICC Statute permits no reser-
vations405-the other holdings created no additional impediment to the
government.
France was hardly the only country to conclude that ratifying the ICC
Statute would require a constitutional amendment. Numerous countries
have considered possible constitutional hurdles to ratification, including
official immunity, prohibition of the extradition of nationals, prohibition
of life imprisonment, and exclusivity of criminal jurisdiction within the
national territory. 406 Sometimes such problems disappear as a result of
interpretation, reading a constitutional provision as applying only to
domestic prosecution, or distinguishing between extradition to a foreign
state and surrender to an international tribunal. In other instances, consti-
tutional amendments have solved the problem. Nevertheless, to this author
as an outside observer, the Conseil's constitutional analysis of the ICC Stat-
ute appears less than fully convincing. The main problem arises from the
Conseil's inconsistent treatment of when the ICC should be treated as exter-
nal to the French constitutional system and when French constitutional
constraints should be projected onto it. For example, the ICC Prosecutor is
too external to be permitted to investigate in France without a chaperone,
but the ICC is not too external to be required to respect French official
immunities and pardons. The ICC criminal process must also respect
some or all of the rights of French constitutional criminal procedure. Per-
haps there are reasons that would justify and reconcile these interpreta-
tions, but they are not obvious and the Conseil did not even hint at them.
The Language Charter and the Patent Agreement
Another 1999 decision provides the one example in the fifty-year
period in which the Conseil constitutionnel's finding of conflict between the
Constitution and a treaty actually deterred France from ratifying the
treaty.407 The Conseil found that the European Charter of Regional or
405. Rome Statute, supra note 400, art. 120.
406. See, e.g., Roy S. Lee, States' Responses: Issues and Solutions, in STATES' RESPONSES
TO ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ICC STATUTE: CONSTITUTIONAL, SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL COOP-
ERATION AND CRIMINAL LAw 1, 9-21 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2005); Venice Commission, Second
Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the
International Court, Doc. CDL-AD(2008)031 (Nov. 4, 2008).
407. But see supra note 341.
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Minority Languages (the "Language Charter") 408 violated specific clauses
of the Constitution rather than the general criterion of national sover-
eignty. The Language Charter was one of two principal treaties promoted
by the Council of Europe4 09 in the 1990s to encourage greater tolerance by
post-Communist states toward their linguistic minority communities.410
The 1990s approach to regional and minority languages was, however,
seriously in tension with French language policy. Looking outward,
France engages in the international promotion of Francophonie, competing
with other globally influential languages (particularly English), and
resisting their incursions within France. 4 1 ' Looking inward, the French
language serves as an important unifying factor for a country whose terri-
tory was assembled over several centuries by absorbing other linguistic
communities.4 12 This practical consideration accompanies an ideological
basis for language policy, the "Jacobin" strain in French Republican
thought, which emphasizes the unity of the Nation and delegitimates
groups or communities whose particular interest competes with the
national interest.4 ' 3 Defense of the French language is a traditional Gaul-
list priority, but Republican concern for linguistic unity transcends the
political spectrum. Nonetheless, the Fifth Republic has always engaged in
some promotion of regional languages, subject to the primacy of
French.4 14
When the Council of Europe first adopted the Language Charter in
1992, France abstained on the vote and declined to sign the treaty, citing
constitutional obstacles.4 15 Even before the Maastricht amendment
enshrined the official character of the French language, the Conseil constitu-
tionnel had invalidated a statute that purported to recognize a "Corsican
people" as a component of the French people.4 16 The Constitution
408. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, opened for signature Nov.
5, 1992, E.T.S. No. 148 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1998) [hereinafter Language Charter].
409. The Council of Europe, not to be confused with the European Union, is the
larger organization for regional cooperation. The Council originated in Western Europe,
but currently has over forty members including Russia. The European Convention on
Human Rights operates under its auspices.
410. See, e.g., David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights,
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 597, 612-15 (1997). The second is the more widely ratified Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, opened for signature Feb. 1,
1995, E.T.S. No. 157 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1998). As of January 1, 2011, the Frame-
work Convention had thirty-nine parties, and the Language Charter had twenty-five
parties.
411. See Debbasch, supra note 273, at 459-460; Leila Sadat Wexler, Official English,
Nationalism and Linguistic Terror: A French Lesson, 71 WASH. L. REV. 285, 313-17
(1996).
412. See Wexler, supra note 411, at 296-304.
413. See Florence Benoit-Rohmer, Les langues officieuses de la France, 45 REVUE FRAN-
ZAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 3, 6-8 (2001).
414. See id., at 17-22.
415. See Wilcox, supra note 273, at 276.
416. CC decision No. 91-290 DC, May 9, 1991. The statute afforded special powers
and organization to the island of Corsica (i.e., La Corse). Many of the provisions were
upheld, but the Conseil constitutionnel invalidated the programmatic statement discussed
in the text, as well as several substantive and procedural provisions.
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"recognises only the French people, made up of all French citizens regard-
less of origin, race or religion."4 17 The Conseil upheld the offering of
instruction in Corsican language and culture in the public schools as con-
sistent with the principle of equality, but only so long as it was optional for
the students.418 Later decisions applying the 1992 French language
amendment to the regulation of language in public and commercial activi-
ties,4 19 and to public administration and education in French Polynesia, 420
further strengthened the inhibition.
After the 1997 elections, in a renewed period of cohabitation, the
Socialist Government of Lionel Jospin reexamined the question. Because
the Language Charter incorporates a lengthy menu of options, and affords
states considerable leeway to designate their own set of obligations, 421 the
Government hoped it could identify a package of language rights that
would exceed the minimum threshold of compliance without transgressing
constitutional norms. President Jacques Chirac had the Language Charter
signed in May 1999, depositing a declaration that set forth some interpre-
tations of the Language Charter and then specified the clauses France
intended to implement after ratification. Shortly thereafter, faced with
opposition from within his own party, Chirac referred the treaty to the
Conseil constitutionnel for an Article 54 ruling on its compatibility with the
Constitution.422
The Jospin-Chirac strategy had some degree of success: in considering
Part III of the Language Charter, the Conseil constitutionnel limited itself to
the undertakings that France had designated in its declaration upon sign-
417. Id. cons. 13. The Conseil constitutionnel distinguished between the island of Cor-
sica, considered as part of the metropolitan territory of France, and overseas posses-
sions (remaining from the former colonial empire), within which the Constitution does
contemplate the existence of distinct peoples with rights of self-determination. The lat-
ter subject deserves fuller discussion, but will not be pursued here because it is not
directly relevant to the decision on the European Charter of Regional or Minority
Languages.
418. Id. cons. 37.
419. CC decision No. 94-345 DC, July 29, 1994. The Conseil was particularly defer-
ential to legislative control of the form of expression by public agencies and persons
engaged in public service.
420. CC decision No. 96-373 DC, April 9, 1996. The Conseil held that even in the
overseas territory of French Polynesia, the French language must be employed in the
public service and also by ordinary citizens in their interaction with the administration.
Nor did the constitutional guarantee of equality permit obligatory teaching of Tahitian
or other Polynesian languages in public schools there. These holdings took the form of
mandated interpretations of challenged provisions, rather than invalidations. See also
CC decision No. 2004-490 DC, Feb. 12, 2004, cons. 70 (holding again that teaching of
Tahitian and other Polynesian languages must be optional).
421. The Language Charter requires parties to apply the provisions of Part II to each
regional or minority language, and to apply for each such language "a minimum of
thirty-five paragraphs or sub-paragraphs chosen from among the provisions of Part Ill of
the Language Charter, including at least three chosen from each of the Articles 8 and 12
and one from each of the Articles 9, 10, 11, and 13." Language Charter, supra note 408,
art. 2.
422. See Benoit-Rohmer, supra note 413, at 13 n.27.
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ing, and found thai none of them violated the Constitution.4 23 However,
the Conseil found unavoidable conflict between the Constitution and non-
optional clauses of Part 11.424 It found that the Language Charter con-
ferred group rights on speakers of regional languages, which applied
within "territories" particular to such languages, and thereby infringed the
constitutional principles of the indivisibility of the Republic, equality
before the law, and the unity of the French people.4 2 5 The Conseil also
found that the Language Charter entailed a right to practice a language
other than French not only in private life, but also "in public life,"4 26
including before courts, administrative agencies, and public services,
which violated the status conferred on the French language by Article 2 of
the Constitution.
On this occasion, the Conseil constitutionnel's decision ended the mat-
ter. Jospin was willing to adopt a narrow constitutional amendment
authorizing ratification of the Language Charter, but Chirac was not. He
issued a statement refusing to undertake an amendment that would violate
"fundamental principles of the Republic. "427
France has kept its distance from both the Language Charter and the
Framework Convention. As will appear infra, the Conseil later identified
the prohibition of collective rights for linguistic groups as an important
French constitutional principle that EU treaties should not infringe. 42 8
423. CC decision No. 99-412 DC, June 15, 1999, cons. 3, 13. The Conseil constitution-
nel also noted that most of the designated clauses involved practices that France already
engaged in for the benefit of minority languages. The Conseil constitutionnel apparently
concluded that France had successfully finessed some of the constitutional problems by
designating clauses that required publication of certain official documents in minority
languages as well as in the national language.
424. Id. cons. 10. The Conseil constitutionnel declined to limit its review to those pro-
visions as interpreted in the declaration that France had deposited because the unilateral
declaration was not internationally binding. Id. cons. 4.
425. Article 2 of the Constitution included language stating that, "France is an indi-
visible, lay, democratic, and social Republic. It ensures equality before the law for all
citizens, without distinction as to origin, race, or religion." In 1995, this language was
moved to Article 1. Article 3 provides, in relevant part, that "National sovereignty
belongs to the people," and that "No section of the people, nor any individual, may
arrogate its exercise to itself." See id. cons. 5.
426. Id. cons. 11; see Language Charter, supra note 408, art. 7(1)(d) (a provision not
subject to reservation).
427. See M. Chirac refuse a M. Jospin la revision constitutionnelle pour la protection des
langues regionales, LE MONDE, June 25, 1999. Ironically, at the very moment when
Chirac refused to modify these principles on behalf of speakers of regional languages, he
and Jospin were engaged in amending Article 3 to authorize the legislature to improve
the access of women to elective office. The gender parity amendment, adopted in Con-
gress on July 8, 1999, overturned decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel that had prohib-
ited laws requiring parties to nominate a minimum percentage of women, on the
grounds that they violated the principle of equality and improperly divided the citizenry
into categories for election purposes. See CC decision No. 82-146 DC, Nov. 18, 1982
(Gender Quotas 1); CC decision No. 98-407 DC, Jan. 14, 1999 (Gender Quotas 11). The
2008 amendments further expanded the parity provision and moved it to Article 1 of the
Constitution.
428. See infra notes 503-513 and accompanying text (discussing CC decision No.
2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004).
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During the massive constitutional reform of 2008, an attempt was made to
add a sentence recognizing regional languages as part of the national patri-
mony in Article 1 of the Constitution.4 29 Ultimately, a similar provision
was placed in Title XII of the Constitution on territorial communities as a
compromise. 430 Neither form of the amendment was intended to impair
the primacy of the French language, or to permit the ratification of the
Language Charter. 431
The interaction between official French and international obligations
returned to the Conseil in 2006, this time involving the threat posed by
English. Dissenting deputies on the right, as well as the Prime Minister,
referred under Article 54 a minor treaty modifying an earlier multilateral
treaty that had established a European (not EU) patent process. 432 The
London Agreement of 2000 sought to lower the costs of European patents
by permitting applicants to file their applications in one of the three official
languages (French, German and English) with only a partial translation
into the other two languages.4 3 3 (The patent claims needed to be fully
translated, but the description of the invention need not be.) The deputies
argued that requiring third parties to avoid infringing a patent that had not
been fully translated into French violated the official status of the French
language under Article 2 of the Constitution, as well as constitutional prin-
ciples of equality, the accessibility and intelligibility of the law, and the rule
of law in the penal context.4 3 4 The Conseil concluded, however, that the
Agreement permitted the use of foreign languages in the private law inter-
actions between patent-holders and interested third parties, and in the
operations of the European Patent Organisation, which was not part of the
domestic legal order and so was not subject to Article 2.4 Whenever pat-
ent litigation took place in the French courts, the Agreement preserved the
power of France to insist on a full translation, and therefore respected the
obligatory status of French in communication with domestic public
429. The attempt was successful in the National Assembly, but rejected by the Senate.
See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, RAPPORT NO. 1009, 13th Legislature, at 53 (2008).
430. 1958 CONST. art. 75-1 ("Les langues regionales appartiennent au patrimoine de
la France.").
431. See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, RAPPORT NO. 1009, 13th Legislature, at 53-54, 57,
186-88 (2008); Christian Lavialle, Du nominalismejuridique: Le nouvel article 75-1 de la
Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, 24 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 1110 (2008).
Subsequently, the Conseil constitutionnel held that the new Article 75-1 does not create a
right or liberty that would enable individuals to challenge legislation under the "priority
question of constitutionality" procedure. CC decision No. 2011-130 QPC, May 20,
2011; see also infra Part V (discussing QPC procedure).
432. CC decision No. 2006-541 DC, Sept. 28, 2006.
433. Agreement on the Application of Article 65 of the Convention on the Grant of
European Patents, Oct. 17, 2000, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT ORGANISA-
TION 550 (2001) [hereinafter London Agreement].
434. CC decision No. 2006-541 DC, Sept. 28, 2006.
435. Id. cons. 6-7.
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authorities.4 3 6 The holding that Article 2 did not apply to the European
Patent Organisation, an external entity, seems reasonable but it deserves
juxtaposition with the Conseil's assumptions in the ICC decision concern-
ing constitutional principles that do apply to an external entity.
After the Conseil's decision, the effect of the Agreement on the status
of the French language in international business remained a divisive issue
across the political spectrum,43 7 but the Government secured majority
approval for the Agreement a year later.43 8 France ratified the treaty in
January 2008.
Thus, the official French language amendment added at the time of
the Maastricht Treaty, combined with Republican principles of indivisibil-
ity and the opposition to collective rights, successfully blocked adherence
to an important human rights treaty of the Council of Europe. The Conseil
constitutionnel confidently drew a line between existing accommodations
to regional languages and more robust language rights. It appears to have
shifted the balance of political forces and preserved the status quo, thereby
fulfilling one of the purposes that Article 54 was intended to serve.
Death penalty treaties redux
The Conseil constitutionnel revisited the subject of human rights trea-
ties abolishing the death penalty, twenty years after its earlier decision of
1985.439 President Chirac referred two treaties that would further expand
France's international obligations not to impose capital punishment (in the
hypothetical future). The Thirteenth Protocol to the European Human
Rights Convention requires abolition of the death penalty in all circum-
stances, not merely in peacetime. 440 The Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) abolishes the
death penalty generally, but permits ratifying states to preserve the power
to apply the death penalty in time of war for a "most serious crime of a
436. Id. cons. 13. The Conseil also easily dismissed the notion that private property
instruments, like patents, were subject to the same requirements of accessibility and
intelligibility as statutes, or that criminal law notice requirements applied, or that the
effect of the London Agreement improperly discriminated against interested third par-
ties with lesser linguistic capabilities. Id. cons. 9-11.
437. See Annie Kahn & Patrick Roger, La loi sur la traduction des brevets europeens
divise les deputes franfais, LE MONDE, Sept. 26, 2007.
438. Loi constitutionnelle 2007-1477 du 17 octobre 2007 autorisant la ratification de
l'accord sur l'application de larticle 65 de la convention sur la delivrance de brevets
europeens, J.O., Oct. 18, 2007, p. 17170.
439. CC decision No. 2005-524/525 DC, Oct. 13, 2005. For the earlier decision, on
the sixth Protocol to the European human rights convention, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 199-202.
440. See Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all Circum-
stances, opened for signature May 3, 2002, E.T.S. No. 187 (entered into force July 1,
2003). The Protocol also prohibits derogation from this obligation, and does not permit
reservations by ratifying states. Id. arts. 2-3.
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military nature."441
The Conseil constitutionnel saw no conflict between the treaties and
express provisions of the Constitution or constitutionally protected
rights.442 Nonetheless, the treaties potentially infringed upon essential
conditions of national sovereignty by preventing the reintroduction of the
death penalty even in an emergency situation that threatens the life of the
nation.443 (It is interesting that a European constitutional tribunal in 2005
would ascribe such importance to the availability of capital punishment in
emergency situations.) As in its 1985 decision on the European Sixth Pro-
tocol, the Conseil observed that the European Thirteenth Protocol did not
fully obstruct reintroduction because France had the (formal) option of
withdrawing from it prospectively under the denunciation clause of the
European Convention.444 However, the ICCPR and its Second Optional
Protocol contain no denunciation clauses, and the Conseil accepted the
international view that they are not subject to denunciation.44 5 Accord-
ingly, ratification of the Second Optional Protocol would violate the Con-
stitution, on the principle that "adherence to an irrevocable international
commitment touching upon a domain inherent to national sovereignty"
infringes upon the essential conditions of its exercise.446
On this occasion, President Chirac, who had been among the minority
of Gaullists voting for the statutory abolition of capital punishment in
1981, responded to the Conseil's Article 54 decision by seeking a sub-
stantive amendment to the Constitution. It eliminated the inconsistency by
making the abolition of the death penalty a constitutional norm, rather
than by authorizing ratification of a treaty. The amendment, overwhelm-
ingly adopted toward the end of Chirac's presidency in February 2007, pro-
vides simply that "No one shall be sentenced to death."448 France then
adhered to both treaties in October 2007.
441. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty art. 2(1), opened for signature Dec.
15, 1989, (entered into force July 11, 1991), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/ccpr-death.htm.
442. CC decision No. 2005-524/525 DC, Oct. 13, 2005, cons. 4.
443. Id. cons. 7. The Conseil drew its phrasing here from the derogation clause of the
Covenant itself, which was inapplicable to the Protocol.
444. Id. cons. 6. Some subtleties lie behind this statement, including uncertainty
about whether the Protocol could be denounced without denouncing the entire Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention, and the fact that any future denunciation would
become internationally effective only after a six-month delay. See Jean-Frangois Flauss,
Le Conseil constitutionnel et les engagements internationaux relatifs a f'abolition definitive
de la peine de mort, 110 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 117, 121-124
(2006).
445. CC decision No. 2005-524/525 DC, Oct. 13, 2005, cons 7; see also Human
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 26: Continuity of Obligations, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997); MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY, XXXVi-xxxvii (2d ed. 2005).
446. CC decision No. 2005-524/525 DC, Oct. 13, 2005, cons. 5.
447. See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, Sept. 18, 1891, 2d sitting, at
1228.
448. 1958 CONST art. 66-1. The vote in the joint Congress was 828 in favor, 16
opposed.
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The Conseil's general statement ol the principle that irrevocable inter-
national commitments touching on a domain inherent to national sover-
eignty require a constitutional amendment raises serious questions about
other constitutional problems France may have overlooked when it ratified
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1980.449 At that time, the
Conseil had not yet emphasized the need for an option to withdraw from a
treaty, and the Covenant did not expressly prohibit denunciation. The
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, also ratified by France
in 1980, equally lacks a denunciation clause, as does the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ratified in
1983. Conceivably, these treaties contain some provisions that pose simi-
lar problems.
Thus, the five decisions on purely international treaties in the post-
1992 period resulted in two rulings of conformity (on the denunciable pro-
tocol and the patent treaty), two rulings of nonconformity that prompted
constitutional amendments (the ICC Statute and the non-denunciable pro-
tocol), and one ruling of nonconformity that halted ratification. The Con-
seil found violations of specific constitutional provisions relating to the
French language, territorial indivisibility, the absence of collective rights
for minorities, and penal immunity for public officials. The Conseil devel-
oped its prior jurisprudence concerning infringement of sovereignty by for-
eign law enforcement, 45 0 and by absolute prohibition of capital
punishment. It broke new ground on the essential sovereign powers of
amnesty and prescription.
One could also say that the Conseil continued its tradition of unpre-
dictability concerning the externalization of international organizations,
that is, when it would hold that a constitutional provision applies only to
restrict the domestic legal actors and when it would bring international or
foreign actors within the restrictive scope of a constitutional provision.
b. The European Union
The Maastricht amendment had apparently endorsed the Conseil con-
stitutionnel's view that principles of national sovereignty permitted some
"transfers of competence" to the European Union but not others. The
express authorizations of transfers in Article 88-2 did not provide advance
consent to future transfers, which would have to be judged on their own
merits. Evaluation of such transfers became the major theme of the Con-
seil's jurisprudence, common to its Article 54 decisions on the Amsterdam,
European Constitution, and Lisbon treaties. Minor themes included the
449. See Flauss, supra note 444, at 132.
450. Compare the discussions of the Franco-German judicial assistance treaty and the
Schengen implementation convention, supra text accompanying notes 192-194,
226-228, with the decision on the ICC, supra text accompanying notes 385-406.
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scrutiny of powers contemplated for the French parliament, and the foun-
dational question of European "constitutionalism."
The Amsterdam Treaty
The Amsterdam Treaty made modest advances on the Maastricht
Treaty. It transferred most of the EU's powers over migration from the
intergovernmental "third pillar" on justice and home affairs to the EC "first
pillar," where these powers would be progressively subjected to qualified
majority voting.45' It integrated the Schengen regime into the EU frame-
work (with opt-outs for the UK and Ireland, and some for Denmark). 452 It
expanded the scope of the "co-decision" procedure; thus, increasing the
power of the European Parliament.453 It created a procedure for sus-
pending a member state that seriously and persistently violates fundamen-
tal rights.4 5 4 It accomplished other minor reforms, although not the
original goal of redesigning representation in the Commission and the EU
Council, in anticipation of future enlargements.4 5 5
The Conseil's 1997 decision on the Amsterdam Treaty placed itself
directly within the framework of analysis provided in Maastricht I. In the
first seven paragraphs, the Conseil reproduced verbatim paragraphs 9-14
of Maastricht I, explaining the sources and limits of France's ability to
transfer competences to an international organization. The Conseil
inserted an additional paragraph, taking note of Article 88-1 added after
Maastricht 1,456 but it did not include this article as one of the sources of
power to transfer, continuing to rely instead on paragraphs 14 and 15 of
the 1946 Preamble.457
Turning to the content of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Conseil noted that
Article 88-2 limited its consent to the terms of transfer provided for in the
Maastricht Treaty.458 Therefore, transfers of competence in other fields of
activity or changes in the manner of exercising competences already con-
ferred needed to be scrutinized for their effect on national sovereignty. The
second Maastricht decision had upheld provisions on common visa policy,
and the res judicata effect of the Conseil's decisions precluded a renewed
challenge to similar provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty.459 However, the
new treaty decreed that, after five years, the procedure for exercising these
powers would change from one that could be initiated by any member state
and that required the unanimous consent of all member states for adoption
451. See Philippe Manin, The Treaty of Amsterdam, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (1998).
452. Id. at 7, 19-20.
453. Id. at 6, 13.
454. Id. at 11-12, 24.
455. Id. at 8-9.
456. CC decision No. 97-394 DC, Dec. 31, 1997, cons. 5.
457. Id. cons. 6; see also Bruno Genevois, Le Conseil constitutionnel et le droit com-
munautaire derive, 20 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 651, 653 (2004) (describ-
ing the citation of Article 88-1 as "juridiquement neutre" [legally neutral]). Recall that
these provisions of the 1946 Preamble addressed international law and international
organizations generally.
458. CC decision No. 97-394 DC, Dec. 31, 1997, cons. 9.
459. Id. cons. 27.
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of a measure to a co-decision procedure. Under co-decision, only the EU
Commission could initiate the process, a qualified majority of the member
states could adopt a measure in the Council, and the European Parlia-
ment's assent was required.4 60 The Conseil concluded that France's result-
ing loss of power within the visa policymaking process required a new
constitutional amendment.461
New authorities regarding asylum, immigration, and the crossing of
internal borders also raised issues of sovereignty. The Conseil found that
the initial arrangement, which required unanimity and provided each state
with the power of initiation, did not sufficiently trench upon on national
sovereignty to require a constitutional amendment. 462 However, after five
years, the co-decision procedure governed some of these matters, and
others were subject to a "passerelle" clause (or "bridging clause") by which
they could be made subject to the co-decision procedure through a unani-
mous vote within the EU Council.463 These bridging clauses would be
given effect by actions internal to the EU institutions that would not pro-
vide an occasion for constitutional review by the Conseil; therefore,
although the intrusion on national sovereignty was contingent, the Conseil
needed to evaluate it immediately. For these reasons, the transfers of new
competences in the migration area (after the five-year period) required a
constitutional amendment.
The Conseil did not object to other features of the Amsterdam Treaty,
including the enhancement of the European Parliament's role by making its
assent necessary in the co-decision procedure across a wide range of regu-
latory subjects.
In response, a constitutional amendment modified Article 88-2, replac-
ing the enumerated transfer of competence over border control under the
Maastricht Treaty by the broader competence resulting from the Amster-
dam Treaty, which it specifically cited. 464 At the legislature's request, the
amendment also modified Article 88-4, expanding the information that the
Government should convey to both chambers about proposed European
measures and the power of each chamber to adopt resolutions addressing
those measures. 465 This expansion represented a compensatory increase
in legislative power, not a requirement of the treaty. In this period of
cohabitation, the amendment received broad support and the opposition of
a vocal minority, with more than 85% of the legislators voting in its favor in
the Congress. 466
Toward a European Constitution, or Not
460. Id. cons. 28; Manin, supra note 451, at 6.
461. CC decision No. 97-394 DC, Dec. 31, 1997, cons. 28-29.
462. Id. cons. 23.
463. Id. cons. 24-25.
464. Loi constitutionnelle 99-49 du 25 janvier 1999 modifiant les articles 88-2 et 88-4
de la Constitution, J.O., Jan. 26, 1999, p. 1343.
465. Id.
466. See Le Congrts a adoptt sans passion la rivision constitutionnelle, LE MONDE, Jan.
20, 1999; Cent onze parlementaires ont vote contre, LE MONDE, Jan. 20, 1999.
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The next major step occurred in the summer of 2004.467 At that time,
the multi-year project of drafting what would later be known as the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE or European Constitution
Treaty) was coming to fruition. The ill-fated TCE was intended as a quan-
tum leap in reform of the EU institutions, comparable to the Maastricht
Treaty, responding to the challenges of the EU's expanding activities and
increasing membership.468 The first stage of the drafting process involved
a "Convention" combining representatives of governments, members of
national parliaments, members of the European Parliament, and represent-
atives of the EU Commission; Valtry Giscard d'Estaing served as President
of the Convention.469 The Convention decided to unify the separate EU
treaties into a single instrument, simpler in form (though still quite volumi-
nous) and constitutional in nature. It would strengthen the EU institutions
and make their procedures less rigid, and it would upgrade the European
Parliament as a partner in a more democratized legislative process. 470 The
Charter of Fundamental Rights, adopted as a non-binding instrument at
the time of the Nice Treaty, would be written into the Constitution Treaty
as its bill of rights.47' The Convention draft was further modified by inter-
governmental conferences, which struggled with difficult issues of distri-
bution of power such as the definition of weighted votes to be used in
structuring qualified majority voting.472 The governments reached agree-
ment on the final text in June 2004.473
Also in June 2004, the Conseil constitutionnel began reviewing a series
of statutes that implemented EU directives.474 (A directive is a binding
norm enacted by the EU that obligates states to adopt legal norms of their
own design that achieve the specified result, as opposed to an EU "regula-
tion," which is a binding norm enacted by the EU that is directly applicable
in the member states' courts.)475 The decisions in these statutory referral
cases reconceptualized the relationship between EU law and the French
Constitution, as well as the relationship between the Conseil constitutionnel
and the European Court of Justice.
467. Recall that the Treaty of Nice was ratified without any evaluation by the Conseil
constitutionnel. See supra Part III.B.L
468. See PIRIs, supra note 129, at 9-14.
469. Id. at 15.
470. Id. at 20-23, 325-26.
471. Id. at 148-49.
472. Id. at 17-19, 221-22.
473. Id. at 19.
474. CC decision No. 2004-496 DC, June 10, 2004; CC decision No. 2004-497 DC,
July 1, 2004; CC decision No. 2004-498 DC, July 29, 2004; CC decision No. 2004-
499 DC, July 29, 2004. For a discussion in English, see Jacqueline Dutheil de la
Rochare, Conseil constitutionnel (French Constitutional Court), Decision No. 2004-496 of 10
June 2004, Loi pour la confiance dans 'economie numrique (e-commerce), 42 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 860-61 (2005). Unlike other decisions discussed in this section, these
decisions involved the referral of domestic statutes with European roots, not referral of
treaties or of statutes authorizing the ratification of treaties.
475. See PIRIS, supra note 129, at 192-94.
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The new approach comprised three main elements. First, the Conseil
identified a different constitutional basis for EU law and its primacy. For
the first time, the Conseil attributed substantive normative content to Arti-
cle 88-1 of the Constitution, a provision added in 1992 by the Maastricht
amendment.476 That article then provided that "The Republic shall partici-
pate in the European Communities and in the European Union, composed
of states which have chosen freely to exercise certain of their competences
in common in accordance with the treaties which created them."477
Although the Conseil had previously explained the supralegislative force of
Community law as resulting from Article 55, which deals with interna-
tional commitments generally,478 the Conseil now interpreted Article 88-1
as entailing a specific constitutional mandate that required the implemen-
tation (or "transposition") of EU directives by domestic law. Conse-
quently, there was constitutional weight on the side of implementing
directives, which would have to be reconciled with countervailing constitu-
tional values.479
Second, the Conseil constitutionnel announced that it was ordinarily
the exclusive responsibility of the EU judges to ensure that European direc-
tives remained within the boundaries of EU competence and respected the
fundamental rights guaranteed under EU law.480 To the extent that a
French statute limited itself to drawing the necessary consequences from
unconditional and precise provisions of a directive, the Conseil constitution-
nel would not review the statute for compliance with fundamental rights
under the French Constitution, but would leave the task of protecting fun-
damental rights with the ECJ.4 8 1 To the extent, however, that the French
statute imposed additional restrictions that were not mandated by the
directive, the Conseil would review those additional aspects of the statute
for compliance with fundamental rights.482 Again, this division of respon-
sibility was expressed as resulting from the provisions of the French Con-
stitution regarding European integration, and not as imposed involuntarily
from above by EU law.
Third, the preceding limitation on the Conseil constitutionnel's role
would be subject to an exception where a directive conflicted with what the
476. CC decision No. 2004-496 DC, June 10, 2004, cons. 7.
477. 1958 CONST. art. 88-1 (1992 version, subsequently amended).
478. See, e.g., CC decision No. 77-90 DC, Dec. 30, 1977; Anne Levade, Le Conseil
constitutionnel aux prises avec le droit communautaire derive, 120 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
889, 891 (2004).
479. CC decision No. 2004-496 DC,June 10, 2004, cons. 7. The Conseil later derived
another conclusion from this constitutional mandate, namely, its authority to review
whether a statute intended to transpose a directive into domestic law was manifestly
incompatible with the directive. See CC decision No. 2006-540 DC, July 27, 2006; CC
decision No. 2006-543 DC, Nov. 30, 2006; see infra text accompanying notes 557-560.
480. CC decision No. 2004-496 DC, June 10, 2004, cons. 7.
481. CC decision No. 2004-496 DC, June 10, 2004, cons. 9.
482. CC decision No. 2004-497 DC, July 1, 2004 (finding that a provision of the law
before it, which was not required by the directive, violated the constitutional right to
equality and was invalid); see CC decision No. 200+496 DC, June 10, 2004, cons. 9, 14
(foreshadowing this result).
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Conseil described as "an express contrary disposition of the Constitu-
tion."4 33 This phrase was soon glossed by the Conseil's Secretary General
as referring to an express disposition particular to (propre a) the French
Constitution, as opposed to those rules common to French and EU law.484
That amplification was then confirmed by the third of the decisions,
upholding a statute implementing an EU directive on the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions. The Conseil indicated that the provisions in
question, which did no more than implement the directive, could not be
challenged as violating the freedom of expression protected by Article 11 of
the Declaration of 1789 because that freedom was also protected in EU law
as a general principle based on Article 10 of the European Human Rights
Convention.48 5 Thus, it appeared that the Conseil constitutionnel would not
independently enforce rights that enjoyed parallel protection under French
and EU law in a manner that threatened the supremacy of an EU directive,
but it reserved the right to block implementation of a directive that
infringed distinctive French constitutional principles. Further clarification
of this division of labor emerged in later decisions. Employing language
derived from the European Constitution Treaty, the Conseil rephrased the
exceptional category as a "rule or principle inherent to the constitutional
identity of France."4 86 Examples probably include the particular French
version of secularism, laicite, and the strong formal equality principle that
opposes recognition of collective rights for groups defined by common ori-
gin, culture, language, or religion.487
483. CC decision No. 2004-496 DC, June 10, 2004, cons. 7.
484. Jean-Eric Schoettl, Le nouveau regime juridique de la communication en ligne
devant le Conseil constitutionnel, LES PETITES AFFICHEs, June 18, 2004, at 10, 18.
485. CC decision No. 2004-498 DC, July 29, 2004, cons. 6-7; see also Jean-lric
Schoett1, La brevetabilite des genes, la droit communautaire et la Constitution, LES PETITES
AFFICHES, Aug. 17, 2004, at 3, 6 (giving this interpretation of the decision). In the fourth
of these decisions, decided the same day as the third, the Conseil more tersely declined
to review a provision of a statute that implemented a directive for its compliance with the
judicially derived right to respect for private life. CC decision No. 2004-499 DC, July
29, 2004, cons. 8. That right is not only common to the French and European systems,
but was read into the general protection of liberty under Article 2 of the 1789 Declara-
tion by the Conseil.
486. CC decision No. 2006-540 DC, July 27, 2006, cons. 19; see also CC decision No.
2006-543 DC, Nov. 30, 2006, cons. 6; CC decision No. 2008-564 DC, June 19, 2008,
cons. 44; CC decision No. 2010-605 DC, May 12, 2010, cons. 18; cf. Pierre Mazeaud,
Voeux du president du Conseil constitutionnel, M. Pierre Mazeaud, au President de la
Republique, CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/documentation-publications/cahiers-du-conseil/cahier-n-18/
voeux-du-pTesident-du-conseil-constitutionnel-m-pierre-mazeaud-au-president-de-la-
republique.51930.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) ("Mais non, le droit europ~en, si loin
qu'aillent sa primaute et son immediate, ne peut remettre en cause ce qui est expresse-
ment inscrit dans nos textes constitutionnels et qui nous est propre. Je veux parler ici de
tout ce qui est inherent A notre identit( constitutionnelle, au double sens du terme
'inherent': crucial et distinctif. Autrement dit: l'essential de la R6publique.").
487. See Bertrand Mathieu, "Les regles et les principes inherent a I'identite constitution-
nelle de la France": Une categorie juridique fonctionnelle a definer, in EN HOMMAGE A FRAN-
cis DELPEREE: ITINERAIRES D'UN CONSTITUTIONNALISTE 977, 985-86 (Robert Andersen et al.
eds., 2007); cf. Jean-Eric Schoettl, Primaute du droit communautaire: I'approche du Conseil
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The Conseil's analysis represented a compromise position between two
poles: the total subjection of constitutional norms to EU lawmaking, and
unilateral insistence that EU regulation must comply with all French con-
stitutional norms. One might say that the compromise lay much closer to
total acceptance of EU supremacy than to total insistence on the
supremacy of the French Constitution. Indeed, the Conseil's new approach
initially prompted press reports that EU law now trumped the Constitu-
tion.4 8 8 The Conseil's renunciation of review with respect to most constitu-
tional rights might be seen as a further evolution of the optimistic
presumption it had indulged concerning EC protection of fundamental
rights in the Maastricht I decision. 48 9 Yet, the Conseil's stance in 2004
amounted to a limited resistance to the conception of European primacy
that had long served as orthodox doctrine in EU law. The new approach
provided a variant on strategies employed by several other constitutional
courts in Europe, seeking to carve out some checking role for their national
constitutions in the ever-expanding EU regime. The greatest resemblance
may be to the Italian Constitutional Court, whose influence on the Con-
seil's solution has been noted.4 90 As the reader will have observed, the text
of Article 88-1 provided no guidance whatsoever on where to draw the
line.4 9 '
The European Constitution Treaty was signed at a formal ceremony in
Rome on October 29, 2004, and President Chirac referred it to the Conseil
constitutionnel under Article 54 the same day.4 92 In response, the Conseil
held that a constitutional amendment would be necessary before the treaty
constitutionnel, in RAPPORT PUBLIC 2007, JURISPRUDENCE ET AVIS DE 2006 (Conseil d'Etat
ed., 2007) (suggesting laicite and equal access to public office as examples).
488. See Les Sages acceptent la primaute de Bruxelles, LE FIGARO, June 17, 2004, at 9;
Herve Gattegno & Christophe Jakubyszyn, Le droit europeen prime desormais sur la Con-
stitution franaise, LE MONDE, June 17, 2004, at 8. The Conseil took the unusual step of
delaying announcement of the decision it had reached on June 10, in order to prevent
misunderstandings of its approach from influencing the elections for the European Par-
liament on June 12. Dutheil de la Rochere, supra note 474, at 859.
489. See supra text accompanying notes 244-247.
490. See, e.g., Genevois, supra note 457, at 654; Bertrand Mathieu, Rapports normatifs
entre le droit communautaire et le droit national, 72 REVUE FRANcAISE DE DROIT CONSTITU-
TIONNEL 675, 679 (2007); Schoettl, supra note 487, at 17 (describing the approaches of
other constitutional courts, in exposition by Secretary General of the Conseil
constitution nel).
491. A few years later, the Conseil d'Etat adopted an analogous, though differently
worded, version of the Conseil constitutionnel's rule to guide its own practice in reviewing
the constitutionality of administrative regulations implementing EU directives. CE Sect.,
Feb. 8, 2007, Rec. Lebon 55 (Societe ARCELOR Atlantique et Lorraine) (holding that, in
view of Article 88-1, administrative courts can review the constitutionality of a regula-
tion transposing the precise and unconditional dispositions of a directive only if there is
no rule or general principle of Community law that, as currently interpreted by the EU
judges, effectively guarantees respect for the constitutional provision invoked); see, e.g.,
Bruno Genevois, L'application du droit communautaire par le Conseil d'Etat, 25 REVUE
FRANIAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 201 (2009).
492. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004.
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could be ratified and also interpreted the treaty in a manner that would
decrease the conflicts between the treaty and its own current jurispru-
dence.493 The decision is remarkable in two respects. The first is the
extent to which the Conseil's reasoning relied on unilateral interpretations
of the treaty, which it could not guarantee that external actors would
accept. Second, the Conseil gave an illustrative, rather than a comprehen-
sive, list of the contradictions between the treaty and the Constitution, tak-
ing for granted that the likely amendment would consent in generalized
terms to the transfers of competences that the treaty would produce.494
The framework stated in the opening paragraphs of the decision devi-
ated from the wording of the Maastricht I and Amsterdam decisions in sub-
tle, but significant, ways. First, the Conseil now included Article 88-1
among the texts enabling France to transfer competences to the European
Union.495 Second, the Conseil designated the EU in that sentence as a "per-
manent European organization" rather than as a "permanent international
organization," signaling its shift from an analysis in terms generally appli-
cable to international treaties to a Europe-specific analysis.496 The Conseil
subsequently described Article 88-1 as establishing the existence of a com-
munity legal order integrated with the domestic legal order and distinct
from the international legal order.497
Nonetheless, the Conseil emphasized that the TCE remained an inter-
national treaty, subject to unilateral denunciation. 498 This observation
was one of a series of deflationary assertions concerning the magnitude of
change that the Treaty would bring, relying in part on the wording of the
Treaty and official European interpretations, and in part on the Conseil's
own construction. The label "Constitution for Europe" did not change the
relationship between the EU and the constitutions of the member states,
and the French Constitution remained at the apex of the domestic legal
order.499 Moreover, TCE Article 1-5 required the EU to respect the national
identity of the member states, inherent in their fundamental political and
constitutional structures.5 0 The express statement of the rule of the pri-
macy of EU law in TCE Article 1-6 did not change the content of the rule as
previously applied,501 and as the Conseil had articulated it in the decisions
493. See id.
494. See id.
495. Id. cons. 6.
496. Id.
497. Id. cons. 11.
498. Id. cons. 9. In fact, the TCE included an explicit withdrawal clause, unlike the
EEC Treaty or the Treaty on European Union. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe art. 1-60, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 OJ (C 310) 40 [hereinafter TCE]; Raymond J. Friel,
Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 of the Draft
European Constitution, 53 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 407, 407 (2004).
499. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 10.
500. Id. cons. 12 (quoting from Article 1-5 of the TCE, supra note 498, which provided
that "[t]he union shall respect the equality of the Member States before the constitution
as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional . .
501. Id.
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of summer 2004.502 Therefore, these features of the TCE did not require a
constitutional amendment.
The Conseil turned next to the European Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which would finally be given binding legal force within the sphere
of EU law by the TCE.5 0 3 This was the first time that the Conseil had openly
confronted the divergence between European and French conceptions of funda-
mental rights. The Conseil examined whether the provisions of the Charter
would violate important principles contained in Articles 1 to 3 of the
French Constitution, and whether they would infringe upon essential con-
ditions of the exercise of national sovereignty. Only five issues received
specific mention, and the Conseil found favorable solutions to all of them.
First, the Conseil maintained that, because TCE Article 11-112 encouraged
interpretation of certain rights in harmony with the traditions of the
national constitutions, the Charter would not impair the prohibition
against recognizing collective rights for groups defined by commonality of
origin, culture, language, or belief.5 0 4 Second, the Conseil maintained that
the Charter would not impair the particular French version of secularism,
laicite, citing as evidence a recent Chamber decision of the European Court
of Human Rights regarding the prohibition of headscarves in a university
in Turkey.5 05 The Conseil also identified reasons for believing that rules in
the Charter concerning the public character of judicial hearings, 50 6 cross-
border limits on double jeopardy,5 0 7 and countervailing considerations of
502. Id. cons. 13. It is relatively rare for the Conseil to make explicit citations to its
prior decisions, but it did so on this occasion.
503. TCE, supra note 498, art. 1-9, at 13; TCE, supra note 498, pt. 11 pmbl., at 41.
504. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 16; cf. supra text accompa-
nying notes 415 -431 (discussing constitutional objections to group rights in connection
with the European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages).
505. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 18 (citing Leyla Sahin v.
Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Chamber Judgment (Fourth Section), June
29, 2004), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&docu-
mentld=699739&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8
6142BF01C1166DEA398649)). This was the first time that the Conseil had ever cited a
European Court of Human Rights judgment among the legal sources of its decisions. In
fact, the judgment was a non-final Chamber judgment that was being referred to the
Grand Chamber of the Court. Although that fact may have made the judgment an inse-
cure basis for reliance, it still possessed utility in the conversation that the Conseil was
conducting. The Grand Chamber affirmed the Chamber's decision in 2005. See Leyla
$ahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173.
506. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 19 (using nonbinding inter-
pretations of the Charter by the praesidium of the convention that initially drafted it to
construe the public hearing provision as incorporating public order exceptions).
507. Id. cons. 20 (using nonbinding interpretations of the Charter by the praesidium
of the convention that initially drafted it to construe the double jeopardy provision as
permitting France to try an individual for treason or espionage offenses under Title IV,
book I of the Penal Code despite a prior foreign prosecution). The prohibition of cross-
border double jeopardy traced back to the Schengen implementation convention of
1990, and disputes over the exceptions had recently resurfaced in connection with the
European Arrest Warrant. See Jerame Roux, Le traite etablissant une Constitution pour
l'Europe a l'epreuve de la Constitution frangaise, 121 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIc 59, 81-82 &
n.144 (2005).
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public interest 508 would be construed in a manner protective of French
national sovereignty. The Conseil concluded from its interpretive exercise
that nothing in the Charter required a constitutional amendment.50 9
Whether its predictions regarding the operative meaning of the Charter will
prove accurate remains to be seen, but its analysis may have served to put
European institutions on notice of a core of interpretive demands.
The Conseil then took up the areas where a constitutional amendment
would prove necessary. As in the Maastricht I and Amsterdam decisions,
these areas involved new transfers of competence that implicated national
sovereignty, changed modes of EU decision regarding competences already
transferred, and new authorities to be exercised by the national parliament.
New transfers infringing upon national sovereignty would occur, for exam-
ple (notamment), in TCE Article 111-265 concerning border controls, and in
TCE Articles 111-269 to 271 concerning judicial cooperation in civil and
criminal matters, to the extent that these exceeded the authorities already
transferred to the EU under prior treaties. 510 The authorization to estab-
lish a European Public Prosecutor's Office, empowered to prosecute crimi-
nal offenses affecting the financial interests of the EU before the national
courts, also raised sovereignty issues serious enough to require a constitu-
tional amendment. 51' Generally speaking, these conclusions involved
areas previously identified in the Schengen, Maastricht, and ICC decisions,
but one can only speak generally because of the summary treatment the
Conseil afforded in the TCE decision.
The Conseil also gave examples of provisions that necessitated a con-
stitutional amendment because those provisions changed the modalities
for exercise of previously transferred competences implicating national
sovereignty, whether by substituting qualified majority voting for unanim-
ity in the EU Council, by requiring the assent of the European Parliament,
or by taking the power to initiate legislative proposals away from the indi-
vidual member states. 512 As in the Amsterdam decision, the Conseil found
that "bridging clauses" that empowered a future shift from unanimity to
qualified majority voting on matters inherent to the exercise of national
sovereignty, without the opportunity for review by the Conseil, required a
constitutional amendment.5 13 Another innovation of the treaty, the "sim-
plified revision procedure" of TCE Article IV-444, permitted the European
Council (i.e. the heads of governments acting by unanimity), with the
express consent of the European Parliament, to replace a unanimity voting
procedure in the EU Council with qualified majority voting, absent objec-
508. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 21 (using nonbinding inter-
pretations of the Charter by the praesidium of the convention that initially drafted it to
construe the general limitations clause of the Charter as including the interest of a single
member state in its territorial integrity, public order, or national security as among the
general interests recognized by the Union justifying restrictions on fundamental rights).
509. Id. cons. 22.
510. Id. cons. 27.
511. Id. cons. 28.
512. Id. cons. 30-32.
513. Id. cons. 33-34.
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tion by the national legislatures.5 1 4 For the same reason as the bridging
clauses, this provision required a constitutional amendment.5 1 5
Finally, the Conseil identified three provisions contemplating that
national parliaments would exercise new prerogatives regarding EU law-
making that exceeded the restricted role of the legislature in the 1958 Con-
stitution.5 16 National parliaments had the power to block a simplified
revision under TCE Article IV-444;5 17 each chamber had the power to com-
pel a reexamination of a proposed legislative act by issuing a reasoned
opinion explaining why the act would violate the principle of subsidiarity;
and each chamber was authorized to initiate proceedings before the ECJ to
vindicate the principle of subsidiarity.5"I A constitutional amendment
would be necessary to confer these powers on the French parliament.
The decision did not address many of the important institutional
changes embodied in the TCE. That silence most likely reflected the
assumption, dating back to the Conseil's first European decision in 1970,
that certain reallocations of authority within the European institutions
were not of constitutional concern to France. 5 19 The Conseil has also
focused its attention on qualitative changes, such as the shift from unanim-
ity voting to qualified majority voting, rather than quantitative changes,
such as distributions of voting weight, despite the obvious significance that
the latter have for France's ability to affect EU policy.
After the Conseil's decision, one might predict that the result would be
a constitutional amendment consenting in general terms to whatever trans-
fers of competence were entailed by the European Constitution Treaty
(since the precise list could not be confidently enumerated), and that three
specific new authorities would be added to the legislature's powers. The
amendment would implicitly adopt the Conseil's analysis, and would
change the status quo to the extent necessary for ratification of the treaty.
Perhaps some extraneous provisions would be added as the price of con-
sent, but the theory of national sovereignty and the relations between the
constitutional order and the European legal order would be left in the
hands of the Conseil. And that is largely what happened. The drafters of
the amendment took the opportunity to clean up the constitutional text,
514. TCE, supra note 498, art. IV-444(1). Another variant, Article IV-444(2), allowed
the European Council to substitute the "ordinary legislative procedure" (formerly known
as co-decision) for various "special legislative procedures" that diminished the role of
the European Parliament. I omit this branch from the text for the ease of the reader; it
was unconstitutional for the same reason.
515. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 35. The broader provision
of TCE Article IV-445 for simplified revision, which streamlined the treaty revision pro-
cess but still required national ratification, did not require a constitutional amendment,
because France's consent to the revision would involve legislative approval and would
therefore be subject to challenge before the Conseil constitutionnel. Id., cons. 36.
516. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 37-41.
517. TCE Article IV-444 therefore required a constitutional amendment for two inde-
pendent reasons.
518. CC decision No. 2004-505 DC, Nov. 19, 2004, cons. 39, 41.
519. See CC decision No. 70-39 DC, June 19, 1970; see also supra text accompanying
note 122.
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removing some material that would become redundant; they made that
rewording contingent on the entry into force of the treaty (which, as it
turned out, never occurred). 52 0 They also introduced a new provision
requiring a referendum before France would consent to the admission of
future member states-a provision directed against Turkey. 52 1 But the main
force of the amendment was an authorization for France to participate in
the European Union according to the terms of the European Constitution
Treaty signed on October 29, 2004.522
Even before the TCE had been signed, President Chirac had yielded to
pressure within his own Gaullist party to submit it to a referendum (as had
been done with the Maastricht Treaty, but not with the lesser Amsterdam
and Nice Treaties). 5 23 The constitutional amendment authorizing ratifica-
tion passed easily, as a mere preliminary to the popular vote. 5 24 The
Socialist Party had split on the treaty, with the party leadership favoring
ratification but a dissident faction led by Laurent Fabius arguing that the
current version was too neo-liberal and that it should be renegotiated to
520. As a result, Article 1 of the amendment added a new, transitional sentence to
Article 88-1 authorizing ratification of the TCE. Once the treaty entered into force, it
would disappear, and Article 3 of the amendment provided that the Europe articles in
Title XV of the Constitution would be replaced. Article 88-1 would state the principle of
French participation in the EU with sole reference to the TCE; the enumeration of trans-
ferred competences in Article 88-2 would be dropped, and only the sentence regarding
the European Arrest Warrant would remain; Article 88-3 would be almost unchanged,
but the references to reciprocity and to the Maastricht Treaty would be dropped as obso-
lete; Article 88-4 would be slightly reworded; Article 88-5 would authorize the new par-
liamentary powers concerning subsidiarity as contemplated by the TCE; Article 88-6
would authorize the new parliamentary powers concerning simplified revision; and Arti-
cle 88-7 would address the referendum on new admissions, discussed in the next foot-
note. See Loi constitutionnelle 2005-204 du ler mars 2005 modifiant le titre XV de la
Constitution, J.O., Mar. 2, 2005, p. 2005.
521. In October 2004, President Jacques Chirac had promised that France would not
agree to the admission of Turkey to the EU (which he favored) without holding a referen-
dum on the issue; it was hoped that guaranteeing the referendum would separate the
question of eventual membership of Turkey from the question of approving the TCE. See
Henri de Bresson & Beatrice Gurrey, M. Chirac promet un referendum sur I'adhision de la
Turquie, LE MONDE, Oct. 4, 2004.
As a result of the contingent amendment strategy, Article 2 of the amendment added a
new, transitional Article 88-5, providing that statutes authorizing the ratification of a
treaty admitting a new member state to the EU would be submitted to referendum, and it
added a cross-reference to this procedure in Article 60 (on the Conseil constitutionnel's
oversight of referenda). Once the TCE entered into force, transitional Article 88-5 would
be replaced by an equivalent Article 88-7. Article 4 of the amendment was a grandfather
clause, specifying that referenda would not be required for certain admissions already
planned (i.e., Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia).
After the European Constitution Treaty failed, the transitional amendment regarding
referenda remained in force. It was softened somewhat in 2008 by the addition of a
method for bypassing the referendum by parliamentary supermajority. See infra note
541.
522. See supra note 520.
523. See Matt Qvortup, The Three Referendums on the European Constitution Treaty in
2005, 77(1) POL. Q. 89, 90 (2006).
524. The vote in the joint Congress was 450 in favor and 34 against; the dissenting
Socialists abstained.
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provide greater protections for French social policy.9 2 5 This dissent appar-
ently provided the margin of nearly ten points that defeated the treaty,
added to the sovereigntists and voters registering their general discontent
with the incumbent government. 526 It is striking how little the Conseil con-
stitutionnel's concerns about the treaty had to do with the concerns of the
decisive segment of voters.
After another negative referendum result a few days later in the Nether-
lands, and with bleak prospects in several other states, the TCE was aban-
doned and two years later the member states negotiated a less ambitious
substitute.5 2 7 The Lisbon Treaty jettisoned the constitutional dress of the
TCE and presented itself as a set of complicated amendments to earlier
European treaties. Much of the content of the TCE was recycled, some-
times with restrictions intended to reassure member states and sometimes
with cosmetic changes in expression. The Charter of Fundamental Rights
was given legal force by reference rather than by textual incorporation into
the treaty. 52 8 The express provision on primacy of EU law was
dropped.5 29 Some additional enhancements were made to the role of
national parliaments in the EU legislative process.5 30
Chirac's successor President Nicolas Sarkozy referred the Lisbon
Treaty for a ruling on the need for a constitutional amendment, and the
similarities between the treaties enabled the Conseil to answer swiftly.53 1
Because the European Constitution Treaty had not been ratified, neither
respect for treaties in force nor the highly specific authorization for the
abandoned treaty provided cover for the Lisbon Treaty. (In a sense, then,
the technique of amending the French Constitution by incorporating
sweeping approval of a named treaty had backfired, and a new amendment
was necessary even for a less invasive substitute.) The authority of the Con-
seil's previous decision, however, supplied direct answers to many of the
relevant questions. Other questions, posed in slightly different terms by
differently worded treaty clauses, received analogous answers. As in the
prior decision, the Conseil left many important institutional reforms within
the EU unaddressed.
The Conseil repeated its framing of the analysis in terms of a European
525. See Renaud Dehousse, The Unmaking of a Constitution: Lessons from the European
Referendum, 13(2) CONSTELLATIONS 151, 153-55 (2006); Isabelle Mandraud, M. Fabius:
"Pour une Europe plus forte, on commence par dire non", LE MONDE, May 10, 2005.
526. Qvortup, supra note 523, at 94-95; Gilles Ivaldi, Beyond France's 2005 Referen-
dum on the European Constitutional Treaty: Second-Order Model, Anti-Establishment Atti-
tudes and the End of the Alternative European Utopia, 29(1) W. EUR. POL. 47 (2006); Allan
Ramsay, The French Referendum, 287 CONTEMP. REV. 11, 14 (2005).
527. See PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM 20-25
(2010).
528. See PIRIS, supra note 129, at 150.
529. See id. at 81.
530. See id. at 124-25.
531. CC decision No. 2007-560 DC, Dec. 20, 2007.
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organization, and not in terms of international organizations generally.53 2
It added an assertion that the relevant constitutional provisions confirmed
the place of the Constitution at the apex of the domestic legal order.533
Giving legal effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights would not infringe
national sovereignty or other constitutional principles, for the reasons
already stated.534 The Conseil did attempt to list exhaustively the articles
of the treaty that would transfer new competences infringing upon the
essential conditions of the exercise of national sovereignty,535 and articles
that would subject existing transfers implicating national sovereignty to
decision procedures that reduced France's control,536 or to bridging
clauses that might do so in the future.53 7 The Conseil reiterated its prior
conclusions about simplified revision procedures. 538 Authorities con-
ferred on the French parliament, as in the previous decision, required a
constitutional amendment, including new provisions increasing the oppor-
tunity for national parliaments to resist violations of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, and a provision permitting parliamentary objection to the use of a
bridging clause regarding family law.539 Thus, to no one's surprise, a con-
stitutional amendment would have to precede ratification of the Lisbon
Treaty.
The necessary amendment was adopted in February 2008, over sub-
stantial opposition and heavy abstentions from the Socialists. 540 The
amendment, like its predecessor, authorized French participation in the
European Union in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, and provided a con-
tingent rewriting of Title XV for when that treaty entered into force. The
form it gave Title XV was essentially equivalent, mutatis mutandis, to the
form contemplated by the TCE amendment.54' Strong objections were
532. Id. cons. 3-9.
533. Id. cons. 8.
534. Id. cons. 12. Apparently the future accession of the European Union to the Euro-
pean human rights convention did not necessitate a constitutional amendment, at least
at this time. Id. cons. 13.
535. Id. cons. 18-19 (listing articles involving counterterrorism, border control,
human trafficking, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, and the European
public prosecutor's office).
536. Id. cons. 21-22.
537. Id. cons. 24-25.
538. Id. cons. 26-27.
539. Id. cons. 32.
540. See Assembl&e Nationale, Scrutin public sur le projet de loi constitutionnelle modifi-
ant le titre XV de la Constitution, Feb. 4, 2008, available at www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
13/scrutins/jo9000.asp (listing 560 votes in favor, 181 against, and 152 legislators
abstaining or not voting).
541. See Loi constitutionnelle 2008-103 du 4 fevrier 2008 modifiant le titre XV de la
Constitution, J.O., Feb. 4, 2008, p. 2202. There were slight differences in wording, and
the 2008 amendment left Article 88-3 unmodified, and therefore left in the reference to
reciprocity. Also, the numbering of the articles was different.
A subsequent amendment in July 2008, part of the large package of institutional
reforms, changed the procedures in Article 88-6 for challenging the compliance of EU
legislation with the principle of subsidiarity. It also created an option in Article 88-5 to
bypass the referendum on admission of a new member state (e.g., Turkey) by a
supermajority procedure similar to the adoption of a constitutional amendment. Loi
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raised to effectively overruling a referendum by substituting a similar treaty
without a new referendum, but parliament enacted the authorizing statute,
and France deposited its instrument of ratification the same month. After
some suspense and delay, the treaty entered into force in December
2009.542
Thus, the Amsterdam, TCE, and Lisbon decisions further developed the
framework of the Maastricht decision within the context of the successive
Europe-specific amendments. The Conseil focused on particular subject
matters that it had previously recognized as essential to national sover-
eignty and added a few more examples. It focused on modes of exercising
transferred competences that unduly impaired France's control over these
subject matters, including bridging clauses that set up contingent future
actions that the Conseil would be unable to review. It also guarded against
enhancements of the French parliament's authority to check EU action,
despite their benefit to national sovereignty, if the enhancements would
transgress the Fifth Republic's design of separated powers.
Meanwhile, the Conseil sought a compromise between submission and
resistance to EU supremacy. It attributed the status of EU law to the con-
sent expressed in the constitutional amendments, and tried to construct an
interpretation of that consent that included limits preserving key elements
of France's constitutional identity.
4. The Form of Amendments
The Conseil constitutionnel has consistently adhered to its pronounce-
ment in the Maastricht II decision that the constituent power is free to
design constitutional amendments in whatever form it chooses, whether as
revisions of existing provisions or through addition of contradictory provi-
sions, by general statements of principle or by explicit reference to a partic-
ular external instrument (such as the Treaty on European Union). The
constituent power has exercised that prerogative, both in the treaty context
and in the domestic context,5 4 3 despite the uncertainties and asymmetries
that critics had warned against.
The amendments authorizing international commitments have taken a
variety of forms. The 1999 amendment that followed the decision of the
Conseil on the International Criminal Court treaty was simple and unin-
formative. It authorized ratification of the specific treaty, without any indi-
constitutionnelle 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve
R~publique, art. 47, J.O., July 24, 2008, p. 11890.
542. Hesitancy by voters in Ireland and by the Czech President led to the negotiation
of concessions in side agreements that enabled all member states to ratify in 2009. See
PIRIS, supra note 129, at 51-63.
543. For a domestic example, see Loi constitutionnelle 98-610 du 20 juillet 1998,
relative A la Nouvelle-Caldonie, J.O., July 20, 1998, p. 11143 (adding articles 76 and 77,
making specific reference to laws and agreements relating to the overseas territory of
New Caledonia).
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cation or limitation of the constitutional provisions that it was
overriding.544 Presumably, the Conseil's decision illuminates the content
of the amendment.545
The 2003 amendment that approved the European Arrest Warrant
more generically authorized the implementation of European Arrest War-
rant regimes adopted pursuant to the Treaty on European Union, again
without any indication or limitation of the constitutional principles being
sacrificed. 546 That amendment may be even less informative than the ICC
amendment, given that the Conseil d 'Etat cannot provide definitive gui-
dance on what the Constitution does and does not require, and given that
the Conseil constitutionnel has never clarified which principles of extradi-
tion law may rise to the level of "fundamental principles recognized by the
laws of the Republic" and thus be guaranteed by the Preamble.547
At the other extreme, the response to the Conseil's second decision on
death penalty treaties was entirely substantive; the 2007 amendment
mooted the conflict with national sovereignty by enshrining the abolition
of the death penalty as a constitutional principle, without any reference to
treaties.548
The 1993 asylum amendment authorized both current and future trea-
ties with comparable European states for the purpose of allocating jurisdic-
tion over asylum claims, and made rather clear that it was carving out an
exception to the individual right of asylum under the 1946 Preamble. 549
The portions of the 1992 Maastricht amendment dealing with the
Maastricht Treaty included a mix of approaches. Articles 88-2 made spe-
cific reference to the terms of the Maastricht Treaty, while also identifying
the subject matter of the competences being transferred. Similarly, Article
88-3 made specific reference to the terms of the treaty while authorizing
inclusion of EU citizens in the municipal electorate. Article 88-1 referred
generically to past and current European treaties as the basis for France's
participation, but did not give advance authorization to future treaties. 550
The 1999 amendment enabling the Amsterdam Treaty modified the
enumeration of transferred competences in Article 88-2. Like its predeces-
sor, it referred both to the subject matter of the competences and to the
specific treaty defining the terms of the transfer.551
544. Loi constitutionnelle 99-568 du 8 juillet 1999, insrant, au titre VI de la Consti-
tution, un article 53-2 et relative A la Cour p~nale internationale, J.O., July 9, 1999,
p. 10175.
545. A partial confirmation of the amendment's substance was added later, when
new Article 67 on presidential responsibility incorporated a cross-reference to Article 53-
2 on the ICC.
546. Loi constitutionnelle 2003-267 du 25 mars 2003, modifiant le titre XV de la
Constitution, J.O., Mar. 25, 2003, p. 5344.
547. See Rousseau, supra note 117, at 109.
548. Loi constitutionnelle 2007-239 du 23 fvrier 2007 modifiant le titre XV de la
Constitution, J.O., Feb. 23, 2007, p. 3355.
549. Loi constitutionnelle 93-1256 du 25 novembre 1993, J.O., Nov. 25, 1993,
p. 16296.
550. Loi constitutionnelle 92-554 du 25 juin 1992, J.O., June 25, 1992, p. 8406.
551. Loi constitutionnelle 99-49 du 25 janvier 1999, J.O., Jan. 25, 1999, p. 1346.
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By the time of the decision on the European Constitution Treaty, the
Conseil constitutionnel had apparently become habituated to amendments
that referenced treaties rather than the constitutional provisions that they
were implicitly modifying. The Conseil felt comfortable giving an illustra-
tive, rather than a comprehensive, exposition of the conflicts between the
Constitution and the treaty, confident that the conflicts would be lifted en
masse if ratification proceeded. As it turned out, that approach produced a
minor inconvenience when a referendum rejecting the treaty followed the
2005 amendment. The government had to repeat the amendment process
in 2008 in order to authorize ratification of the weaker Lisbon Treaty.5 52
Both the TCE and Lisbon amendments suppressed the enumeration of
transferred competences in Article 88-2, and relied instead on the genera-
lized reference to transfers of competence by virtue of specifically men-
tioned treaties in Article 88-1.553
The practice of opaquely authorizing the ratification of treaties creates
uncertainty about the reach and content of other constitutional principles
with which the treaties were once thought to conflict. Moreover, the Con-
seil constitutionnel's announcement of exceptions to the supremacy of EU
law in 2004 raises the possibility that consent may not be unqualified, but
rather the scope of the consent expressed in a constitutional amendment
may also become a matter of constitutional interpretation. The failure of
the constituent power to delineate the implications of its choice effectively
delegates the task to others-the legislators may be agreeing to more, or
less, than they realized. The Conseil constitutionnel's answers to such ques-
tions have particular authority, although its limited jurisdiction may
decrease its opportunities to provide them.
5. Employment of Europe-Specific Articles
As this article has repeatedly emphasized, prior to 1992, the French
Constitution made no mention of the European Communities. Decisions
concerning European integration relied instead on generic categories of
international law and international agreements, or on the slightly more
specific Paragraph 15 of the 1946 Preamble concerning international orga-
nizations. The Maastricht amendment added a new Title XV to the Consti-
tution, addressing the European Communities and the European Union.
The text now provided a basis for Europe-specific doctrines, which slowly
emerged.
A first example arose in 1998, when the Conseil constitutionnel
reviewed the organic statute implementing the right of European citizens to
552. See Loi constitutionnelle 2008-103 du 4 fevrier 2008 modifiant le titre XV de la
Constitution, J.O., Feb. 5, 2008, p. 2202.
553. The amendments also made specific reference to the treaties with regard to the
authorization of legislative participation in the simplified revision process. See 1958
CONST. art. 88-7 (current version added by the Lisbon amendment); Loi constitution-
nelle 2005-204 du ler mars 2005 modifiant le titre XV de la Constitution, J.O., Mar. 2,
2005, p. 2005 (adding a new article 88-6 that was contingent on the entry into force of
the TCE).
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vote in municipal elections in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty. The
Conseil explained that the phrasing of Article 88-3 made clear that the con-
stituent power intended the Conseil to review the consistency of the organic
statute with European law as part of its mandatory review of constitution-
ality, contrary to its usual practice of not reviewing whether statutes com-
ply with treaties.5 54 Accordingly, the Conseil compared the organic statute
with the relevant treaty provision and with the EU directive implementing it
before approving the statute as constitutional. 55 5
It was not until 2004, however, that the Conseil constitutionnel gave
substance to Article 88-1 as the basis for French participation in the Euro-
pean Union. As mentioned earlier, the Conseil interpreted Article 88-1 as
imposing a constitutional mandate that EU directives be implemented in
France, and itemployed that constitutional mandate as a justification for
allocating jurisdiction to protect individual rights as between itself and the
ECJ. 55 6 Subsequently, the Conseil derived from this constitutional man-
date a responsibility for it to examine whether a statutory provision
intended by the legislature to implement a directive actually complied with
that directive.55 7 Nonetheless, it said, the brief period of time within
which the Conseil must decide made it impossible to refer unclear issues to
the European Court of Justice. Accordingly, the Conseil could invalidate a
statutory provision only if it was manifestly incompatible with the particu-
lar directive that it was intended to implement.5 5 8 At the same time, the
Conseil emphasized that it would limit its review of compliance with the
directive to those portions of the statute intended to implement the direc-
tive. 55 9 Thus, the limited exception derived from Article 88-1 did not
extend to the compliance of statutes with directives or EU law generally,
which remained the province of the French civil/criminal and administra-
tive courts and the ECJ.56 0
554. See CC decision No. 98-400 DC, May 20, 1998, cons. 4. The relevant sentence
reads, "Subject to reciprocity and in accordance with the terms of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union signed on 7 February 1992, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in
municipal elections shall be granted only to citizens of the Union residing in France."
1958 CONsT., art. 88-3. Recall that organic statutes are subject to mandatory referral to
the Conseil constitutionnel before promulgation.
555. See CC decision No. 98-400 DC, May 20, 1998, cons. 4.
556. See CC decision No. 2004-496 DC, June 10, 2004.
557. See CC decision No. 2006-540 DC, July 27, 2006 (requiring that the statute be
construed in a manner consistent with the directive it transposed); CC decision No.
2006-543 DC, Nov. 30, 2006 (finding a manifest conflict between the statute and the
directive it transposed); see also CC decision No. 2008-564 DC, June 19, 2008 (finding
no manifest conflict between the statute and the directive it transposed).
558. See CC decision No. 2006-540 DC, July 27, 2006, cons. 20.
559. See id. cons. 72.
560. See CC decision No. 2008-564 DC, June 19, 2008; CC decision No. 2006-
540 DC, July 27, 2006, cons, 20; CC decision No. 2006-535 DC, Mar. 30, 2006. In
2007-2008, the drafters of the package of constitutional amendments deliberately chose
not to confer on the Conseil constitutionnel the responsibility of evaluating the consis-
tency of statutes with prior treaties. See infra note 632.
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6. The ECHR and Constitutional Interpretation
The influence of European human rights jurisprudence on the Conseil
constitutionnel's interpretation of French constitutional rights has increased
and has become more openly avowed in the second period. It remains true
that the Conseil almost never cites Strasbourg judgments in its own deci-
sions. However, the Conseil has expanded the information that it provides
to the public about its procedures and working methods, 56 1 and public
statements by members of the Conseil confirm this attention to foreign and
international precedents. Thus, for example, the legal staff of the Conseil
constitutionnel prepares a dossier of relevant legal texts for each case, which
may contain domestic, foreign, and international decisions, including judg-
ments of the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human
Rights, and foreign constitutional courts.5 62
An essay by a member of the Conseil provides a convenient list of doc-
trines inspired by European human rights law since 1992.563 These
include the right to respect for private life,56 4 freedom of marriage,5 6 5 the
right to lead a "normal family life," 566 the principle of the dignity of the
human person,56 7 the requirement of reasonable suspicion of crime for
arrest without prior judicial authorization, 568 the right to an effective judi-
561. Prior to 2010, the procedures of the Conseil constitutionnel in deciding on the
constitutionality of statutes and treaties were always informal and nonpublic, reflecting
both the limited time frame within which it must decide, and the absence of parties to its
abstract adjudication. In order to increase public understanding of its work, the Conseil
has published some of the inputs into its decisions, including the written submissions
on the merits (if any) of the legislators who invoke the procedure and of the Govern-
ment. In the digital era, these materials are available on the Conseil's website. The Con-
seil maintains the secrecy of the internal memoranda preceding contemporary decisions,
and its procedures do not include an advocate general or commissaire du gouvernement
whose submissions are made public. As a partial substitute, the Conseil constitutionnel
has had its legal staff issue a semi-official, post-decisional interpretation of its rulings,
and commentaries on the rulings by the head of its legal staff (the Secretaire Gendrale)
are often published in a legal journal. In 2010, for its new jurisdiction to hear individu-
als' challenges to legislation in force, the Conseil has developed more court-like formal-
ized procedures and even webcasts the oral hearings.
562. See OLIVIER DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTHE, LES MODES DE DECISION DU JUGE CONSTITU-
TIONNEL (2001), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitution-
nel/root/bank-mm/pdf/Conseil/modes.pdf; Olivier Schrameck, Les aspects proceduraux
des saisines, in VINGT ANS DE SAISINE PARLEMENTAIRE 81, 84 (Association Francaise des
Constitutionnalistes ed., 1994).
563. See Dutheillet de Lamothe, supra note 395, at 408-10.
564. See CC decision No. 99-416 DC, July 23, 1999 (attributing the right to respect
for private life to liberty under Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen); CC decision No. 94-352 DC, Jan. 18, 1995.
565. See CC decision No. 2003-484 DC, Nov. 20, 2003 (attributing freedom of mar-
riage to liberty under Articles 2 and 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen); CC decision No. 97-389 DC, Apr. 22, 1997.
566. See CC decision No. 93-325 DC, Aug. 13, 1993 (attributing the right to lead a
normal family life to protection of the family under Paragraph 10 of the 1946 Preamble).
567. See CC decision No. 94-343/344 DC, July 27, 1994 (attributing the principle of
the dignity of the human person to the opening paragraph of the 1946 Preamble).
568. See CC decision No. 2003-467 DC, Mar. 13, 2003 (deriving this principle from
liberty under Articles 2 and 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,
along with judicial guardianship of liberty under Article 66 of the Constitution); cf.
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cial remedy,569 the right to a public hearing in a criminal case,570 the
requirement of impartiality and independence of courts,571 the obligation
for a court to give reasons in a criminal case,572 and the requirement of
non-retroactivity of preventive detention.573
Another example arose from a rare direct confrontation between the
Conseil constitutionnel and European Court of Human Rights, in which the
former upheld a statute as constitutional, and then the latter found the
statute inconsistent with the European Convention.574 The case turned on
the practice of retroactive legislative validation of challenged administrative
acts; the Strasbourg Court has expansively interpreted the right to fair hear-
ing before an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of
civil rights and obligations as restricting the power of the legislature to
intervene in litigation against the state.575 After this adverse judgment, the
Conseil constitutionnel revised its jurisprudence, raising the standard for
justifying a legislative validation so as to bring it closer to the European
human rights norm.5 76
Several factors have contributed to the increased influence of Euro-
pean human rights law on French constitutional interpretation. One is the
explosion of Strasbourg jurisprudence since the end of the Cold War. The
European Court of Human Rights has not only decided vastly more indi-
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 5(1)(c), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on
Human Rights] (recognizing as permissible grounds for deprivation of liberty the "law-
ful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or
when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or
fleeing after having done so").
569. See CC decision No. 99-416 DC, July 23, 1999; CC decision No. 96-373 DC, Apr.
9, 1996 (deriving this principle from the guarantee of rights and separation of powers
under Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen).
570. See CC decision No. 2004-492 DC, Mar. 2, 2004 (deriving this principle from
Articles 6, 8, 9, and 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen); CC
decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999.
571. See CC decision No. 2006-545 DC, Dec. 31, 2006 (attributing this principle to
Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen); CC decision No.
98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999.
572. See CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999 (deriving this requirement from
the principle that crimes and punishments should be defined by law under Articles 7
and 8 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen).
573. See CC decision No. 2008-562 DC, Feb. 21, 2008.
574. See DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTHE, supra note 562, at 410-12; see also Bertrand
Mathieu, Les validations legislatives devant le juge de Strasbourg: Une reaction rapide du
Conseil constitutionnel mais une decision lourde de menaces pour I'avenir de la juridiction
constitutionnelle, 16 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DRO1T ADMINISTRATIF 289 (2000) (describing the
events and interpreting them as demonstrating a loss of autonomy and significance for
constitutional review). Compare CC decision No. 93-332 DC, Jan. 13, 1994, with Zielin-
ski v. France, 1999-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 95 (Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights).
575. See Zielinski v. France, 1999-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 95 (Grand Chamber of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights).
576. See CC decision No. 99-422 DC, Dec. 21, 1999; DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTHE, supra
note 562, at 411 (noting the different verbal formula used by Conseil constitutionnel, and
adding "everyone has his dignity").
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vidual cases, but has generated ever more detailed interpretations of the
European Convention.577 Meanwhile, the European Union has drawn
closer links between the multilateral European Convention and the EU's
own fundamental rights commitments.578 These developments place both
practical and ideological pressure on the interpretive choices of the Conseil
constitutionnel. The Conseil may uphold a French statute based on a nar-
row interpretation of a constitutional right, and then see the statute set
aside for violating a European right. Alternatively, the Conseil may give one
constitutional right a broad interpretation, and then see the European
interpretations strike a different balance between that right and another
right. These practical problems are complicated in France by a common
tendency to conflate French constitutional rights with universal rights.
Inconsistency between the Conseil and Strasbourg is perceived as criticism
or disrespect, rather than as the understandable consequence of embody-
ing individual rights in multiple legal orders.579 As a practical matter,
accepting the influence of Strasbourg interpretations also gives the Conseil
constitutionnel the opportunity to participate in a dialogue that helps shape
future interpretations.
In addition to pressure from "above" from the European Court of
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, the Conseil constitution-
nel faces competition from "below," from the Cour de Cassation and the
577. See Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal
Orders, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 3,
6-7, 12-13 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
578. The Maastricht Treaty, supra note 241, committed the European Union to
"respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention ... and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general prin-
ciples of Community law." The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
of 2000, originally nonbinding, contains a provision requiring that Charter rights corre-
sponding to European Convention rights should be given the same meaning as the Euro-
pean Convention rights (Article 52(3)). The nonratified European Constitution Treaty
and the substitute Lisbon Treaty of 2009 both made the Charter legally binding and
required the European Union to accede to the European Convention.
579. Professor Mathieu wrote of the decision on legislative validations as a "snub"
(camouflet) to the Conseil constitutionnel. Mathieu, supra note 574, at 296.
On the "dual positivization" of individual rights as national constitutional rights and
international human rights, see Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional
Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1864-79 (2002-2003). For an
explicit dismissal of such positivist attitudes as "hyperformaliste," see Denys de Bechil-
Ion, De quelques incidences du contrOle de la conventionnalite internationale des lois par le
juge ordinaire (Malaise dans la Constitution), 14 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
225, 232 (1998).
The most painful confrontation between courts in Strasbourg and Paris thus far has
not concerned the Conseil constitutionnel, but rather the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de
Cassation. Specifically, the European Court of Human Rights has forced the French
courts to redesign their structures of decision-making, which had been found to violate
fair procedure norms under Article 6 of the European Convention. The criticisms have
involved both "equality of arms" and, most controversially, the appearance of partiality,
due to the roles of the avocat general and the commissaire du gouvernement (now renamed
rapporteur public). For an illuminating account in English, see MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E.
LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE
(2009).
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Conseil d'Etat. Under the division of labor that the Conseil constitutionnel
created in 1975, the Conseil exercised constitutional review of statutes
before promulgation, while leaving the two supreme courts to adjudicate
treaty-based challenges under Article 55 to statutes that are already in
force.580 The result was a proliferation of individual rights litigation in the
courts that was based on European human rights law because individuals
had no forum in which they could bring constitutional rights challenges to
statutes.58 1 The perceived subordination of national constitutional rights
motivated the 2008 reform that created a vehicle for individuals to chal-
lenge statutes in force before the Conseil constitutionnel.58 2
The extent of the constraints that European human rights law now
places on both constitutional rights and state power in France were not
foreseen when France ratified the European Convention (without referral
to the Conseil constitutionnel) in 1974.583 Nor did the Conseil grapple with
these constraints in its first decision on the Maastricht Treaty.584 By the
time of the European Constitution Treaty, the Conseil was more alert to the
dynamic and did address some of the implications of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights for national sovereignty and other constitutional princi-
ples. 585 Ratification of such treaties entails consent to a multilevel
elaboration of rights, a process that the Conseil can attempt to mediate but
cannot predict or control.
7. Article 55, Reciprocity, and Treaty Interpretation
Returning to the question of reciprocity as a limit on the supremacy of
treaties over statutes under Article 55, several further developments
occurred in the post-Maastricht period. First, the Conseil constitutionnel,
which had not found occasion to address this question earlier, added its
voice. In 1998, while reviewing the organic statute implementing the right
of EU citizens to vote in municipal elections, the Conseil construed the spe-
cific requirement of reciprocity for electoral rights set forth in the new Arti-
cle 88-3.586 It asserted that the ratification of the treaty by all EU member
states sufficed to satisfy the requirement of reciprocity; if another member
580. See supra Part III.A.3.
581. For example, it was estimated in 2008 that treaty-based challenges to statutes
were included in one-third of the cases decided by the Conseil d'Etat. See ASSEMBLEE
NATIONALE, RAPPORT NO. 892, 13th Legislature, at 439 (2008) (testimony of M.Jean-Marc
Sauv6, Vice President of the Conseil d'Etat).
582. 1958 CONsT. art. 61-1; see also infra Part V.
583. It was clear, however, that the European Convention on its face would require
some changes in French law and more effective enforcement of existing French law. See
Alain Pellet, La ratification par la France de la Convention europtenne des Droits de
l'Homme, 90 REvUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1319, 1373-77 (1974).
584. See supra Part Ill.A.2.d.
585. See supra text accompanying notes 503-509.
586. The relevant sentence reads, "Subject to reciprocity and in accordance with the
terms of the Treaty on European Union signed on 7 February 1992, the right to vote and
stand as a candidate in municipal elections shall be granted only to citizens of the Union
residing in France." 1958 CONST art. 88-3 (added by the 1992 amendment authorizing
ratification of the Maastricht treaty).
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state violated its obligations, France's remedy would be litigation before
the European Court of Justice.58 7 This reasoning has been understood as
endorsing the view of the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d'etat that
reciprocity exceptions do not apply to EU law, which substitutes the ECJ
remedy for noncompliance. 58  Then, in 1999, the Conseil constitutionnel
addressed reciprocity more broadly in its Article 54 decision concerning
the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. While the Conseil
found several conflicts necessitating a constitutional amendment, it went
out of its way to insist that the humanitarian purpose of the treaty made it
exempt from any requirement of reciprocity under Article 55.589
A 2001 study by the Conseil d'Etat characterized the current regime as
denying the applicability of the reciprocity proviso to either EU law obliga-
tions or treaties of a humanitarian character, including the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. 59 0 For the remaining treaties to which the
requirement of reciprocity does apply, the study continued to assert the
Conseil d'Etat's position that when reciprocity is questioned, the court
must seek a binding evaluation of the other state's compliance from the
ministry of foreign affairs. 59 1 That practice, however, would soon be criti-
cized by Strasbourg as incompatible with judicial independence.
This story about conflicting conceptions of judicial role really begins
in 1994, with the Beaumartin judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights.5 9 2 In 1989, the Conseil d'etat had accepted as definitive the inter-
pretation of a bilateral treaty by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in accor-
dance with the traditional practice that it subsequently overturned in
GISTI.5 93 In Beaumartin, the unsuccessful claimants challenged the fair-
ness of the decision under Article 6(1) of the European Convention, and a
chamber of the European Court of Human Rights concluded unanimously
that France had not afforded the claimants an "independent" tribunal to
determine their rights.594 The ministry, not independent of the executive,
had resolved the interpretive question without any input from the claim-
ants, and the Conseil d'etat had not exercised any jurisdiction over the
question. This practice was unique among the parties to the Convention
and had since been abandoned for the future by the Conseil d'Etat. Accord-
587. See CC decision No. 98-400 DC, May 20, 1998, cons. 5.
588. See, e.g., CONSEIL D'ETAT, supra note 33, at 54.
589. CC decision No. 98-408 DC, Jan. 22, 1999, cons. 12; see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 387-389.
590. See CONSEIL D'TAT, supra note 33, at 54-55. With regard to the European Con-
vention, the report cited a 1989 case of the Cour de Cassation and a 1992 case of the
Conseil d'Etat.
591. See id. at 55.
592. See Beaumartin v. France, 296-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
593. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
594. Article 6(1) provides in relevant part: "In the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law." European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 568, art. 6(1).
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ingly, France had violated Article 6(1).595 The consequences of the
Beaumartin judgment spread through the French courts over time. The
Conseil d'etat was already in compliance with its approach, and the cham-
bers of the Cour de Cassation began to expand the range of cases in which
they denied binding authority to ministerial interpretations of treaties.596
The reasoning in Beaumartin also called into question the Conseil
d'Etat's practice of absolute deference to the foreign ministry's ad hoc
determinations of lack of reciprocity.597 The Conseil d'Etat regarded the
issues of treaty interpretation and reciprocity as distinct, however, and con-
tinued to hold that the ministry's determinations on reciprocity were bind-
ing. In the 2003 Chevrol case, a litigant challenged in Strasbourg the
Conseil d'Eat's deference to a ministry determination that Algeria was not
complying with a provision of a bilateral treaty.598 France defended this
deference, arguing that determinations of reciprocity involved difficult
evaluations of the conduct of a foreign government and implicated foreign
policy, making them inappropriate tasks for courts under the separation of
powers.599 A majority of the chamber rejected this defense and insisted
that an independent tribunal must review the ministry's evidence of lack of
reciprocity, along with contrary evidence submitted by the individual.600
Several years later, the Conseil d'Etat had occasion to return to the
issue. In 2010, it finally accepted the obligation to independently review
reciprocity issues.601 The decision involved precisely the same issue of
reciprocity that had been involved in Chevrol, mutual recognition of medi-
cal degrees between Algeria and France. On this occasion, the Conseil
d'Etat rejected the ministry's conclusion that Algeria was not complying
with its obligations. Apparently, the Conseil d'Etat's delay did not result
from reluctance, but rather from the infrequency with which the defense of
lack of reciprocity is asserted.602
595. Beaumartin v. France, 296-B Eur. Ct: H.R. (ser. A), T1 38-39 (1994). As previ-
ously mentioned, the commissaire du gouvernement in GISTI had predicted this evalua-
tion of the practice. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
596. See Alland, supra note 311, at 603-04 (1966); Cass. le civ., Dec. 19, 1995, Bull
civ. I, No. 470, 376 (Banque africaine de developpement); Cass. crim, Feb. 11, 2004, Bull.
crim., No. 37, 150 (Lacour) (decision of criminal chamber accepting responsibility of
judge to interpret treaty).
597. The Beaumartin court's criticism probably does not apply to the modern practice
of the Cour de Cassation. The Cour de Cassation does not refer questions of reciprocity
to the ministry on a case-by-case basis; it applies the reciprocity proviso of Article 55
only when the executive has already responded to the other country's noncompliance by
denouncing or suspending the application of the treaty in general. See Sophie Lemaire,
Lejugejudiciaire et le contr6le de la reciprocite dans 1'application des traites internationaux,
2007 RECUEIL DALLOz 2322, 2323-24.
598. Chevrol v. France, App. No, 49636/99, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 2.
599. Id. 9N 69-70.
600. Id. '1 81-84. One judge found France's arguments persuasive and dissented.
601. CE Ass., July 9, 2010, 26 REVUE FRAN(GAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 1133 (2010)
(conclusions of Dumortier, rapporteur public) (Cheriet-Benseghir).
602. See id. at 1133 & n. 1 (conclusions of the rapporteur public) (indicating that the
present case was the first to come before the Conseil d'Etat since Chevrol).
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It is unclear whether the new practice will dilute or strengthen what
little remains of the reciprocity proviso of Article 55. Independent judicial
evaluation potentially reduces both the ministry's discretion to exaggerate
the level of noncompliance by the other state and the ministry's discretion
to overlook noncompliance. Given that lack of reciprocity can already be
waived by not asserting it,60 3 the balance may be in favor of further dilu-
tion. However that may be, restrictive interpretations have already neutral-
ized the requirement of reciprocity in the areas where the potential for
"supranationality" has been the greatest.
8. Conclusion on the Second Period
The momentum toward compromise of national sovereignty that
began in the pre-Maastricht period thus continued in the following
decades. Article 54 proceedings occurred somewhat more frequently and
with greater success, but almost always resulted in constitutional amend-
ments. The Article 55 reciprocity proviso continued its long decline.
The period from 1992 to 2008 witnessed a "Gaullist" resurgence. Jac-
ques Chirac's long quest for the presidency finally succeeded in 1995. The
right won three of the four parliamentary elections, although Chirac had to
cohabit with Jospin from 1997 to 2002.604 Even the Senate presidency fell
to the Gaullists in 1998,605 and they were therefore in a position to appoint
all the new members of the Conseil constitutionnel from 2002 to 2008.606
The past three presidents of the Conseil have been Gaullists (Yves Guena,
Pierre Mazeaud, and Jean-Louis Debr , a son of Michel Debr ).60 7
By the late 1990s, however, most Gaullists-not all-had made their
peace with the European Union. The political elite has consented to fur-
ther "transfers of competences" and to strengthening (qualified)
majoritarian institutions in order to make an expanded EU governable. 60s
The Maastricht decisions of 1992 continue to supply the basic orientation
for constitutional review of treaty revisions, and, although the Conseil con-
stitutionnel has required some constitutional amendments, the amend-
ments have followed as technocratic updates rather than as changes of
principle. Ironically, some portions of the amendments have been necessi-
603. Under administrative law practice, lack of reciprocity is an objection that must
be raised by a party, and not one that the court raises sua sponte. See CONSEIL D'ETAT,
supra note 33, at 55; CE Ass., May 19, 1981, Rec. Lebon 220 (Costa).
604. See Les elections legislatives et la composition de l'Assemblee Nationale sous la V
Republique (1958-2002), ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elec-
tions/historique-2.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
605. UMP members Christian Poncelet and Gerard Larcher served as President of the
Senate from 1998 to 2008 and from 2008 to 2011 respectively. In October 2011, Jean-
Pierre Bel became the first Socialist President of the Senate of the Fifth Republic. See
Guillaume Perrault, Bel permet au PS de prendre la tete du Senat, LE FIGARO, Oct. 3, 2011.
606. Recall that the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate, and the
President of the National Assembly each appoint one-third of the members of the Conseil
constitutionnel, not counting the former Presidents of the Republic who can sit ex officio.
607. Guena became President of the Conseil in 2000, Mazeaud in 2004, and Jean-
Louis Debr in 2007.
608. See supra Part III.B.3.b.
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tated by treaty provisions empowering the French parliament to intervene
in EU affairs; 60 9 these protections for national sovereignty modified the
Gaullist design for restricted parliamentary power. The Maastricht I inter-
pretation of pacta sunt servanda as a constitutional principle continued to
immunize older international commitments from constitutional review,
even when they had escaped review initially and were restated in a new
treaty. As in the first period, the Conseil has done little to resist the contin-
uing incremental rise in the power of the European Parliament, except in
specific fields that the Conseil has characterized as particularly relevant to
national sovereignty.
The form of these constitutional amendments, as the Conseil held in
Maastricht II, has been left to the discretion of the legislature. The Conseil
has also answered the question, left slightly open in Maastricht II, as to
whether it could review the substance of a constitutional amendment to
ensure the preservation of a republican form of government: it cannot.6 10
The Conseil has continued to maintain that EU supremacy operates by
the consent of the French Constitution, not by its own autonomous force,
and that there are some limits to the consent that has been given (to date).
The Conseil also deflated the rhetoric of the European Constitution move-
ment in a manner calculated to reduce the significance of ratifying the
TCE. Simultaneously, the Conseil has largely relinquished to the ECJ the
task of determining whether EU directives endanger constitutional
rights.611 This combination of firm theoretical disagreement and general
factual acquiescence resembles the stance that other constitutional courts
have taken in their dialogues with EU institutions. The space for such dia-
logues is narrow because it is obvious that the functioning of a regulatory
system with over twenty formally equal members depends upon self-
restraint. Meanwhile, French constitutional law has been increasingly
open to influence from Europe in the broader sense (the Council of
Europe) in the interpretation of constitutional rights. Article 54 decisions
have rarely turned on the protection of individual rights, rather than the
protection of national sovereignty. 6 12
The addition of Article 88-1 in 1992 eventually prompted the Conseil
to develop some Europe-specific doctrines that do not extend to classical
international treaties. Nonetheless, interpretations of more general provi-
sions that the Conseil had used earlier in relation to Europe continued to
benefit international treaties. Paragraph 15 of the 1946 Preamble sup-
ported the creation of an international criminal court empowered to prose-
cute French defendants with the mandatory cooperation of France if
609. See supra text accompanying notes 516-518.
610. See supra text accompanying notes 383-384.
611. See supra text accompanying notes 476-491.
612. The one formal counterexample in this period, the violation of "equality" found
in the Language Charter case, was arguably more about an abstract republican principle
than about a threat to any individual's right. A more straightforward example of a treaty
provision that violated an individual right appeared in the 2010 decision about the
return of Romanian minors, which is technically outside the temporal period of this
article. See CC decision No. 2010-614 DC, Nov. 4, 2010, discussed supra note 341.
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French authorities failed in good faith to do so in a particular case. (But
overcoming official immunities, amnesties, and rules of prescription did
necessitate a constitutional amendment.) The Conseil also accorded the
ICC Statute, and a broader category of humanitarian treaties, an implied
exemption from the operation of the reciprocity proviso of Article 55. If
the Conseil has been unpredictable in its conclusions regarding when an
international organization or actor should be deemed external to the
French constitutional system and therefore outside the scope of a constitu-
tional rule, and when a French constitutional rule should be projected onto
an international organization or actor, the same can be said of the Conseil's
application of this technique to European institutions.
The routine enforcement of Article 55 by the administrative and civil/
criminal courts, privileging treaties over statutes, has transformed the
French legal landscape. The ability of individuals to challenge statutes in
force on ECHR grounds has unsettled the prestige of both national legisla-
tion and the national constitution. In 2008, the Gaullist majority found it
necessary to grant private parties access to the Conseil constitutionnel in
order to "re-nationalize" litigation over individual rights.6 13 That redefini-
tion of the Conseil's role represents both the culmination of an evolution
initiated in 1958 and a profound change in the constitutional regime.
IV. What Went Wrong?
If we ask what went wrong in the application of the 1958 Constitution
to international agreements, then two answers suggest themselves. From
one perspective, nothing went wrong. The 1958 Constitution was a com-
promise; de Gaulle and Debre did not get everything they wanted, and the
text carried forward legacies of the 1946 constitution that facilitated the
process of European integration until Maastricht, when an amendment
became necessary to go further. Once that amendment had passed, addi-
tional diminutions in national sovereignty became legitimate and routine.
But that is not the whole story, and probably not even half.
As we have seen, by 1992 the protective mechanisms of the 1958 Con-
stitution had failed to prevent the spread of qualified majority voting in the
EEC, the rise of the European Parliament, the suppression and blurring of
borders in the Schengen system, and the penetration of the French legal
system by European human rights law. First the Cour de Cassation and
then the Conseil d'Etat were co-opted as enforcers of both EC law and Euro-
pean human rights law, overriding subsequent statutes and discarding the
reciprocity proviso of Article 55. After 2000, the Conseil constitutionnel
renounced its authority to safeguard most constitutional rights against
infringement by EU directives. 61 4 European human rights became such
potent competitors with French constitutional rights that France aban-
613. See Nicolas Sarkozy, Entree en vigueur de I'article 61-1 de la Constitution (Mar.
1, 2010), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/
root/bank mm/discours interventions/2010/lermars2010_pdr.pdf.
614. See supra text accompanying notes 476-491.
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doned its distinctive model of judicial review in the hope of restoring the
prestige of the national constitution.
How did it happen? Several legal and non-legal causes contributed to
this evolution. Some were contingent events of history and politics. Others
were structural flaws in the mechanisms themselves. The key flaw, how-
ever, may have been the expectation that a quasi-judicial body would resist
the majority's preference for international cooperation, particularly by
employing a standard as vague and contestable as the principle of national
sovereignty.
Political contingencies, including the long inability of the Gaullists to
secure the Senate presidency, the victory of Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, and
the Socialist sweep of the early 1980s helped propel legal change. Such
events, however, were not unforeseeable, and constitutions are meant to
channel political forces. The main purpose of Article 54 was to encumber
a future majority that was pursuing supranational goals. The mere emer-
gence of that majority would provide a test of the safeguard, not the expla-
nation for its failure.
In retrospect, the design of Article 54 had two principal disadvantages.
It made review of the constitutionality of international commitments too
discretionary, and a priori. The parliament could authorize ratification of
major treaties without referring them to the Conseil. Even when review did
occur, the Conseil might not anticipate the future effects of the treaty.
Given the dynamic nature of modern treaty interpretation, a priori review
afforded a very limited defense.
The inherent weaknesses of Article 54 were compounded by the Con-
seil's interpretive choices. The Conseil chose to evaluate treaties based on
their content rather than on their tendencies. It chose to limit its examina-
tion to the incremental advances of treaties rather than their total content.
The international law principle of pacta sunt servanda did not literally for-
bid the Conseil to hold that a constitutional amendment would be required
before ratification of a new treaty because of a combination of factors relat-
ing to old and new obligations. The Conseil also chose to let its own stan-
dards evolve over time, rather than freeze the conclusions of its earliest
(mostly Gaullist) members.6 1 5 These choices abetted the progress of Euro-
pean integration in the period when constitutional amendments would
have been hard to obtain.
Another structural factor, the absence of Europe-specific provisions in
the 1958 Constitution, may actually have increased the long-term sacrifice
of sovereignty. The interpretations given to Article 55 by the Cour de Cassa-
tion, and later by the Conseil d'Etat, were consciously pro-European. 6 16
The constitutional text did not inexorably require that these interpretations
apply to international treaties more generally, but it made the extension of
these interpretations easier. The consequence has been the near total evis-
615. See supra Part III.A.4.
616. See supra Part III.A.3.a.
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ceration of the reciprocity proviso that Michel Debre fought so hard to
include.
In 1976, the Gaullist majority of the Conseil constitutionnel had the
opportunity to demand a constitutional amendment before the implemen-
tation of direct suffrage for the European Assembly. The Gaullist votes
divided, however, and the Conseil accommodated Giscard's initiative, while
attempting instead to control the future through dicta. 6 17 They could not
draft the constitutional amendment themselves, and they expressed con-
cern about the form that a responsive amendment might take.6 18 Their
dilemma highlights the difficulty of expressing in words, especially in suc-
cinct phrases, a formula that could control transnational action across the
wide range of situations where events might make it desired.
The long slide from the 1958 Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty fol-
lowed a specific route that could not have been predicted in advance. Still,
the experience of France suggests that the probability of long-term success
of purely legal barriers against international projects is low. Failure was
not inevitable, but likely. Each unhappy family may be unhappy in its own
way, but their malfunctions have something in common after all.
V. Epilogue: Plus ga change ...
This Article has generally tried to limit its analysis to the years 1958 to
2008, in order to avoid dealing prematurely with matters unsettled by the
massive constitutional amendment of July 2008. In closing, however, it
may be useful to make some preliminary observations about the major
change in the structure of constitutional review brought about by that
amendment and its relationship to the themes of this article.
The constitutional amendment of July 2008 on "the modernization of
the institutions of the Fifth Republic" resulted from a complex deliberative
process initiated by President Nicolas Sarkozy in July 2007.619 A Commit-
tee of Reflection, chaired by former Prime Minister tdouard Balladur,
issued a lengthy report in late October 2007, proposing a series of revi-
sions to the powers of the executive, the procedures of the legislature, and
the means of protecting the rights of the citizens.6 20 The Government
presented its preferred version of the package in April 2008, and the two
chambers made significant modifications before adopting the final version
in Congress. 62 1 The overall focus of the reform, as its name suggests, was
structural. Key provisions included reduction in the President's emergency
617. See supra Part Ill.A.2.b.
618. Id.
619. Loi constitutionnelle 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institu-
tions de la Ve Republique, J.O., July 24, 2008, p. 11890.
620. COMITE DE REFLEXION ET DE PROPOSITION SUR LA MODERNISATION ET LE REEQUILIBRAGE
DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA VE REPUBLIQUE, UNE VE REPUBLIQUE PLUS DEMOCRATIQUE (2007)
[hereinafter Balladur Committee Report].
621. The amendment achieved the necessary supermajority in Congress by a single
vote. This outcome probably resulted from discontent that the reform had not gone
further and reluctance to hand President Sarkozy a political victory.
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powers, authorizing the President to address the legislature in person, and
relaxation of some of the constraints imposed on parliament in 1958. For
present purposes, the most interesting reform was a sweetener to the deal, a
provision giving individuals access to the Conseil constitutionnel to chal-
lenge legislation already in force.
The Balladur Committee had revived the project, pursued without suc-
cess in the Mitterrand years, of creating an exception d'inconstitutionnalite,
allowing litigants to raise constitutional objections to statutes before the
civil/criminal and administrative courts and to have the objections referred
to the Conseil constitutionnel for resolution.622 Opposition from the right
had blocked the project in the early 1990s, but by 2008, new reasons had
emerged to broaden its appeal. 623 The frequency with which individuals
challenged legislation in court on grounds of EU law and European human
rights had hollowed out the traditional sanctity of promulgated statutes,
and politicians had come to perceive the anomaly of simultaneously deny-
ing citizens the opportunity to challenge legislation on the basis of their
own national constitution. The prestige of the national constitution as the
apex of the domestic constitutional order, so recently besieged by EU ambi-
tions, was felt to be at stake.
New Article 61-1 authorizes the Conseil constitutionnel to hear claims
that "a statutory provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution" when they arise in litigation and are referred by the Con-
seil d'etat or the Cour de Cassation.624 The article remits the procedural
details to an organic statute. The implementing legislation was enacted in
December 2009 and took effect in March 2010.625 The legislation estab-
lishes a filtering procedure in which the two supreme courts weed out
insubstantial claims and transmit serious constitutional questions to the
Conseil constitutionnel for resolution.6 26
In its new head of jurisdiction, the Conseil constitutionnel operates
more like a conventional constitutional court adjudicating an individual
complaint, and the legislators understood that European human rights law
would require more judicialized procedures than the Conseil has employed
in the past for its abstract a priori review of statutes. The Conseil has intro-
duced adversary briefing and public oral hearings, which even include
webcasting.627
The organic statute goes beyond the constitutional amendment by
requiring that courts refer constitutional questions to the Conseil before
622. See Balladur Committee Report, supra note 620, at 87-90.
623. See id.; DRAGO, supra note 95, at 440.
624. 1958 CONST. art. 61-1 ("qu'une disposition 16gislative porte atteinte aux droits et
libertis que la Constitution garantit").
625. See Loi organique 2009-1523 du 10 decembre 2009 relative a I'application de
Particle 61-1 de la Constitution, J.O., Dec. 11, 2009, p. 21379.
626. See id. art. 23-4.
627. See Reglement int&rieur du 4 fevrier 2010 sur la procedure suivie devant le Con-
seil constitutionnel pour les questions prioritaires de constitutionnalite, Feb. 4, 2010,
arts. 1, 8-10, reprinted in 29 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (2010).
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resolving challenges based on incompatibility with treaties. 62 8 It accord-
ingly re-labels the process as the "priority question of constitutionality"
(question prioritaire de constitutionnalitd, or QPC). 6 29 When the organic
statute was referred to the Conseil constitutionnel for its mandatory review
before promulgation, the Conseil observed that:
when requiring that arguments of unconstitutionality be examined in prior-
ity to those based on the failure of a statutory provision to comply with
international commitments entered into by France, Parliament . .. intended
to ensure compliance with the Constitution and reiterate the place of the
latter at the apex of the national legal system. This priority merely results in
specifying the order in which the arguments raised before the court to which
the matter is referred be examined. It does not restrict the jurisdiction of
said court, once the provisions pertaining to the priority preliminary ruling
on the issue of constitutionality have been complied with, to ensure the
superiority over national laws of legally ratified or approved treaties or
agreements and norms of the European Union. It thus does not fail to com-
ply with either Article 55 of the Constitution or Article 88-1 . . .630
Shortly after the new regime took effect, the Conseil issued a decision
on a priori review of a statute that reaffirmed several of its earlier doc-
trines.6 3 1 The Conseil does not review whether statutes are consistent with
an international treaty or European law under Article 55; such review
remains within the province of the civil/criminal and administrative
courts, as the organic statute for the QPC makes clear.6 32 Compliance
with the Treaty of Lisbon is not a constitutional issue for the Conseil to
decide, despite the fact that Article 88-1 of the Constitution refers to
France's participation in the EU in accordance with the Treaty of Lis-
628. This is the subject of another article, Gerald L. Neuman, Anti-Ashwander: Consti-
tutional Litigation as a First Resort in France, 43 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 15 (2010). The
problem of coordinating referrals to the Conseil constitutionnel and referrals to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice raises delicate questions of EU law that have not yet been fully
settled as of this writing. See Denys Simon, Conventionnalite et Constitutionnalite, 137
PouvolRs 19, 27-30 (2011-2012).
629. See Loi organique 2009-1523 du 10 dcembre 2009 relative A l'application de
Particle 61-1 de la Constitution, J.O., Dec. 11, 2009, p. 21379.
630. CC decision No. 2009-595 DC, Dec. 3, 2009, cons. 14. The Conseil upheld the
organic statute, subject to a few points of interpretation.
631. CC decision No. 2010-605 DC, May 12, 2010. (As the notation DC indicates,
this was an abstract review of a statute not yet promulgated; it was not a concrete review
of a question arising from the application of a statute in litigation (QPC)). The decision
also took the occasion to provide initial guidance concerning the procedure to be fol-
lowed when a litigant raises both a QPC and a challenge based on EU law. See supra
note 628.
632. CC decision No. 2010-605 DC, May 12, 2010, cons. 11, 16; see also CC decision
No. 2010-4/17 QPC,July 22, 2010, cons. 11 (holding that violation of a treaty cannot be
raised in a QPC proceeding). It is also quite clear from the legislative history of Article
61-1 that the drafters did not intend to involve the Conseil constitutionnel in reviewing
compliance with treaties. See Balladur Committee Report, supra note 620, at 88-89;
ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, RAPPORT NO. 892, 13th Legislature, at 441-42 (2008); StNAT, RAP-
PORT NO. 387, 13th Legislature, at 177 (2008).
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bon.633 Article 88-1 does entail a constitutional mandate to implement
directives, and the Conseil reaffirmed its prior statements concerning its
scope of review of statutes implementing directives: the Conseil would
examine whether a statutory provision was manifestly incompatible with a
directive that it was intended to transpose, and the Conseil would examine
whether the transposition of a directive violated a rule or principle inherent
to the constitutional identity of France. 634 The mandate to implement
directives, however, was not a "right [or] freedom guaranteed by the Consti-
tution" that could give rise to a priority question of constitutionality. 635
Two days later, the Conseil d'Etat published a filtering decision stating
its position on an important interpretive question concerning Article 61-1
and the organic statute. By authorizing litigants to challenge a "statutory
provision" (disposition legislative) that infringes a constitutional right, did
the reform open up challenges to treaties in force, either directly or by
means of challenges to the statute that had authorized the ratification of
the treaty?636 As the rapporteur public explained, absolutely not. A treaty
was not a statute and could not be directly challenged.637 To invalidate the
treaty would violate the principle of pacta sunt servanda. The Conseil con-
stitutionnel had always limited itself to reviewing treaties before their ratifi-
cation and would not review the constitutionality of provisions that merely
repeated the content of prior treaties. 638 The authorizing statute could in
theory be referred, but referral would be inappropriate because the statute
was not itself applicable to the case and did not itself violate any constitu-
tional right. The Conseil d'Etat followed the recommendation of the rap-
633. CC decision No. 2010-605 DC, May 12, 2010, cons. 16. The Conseil thus distin-
guished its earlier decision concerning Article 88-3, discussed supra in text accompany-
ing notes 554-555.
634. Id. cons. 18. The Conseil has since had occasion to apply this rule in a QPC case,
declining to review the constitutionality of a statute transposing the EU directive on
qualifications for refugee status and subsidiary protection. CC decision No. 2010-
79 QPC, Dec. 17, 2010.
635. CC decision No. 2010-605 DC, May 12, 2010, cons. 19.
636. Remarkably little was written on the subject while the constitutional amendment
and the organic statute were under consideration. The question was posed in Pascal
Mbongo, Droit au juge et pregminence du droit: Breviare processualiste de I'exception
d'inconstitutionnalitt, 2008 RECUEIL DALLOz 2089, 2091-92. A handbook published
shortly before the QPC procedure took effect asserted categorically that such statutes
cannot be referred. See Jr6me Roux, Contre quels textes soulever la question prioritaire
de constitutionnalite?, in LA QUESTION PRIORITAIRE DE CONSTITUTIONNALITE 28, 36 (Domi-
nique Rousseau ed., 2010).
637. CE, May 14, 2010, 26 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 709 (2010) (con-
clusions of Burguburu, rapporteur public) (Rujovic). A year later, the Cour de cassation
similarly held that the QPC procedure does not permit litigants to challenge a treaty by
challenging the constitutionality of a statute authorizing its ratification. Cass. crim.,
May 17, 2011, No. 10-82938 (Commune de Mesquer), available at http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichJurijudi.do?oldAction-rechjurijudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000024567461&
fastReqld=440154515&fastPos=1; see Jean-Baptiste Perrier, Le non-renvoi des questions
prioritaires de constitutionnalite par la Cour de cassation, 27 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 910, 911-12 (2011).
638. See CE, May 14, 2010, 26 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 709, 710
(2010) (conclusions of Burguburu, rapporteur public) (Rujovic).
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porteur public and avoided referral on that basis. 6 39  On that
interpretation, respect for treaties in force keeps them beyond the reach of
the Conseil constitutionnel, just as before 2008, even if they violate the
Constitution.
639. See id. at 712.

